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Security is considered the most important requirement for the success of electronic 
commerce, which is built based on the security of hash functions, encryption 
algorithms and pseudorandom number generators. Chaotic systems and security 
algorithms have similar properties including sensitivity to any change or changes in 
the initial parameters, unpredictability, deterministic nature and random-like 
behaviour. Several security algorithms based on chaotic systems have been proposed; 
unfortunately some of them were found to be insecure and/or slow.  
In view of this, designing new secure and fast security algorithms based on chaotic 
systems which guarantee integrity, authentication and confidentiality is essential for 
electronic commerce development. In this thesis, we comprehensively explore the 
analysis and design of security primitives based on chaotic systems for electronic 
commerce: hash functions, encryption algorithms and pseudorandom number 
generators. Novel hash functions, encryption algorithms and pseudorandom number 
generators based on chaotic systems for electronic commerce are proposed. The 
securities of the proposed algorithms are analyzed based on some well-know 
statistical tests in this filed. In addition, a new one-dimensional triangle-chaotic map 
(TCM) with perfect chaotic behaviour is presented. 
We have compared the proposed chaos-based hash functions, block cipher and 
pseudorandom number generator with well-know algorithms. The comparison results 
show that the proposed algorithms are better than some other existing algorithms. 
Several analyses and computer simulations are performed on the proposed 
algorithms to verify their characteristics, confirming that these proposed algorithms 
satisfy the characteristics and conditions of security algorithms. The proposed 
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hanks to recent advanced developments in communications and computer 
technologies, the Internet has become widespread and is used for the 
purpose of supporting client and server services. The Internet has enabled 
collaboration and supporting interactivities between individuals, government 
agencies, academic institutions and businesses of all sizes [1]. People have become 
dependent on the Internet for personal and professional usages. Many people perform 
their shopping, payments, money transfers, and many other electronic commerce 
activities over the Internet. With the increased usage of and dependence on the 
Internet, information security and privacy have become major problems, and 
researchers have been motivated to solve these problems to protect Internet users [2-
5].  
Electronic commerce services have grown rapidly to become a core element of the 
Internet and web environment, resulting in the development of new strategies and 
new eCommerce applications [2, 3]. Many people still prefer to engage in physical 
commerce instead of electronic commerce due to the electronic commerce security 
problems, which lead to customers’ lack of trust in electronic commerce. Electronic 
commerce transactions’ security is considered one of the crucial factors in ensuring 
the success of electronic commerce [4]. Therefore, it is very necessary to have 






organizations, and other organizations that communicate with each other [6].  
Nowadays, cryptography plays a significant role in protecting systems and personal 
and secret information such as payment systems and credit card information [7]. 
1.2 Cryptography and Cryptanalysis 
Cryptography is the art and science of encrypting and decrypting data to be 
protected while it is stored or transferred over insecure networks; this can be 
achieved by designing cryptographic techniques. On the other hand, cryptanalysis is 
the art and science of studying and analyzing cryptographic techniques to break them 
[7-11]. It is very clear that there are strong relations between cryptography and 
cryptanalysis. Cryptography has a very long history dating back over 4000 years 
[10]. In 1976, cryptography underwent a remarkable development after Diffie and 
Hellman published a paper entitled "new directions in cryptography" in which they 
introduced the public key concept and provided different methods of key exchange 
[12]. In general, cryptography algorithms are used mainly for encrypting and/or 
signing data. Cryptography algorithms are categorised into three main categories: 
symmetric cryptosystem, asymmetric cryptosystem, and cryptography hash function. 
A cryptosystem is a cryptographic algorithm that depends on certain parameters 
called keys [13]. A symmetric cryptosystem uses one key to encrypt and decrypt 
messages. On the other hand, an asymmetric cryptosystem uses two keys, a public 
key and a private key, to encrypt/decrypt an input message. A symmetric key 
primitive can be further divided into two main categories: block cipher and stream 
cipher. In addition, a cryptographic hash function can be further divided into two 
main categories: keyed hash function and unkeyed hash function. 
A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic procedure that processes variable-
length input messages and produces fixed-length hash values. Hash values are used 
in many different applications such as verifying message integrity, message identity, 
message authentication code, key derivation, password derivation, password 
verification, and pseudorandom number generator. A block cipher is a symmetric key 
encryption method that encrypts/decrypts one group of data at the same time and 





secret key. A block cipher can be used to construct other cryptography primitives 
such as stream cipher using OFB and CTR modes, hash function, message 
authentication code, and secure pseudorandom number generator. A cryptographic 
pseudorandom number generator is a deterministic procedure generating a random 
statistical independent sequence of bits using a mathematical formula that is used to 
provide high security for many cryptographic applications such as key generation, 
one-time pads, prime numbers in RSA, digital signature, Nonces (numbers used 
once), and Salts. In general, cryptography algorithms are considered computationally 
secure if they cannot be attacked using different types of analysis and available 
resources. 
There are three basic cryptanalysis (attack) techniques in cryptology: known 
plaintext attack, chosen plaintext attack, and ciphertext only attack [6-10, 14]. Under 
known plaintext attack (KPA), the attacker has pairs of plaintext and ciphertext, 
which can be used to deduce the used secret key or the original text. Under chosen 
plaintext attack (CPA), the attacker is assumed to have the ability to encrypt random 
plaintext using encryption algorithm to obtain its corresponding ciphertext or decrypt 
random ciphertext to obtain its corresponding plaintext. In the case of ciphertext only 
attack (COA), the attacker has access to a set of ciphertext only and tries to find 
corresponding plaintext of full or partial ciphertext or figure out the used key to 
reduce encryption scheme security. Moreover, another type of attack (brute-force 
attack) is to try all possible keys until one finds the right key that converts the 
ciphertext to intelligible plaintext. 
1.3 Cryptography and Electronic Commerce 
Over the last few years, electronic commerce has become very popular and 
has grown very rapidly [15]. Furthermore, different types of electronic commerce 
services have been developed, such as e-banking, e-shopping, e-bills, and e-
payments. Most electronic payment systems utilize cryptography algorithms in 
several ways to guarantee the security and confidentiality of secure information [15-
21]. Some of the most popular electronic payment systems are credit cards, e-cash 





insecure and un-trusted networks over which the trading parties have no control. 
Likewise, merchants’ websites are liable to remote attack via the Internet by 
numerous attackers worldwide. In cryptography algorithms, a message digest is used 
to provide data integrity, digital signature is used to provide authentication, secret 
key is used for privacy, and public key is used for privacy and authentication. 
Therefore, cryptography can provide the capability of hiding electronic transactions, 
detecting message changes, and confirming the source of electronic transactions.  
A strong and fast encryption algorithm for eCommerce transactions is considered an 
essential requirement. There are two types of cryptography encryption algorithms: 
symmetric and asymmetric key encryption algorithms. Symmetric key encryption is 
considered faster than asymmetric key encryption. Therefore, in eCommerce a 
combination of public key and symmetric key technologies is used to provide fast 
and confidential eCommerce transactions, where  public key is considered 
confidential and slow but symmetric key is considered a fast and simple algorithm 
[22]. In addition, hash function and digital signature are used to detect message 
modifications, to guarantee message source, and to prevent message denial [16, 22, 
23]. In electronic commerce systems,  customers and merchants have many concerns 
that can be solved using cryptography algorithms and certificates methods [6]. The 
integrity of e-payments is achieved by using hash function and encryption algorithm 
within SSL and SET technologies [24]. An effective digital signature can be proved 
by a combination of hash function and public key encryption algorithm. Therefore, 
we need to utilize cryptography algorithms to offer high-security services to 
encourage customers to use eCommerce. We will explain the basic principles of 
cryptography in electronic commerce by taking an online bank account as an 
example. 
1- Authentication is to allow the account owner only to login to the online bank 
account. 
2- Authorization is to allow the account owner only to manipulate the account 
information and perform certain operations. 
3- Encryption is to hide all account information and transactions from spying.  





5- Confidentiality is to allow authorized people only to read protected data. 
6- Integrity is to ensure that the sent information is received as it was sent. 
7- Availability is to ensure that the authorized people are able to access the data 
resources.  
1.4 Chaotic Cryptography 
Over the last few years, many researchers have studied chaos theory in 
several fields, such as electronic systems, fluid dynamics, lasers, weather, climate 
and cryptography [25-29].  Chaos theory has attracted the cryptography field due to 
its characteristics, such as its deterministic nature, unpredictability, random-look 
nature and its sensitivity to initial value [30]. Cryptographers have utilized dynamic 
chaotic systems to develop new cryptographic primitives by exploiting chaotic maps, 
such as logistic maps, Henon maps, and Tent maps.  
There are similarities and differences between cryptography algorithms and chaotic 
maps [31]. The parameters in chaotic maps are meaningful, mostly if they on real 
numbers, which can be used in the cryptographic algorithms as encryption and 
decryption keys. Chaotic systems are sensitive to any change or changes in the initial 
condition(s) and are unpredictable in the long term, thus representing the diffusion in 
cryptographic encryption algorithms. Iterations of a chaotic map lead to the 
spreading of the initial region over the entire phase space, and this can be achieved in 
cryptographic algorithms by designing the algorithm based on rounds. The main 
difference between chaotic systems and cryptographic algorithms is that encryption 
transformations are defined on finite sets, whereas most of chaotic systems have 
meaning on real numbers [31]. There are few chaotic maps are defined on complex 
numbers such as complex squaring map, which to the best of my knowledge they 
have not been exploited in chaotic cryptography. 
Since 1990, many studies on digital chaotic cryptography have been proposed to 
provide secure communications based on chaotic maps include chaotic block ciphers 
[13, 32-68], chaotic cryptography hash functions [30, 63, 69-89], and chaotic 
pseudorandom number generators [34, 62, 68, 90-117]. In general, chaos theory has 





various studies have been conducted on chaotic cryptographic algorithms [118-155]. 
Some of the proposed chaotic cryptographic algorithms that have been analyzed have 
had weak internal designs and incorrect exploitation of chaotic maps. In this 
research, we will focus on studying and analysing chaotic cryptography hash 
function, chaotic block cipher encryption, chaotic maps, and chaotic cryptographic 
secure pseudorandom number generators.  
1.5 Original Key Contributions of this Thesis 
Recently, collisions of well-known hash functions such as PIREMD, MD4,  
MD5 and SHA-1 have occurred [156-158]. Moreover, security of full or reduce 
version of some block cipher algorithms are analyzed such as DES, RC6, RC5, 
IDEA and AES [14, 159-164]. SHA-1 is one of the most widely used hash functions 
employed in numerous security applications and protocols. Since SHA-1 was 
attacked in 2005, many researchers have been working on designing new alternative 
secure hash functions [165]. Designing a secure hash function based on chaos theory 
has attracted the interest of researchers due to its characteristics that are analogous to 
hash function requirements [30, 70, 76, 81, 87, 88]. In 2008, we designed a new hash 
function using a logistic map CHA-1 [30]. CHA-1 is a secure chaotic hash function, 
but it is at least three times slower than SHA-1. In this thesis, research on chaotic 
cryptography was initially motivated by our interest in designing a fast and secure 
hash function for electronic commerce applications. Later on, we realized that other 
secure chaotic cryptographic systems are needed for electronic commerce and other 
applications.  
This thesis involves the following aspects of analysis and design of chaotic 
cryptographic algorithms for electronic commerce: cryptographic hash functions, 
block cipher, pseudorandom number generators and chaotic maps. The original key 
contributions of this thesis are listed as follows: 
1- During our review of the chaotic hash function literature, we reviewed one of 
the proposed hash function algorithms based on a chaotic system that was 
called CBHF. We realized that the proposed hash function has a simple and 





and analyzed its security. In this research, we show in strong sense how to 
break keyed and unkeyed versions of CBHF theoretically and we give real 
collision examples.  
2- After we analyzed the security of the CBHF hash function, we designed new 
parallel hash function based on chaotic maps for electronic commerce 
applications. Several analyses and computer simulations are performed to 
show the security and performance of our proposed hash function. Moreover, 
the proposed hash function is compared with other proposed hash function 
algorithms. Overall comparison results shows that the proposed hash function 
algorithm outperforms other algorithms.   
3- In recent years, several chaotic block cipher encryption algorithms have been 
proposed. Some of the proposed algorithms have been proved to be insecure 
and/or having slow encryption speed. This motivated us to design and 
implement a new block cipher encryption algorithm by utilizing chaotic maps 
for electronic commerce applications. The security and performance of the 
proposed algorithm is analyzed using well-known computer simulations and 
theoretical analysis in this field. Both experimental results and computer 
simulations confirm that the proposed chaotic block cipher encryption 
algorithm satisfies the cryptographic properties. 
4- The main function of the proposed block cipher encryption algorithm shows 
very high sensitivity to the input message and/or secret key. Characteristics of 
our proposed block cipher encryption function include the possibility of 
adapting its design to build and design a secure hash function. Therefore, our 
proposed chaotic block cipher encryption function is modified to design and 
build a new fast and secure chaotic hash function. We performed some 
statistical analysis that confirmed this hash function satisfies the 
cryptographic hash function properties. The proposed hash function algorithm 
has been compared with other cryptographic hash functions. These 
characteristics confirm that this hash function is high-potential to be adopted 





5- Most of the well-known chaotic maps show chaotic behaviour over small 
regions with certain parameter values. Moreover, within the chaotic areas 
there are some regions of n-periodic window with small values of n (2, 3, 
6…), which can be exploited by attackers to help them attack the 
cryptographic systems that fall in these regions. Therefore, we designed a 
new triangle-chaotic map with full chaotic population and a very large value 
of periodic window. Triangle-chaotic map analysis shows its great sensitivity 
to initial conditions, unpredictability and intensive chaotic population. These 
properties confirm that the proposed triangle-chaotic map can be adopted for 
many applications in many disciplines such as computer science, engineering, 
mathematics, physics and economics. 
6- A cryptographic secure pseudorandom number generator is used to provide 
high security for several cryptographic applications such as key generation 
and digital signature. In this research, a new cryptographic secure 
pseudorandom number generator based on the proposed triangle-chaotic map 
is put forward. The proposed generator was tested using the well-known 
NIST 800-22 suite test, which is designed to test cryptographic random and 
pseudorandom number generators, and compared with two other generators 
based on logistic map and modified version of logistic map, respectively. The 
tests and comparison results showed randomness of proposed generator 
output and non-randomness of the other two logistic generators’ outputs. 
Therefore, the proposed generator is a high-potential candidate for high-
security applications such as e-payments and online banking systems. 
Moreover, we proved experimentally that one of the proposed pseudorandom 
number generators based on logistic map is not secure at all.  
1.6 Organization of this Thesis 
Here is a brief chapter summary of this thesis. 
 Chapter 2: gives an introduction to electronic commerce, electronic 
commerce security protocols and cryptography primitives. This chapter is 





cryptographic hash functions, block cipher algorithms and random number 
generators. Hash function principles, properties and applications are given. 
Moreover, block cipher principles, evaluation, modes of operation and 
multiple modes encryption are discussed. In addition, different cryptanalysis 
techniques are presented. 
 Chapter 3: introduces chaos theory, explains some of the chaotic maps and 
their characteristics, and focuses on analysis and design of a logistic map in 
detail. In addition, this chapter presents a comprehensive survey of chaotic 
cryptography. All of the proposed chaotic cryptographic algorithms are 
classified into categories. Several proposed chaotic cryptographic algorithms 
are studied in detail.  
 Chapter 4: focuses on one of the proposed hash function algorithms based on 
chaotic maps, called CBHF. The security of keyed and unkeyed versions of 
the CBHF hash function is analyzed. Theoretical and practical analysis of the 
CBHF hash function algorithm is presented in detail. Examples of real 
collisions are given. 
 Chapter 5: describes in detail the design and analysis of a novel developed 
parallel chaotic hash function. Comparisons between the proposed hash 
function and other proposed hash functions are presented.  Several analyses 
and computer simulations of the proposed hash function are performed.  
 Chapter 6: depicts details of our new proposed image/text block cipher 
encryption algorithm based on chaotic maps. Analysis of other proposed 
chaotic block cipher encryption algorithms is discussed. A comparison 
between the proposed algorithm and other block cipher algorithms is given.   
Experimental analysis results on security and performance of the proposed 
algorithm are presented in detail.   
 Chapter 7: describes the details of design and analysis of a fast and secure 
hash function based on a modified version of our proposed block cipher 





proposed hash function are depicted. A comparison between the proposed 
hash function and other hash functions is given in this chapter. 
 Chapter 8: demonstrates the limitations of some existing chaotic maps, such 
as small size of periodic and partial chaotic population. In this chapter, the 
design and analysis of a new proposed triangle-chaotic map with full chaotic 
population is explained in detail. Several test and simulation results on the 
proposed chaotic map are given. Moreover, we propose novel cryptographic 
pseudorandom number generator based on a triangle-chaotic map. It is called 
PRGBT in this thesis. The proposed generator and two other pseudorandom 
number generators based on a logistic map and a modified version of a 
logistic map are tested and analyzed using NIST 800-22 test suite. Each 
performance of the NIST 800-22 test is briefly explained and the results of 
NIST statistical test suite for each generator are given. 
 Chapter 9: gives a quick summary and conclusion of this research, followed 
by a list of open problems and future research issues. 
 






2.  Basic Concepts 
We dedicate this chapter to explaining the fundamental concepts of cryptography 
primitives. We start by discussing principles of security, electronic commerce, 
electronic commerce security protocols, cryptographic terms and cryptographic 
primitives. Furthermore, we discuss in detail block ciphers, cryptographic hash 
functions and random number generators. We briefly explain three well-known block 
cipher algorithms (DES, IDEA, and AES) and two well-known hash function 
algorithms (MD5, SHA-1). Finally, confusion and diffusion properties and 
cryptanalytic techniques are presented.  
2.1 Principles of Security 
t is very important to understand the principles of security in order to start 
thinking about the various methods of solving the security problems that occur 
in security systems such as attacks. Therefore, we will simplify the principles of 
security by taking a simple example from a real-life scenario. So, let us assume that a 
person A (Alice) lives in London and she wants to send a cheque worth £20,000 by 
post to another person B (Bob) who lives in Durham. What would Alice and Bob do 
in such a case [1]? Normally, Alice (Sender) would write the cheque (£20,000), put it 
inside an envelope and then send it by post to Bob (Receiver). The following security 






A. Alice would like to ensure that only Bob will be able to access the envelope, 
so Alice will try to protect the cheque from unauthorized parties, preventing 
them reading or disclosing information. This is the principle of 
confidentiality.  
B. Bob would like to be sure that the cheque has really come from Alice and that 
it is not a falsified cheque sent by someone else claiming to be Alice. The 
receiver should know that “YOU ARE WHO YOU ARE”. This is the 
principle of authentication. 
C. Alice and Bob would like to make sure that no one can forge the contents of 
the cheque (such as its amount, date, signature, name of the payee, etc.). Bob 
should receive the cheque “AS IT IS”. This is the principle of integrity. 
From the previous example we note the following as major security issues that could 
occur in electronic commerce systems [3, 6, 7]: 
 Confidentiality (Privacy): ensuring that the transmitted data are accessible 
only by authorized parties for reading. This is maintained by the use of the 
secret key, so the information will make sense only to those who have the 
secret key. 
 Authentication: ensuring that the origin of the received message is the 
genuine sender, not an attacker. Thus, the communication is authentic and the 
received message is from the source whose identity is not in doubt.  
 Integrity: ensuring that only the authorized parties are able to perform any 
modification (duplication, insertion, deletion and/or reordering) of the 
message - “message received as sent”. Thus, the integrity ensures that no-one 
can change the message content without its detection by the sender or the 
receiver, as each different message has a different fingerprint encrypted by 





2.2 Electronic Commerce 
Electronic commerce (ecommerce or e-commerce) is defined as the process of 
buying, selling or exchanging products or services over the Internet [3].  Over the 
last few years, e-commerce has become very popular; it is growing rapidly, 
improving business efficiency and reducing business process costs [15]. Nowadays, 
e-commerce is a main channel for sales and services. Furthermore, various types of 
e-commerce services have been developed such as e-banking, e-shopping, e-bills and 
e-payments. E-commerce payment is defined as transferring an amount of money 
from payer account to payee account over the Internet. Online merchants can use 
various types of online payment systems such as e-cash, e-check, and digital wallet 
[22]. Moreover, another type of third-party online payment system is also available 
to complete consumers’ online transactions.  
E-commerce has to confront many problems and challenges. Providing high security 
for e-commerce systems is considered a major challenge to e-commerce success, and 
running e-commerce over an insecure network is considered a major problem in e-
commerce. Insufficient security in e-commerce systems leads to the leakage of 
secure and personal information. Many e-commerce consumers are worried about 
using online payment systems due to the increase in online fraud and risks [24]. 
Thus, security of electronic payment systems is considered one of the most important 
barriers to e-commerce development [17, 22, 166]. Consequently, providing high 
security for electronic payment transactions will make e-commerce successful. The 
existing security technologies have failed to meet customers’ needs; thus adapted 
security technologies need to be developed [16]. Providing high security for 
electronic commerce applications can be achieved using cryptography algorithms 
such as hash function and encryption algorithms. In e-commerce systems, customers 
and merchants have many concerns that can be solved using cryptography algorithms 
and certificates methods [6]. In general, customers need to ensure the following: 
1. They are communicating with the intended merchant. 
2. Only the merchant can read the sent message. 
3. The message is received as it was sent. 





5. Guaranteed delivery of what they ordered. 
On the other side, merchants need to ensure the following: 
1. They are communicating with the intended customer. 
2. Only the intended customer can send messages. 
3. Identity of the customer is unmistakable. 
4. Content of received message is correct. 
5. They send acknowledgement of the received message. 
2.3 Electronic Commerce Security Protocols 
In e-commerce, various different security protocols are used, such as payment 
secure protocol and web secure protocol [16, 20, 22]. We will give brief details of 
the three most popular security protocols in e-commerce. 
1. SSL 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL), and its successor Transport Layer Security (TLS), is 
used to protect communication between running clients and servers [19]. It encrypts 
the outgoing data from sender to receiver and decrypts the incoming data on the 
receiver side. In general, SSL protocol helps the average user to handle various 
security issues such as encryption, digital signature and digital certificates by web 
browsers and web servers [20]. This protocol  uses the public key technique to 
exchange a secret key that is used in encryption transaction to provide an efficient 
encryption algorithm [22]. Clients use SSL server authentication to prove server 
identity. One-way hash function is used in this protocol to detect message 
modifications and to protect the shared secret key.  
2. SET 
Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) was designed to provide security for electronic 
payment transactions and authentication of the parties involved in the transactions 
[22]. SET was developed by Visa and MasterCard with the collaboration of other 
software companies such as Microsoft and VeriSign [20]. Cryptographic algorithms 





provide the trust required by consumers and ensure the security and confidentiality of 
information. The sent message is encrypted using a randomly generated secret key 
that is encrypted using receiver public key. The receiver decrypts the encrypted 
secret key using his/her private key and then decrypts the encrypted message using a 
decrypted secret key. Some of the proposed protocols for electronic payment systems 
are based on security of cryptographic mechanisms [17].  One-way hash function is 
used in SET protocol to detect message modifications.  
3. HTTPS 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) is designed to add security and support 
at application level and various security mechanisms [19]. HTTPS protocol is a 
combination of HTTP and SSL/TLS protocols used to encrypt the transactions and 
provide security for web server and web browser. This protocol is mainly used to 
provide a secure transmission channel over an insecure network [22]. HTTPS 
connection is normally used with sensitive information transmission, such as 
payment transactions. In general, with https several protection mechanisms are used 
between client and host, such as message encryption, digital signature and digital 
certificate. 
2.4 Cryptographic Terms 
Cryptology is the mathematical science that studies cryptography and 
cryptanalysis sciences [7]. Cryptography is the art and science of encrypting and 
decrypting data to protect them while they are stored or transferred over insecure 
networks; this can be achieved by designing cryptographic techniques. On the other 
hand, cryptanalysis is the art and science of studying and analyzing cryptographic 
techniques to break them [8-11]. Cryptographers are  people working to develop new 
cryptography algorithms to provide security services, while Cryptanalysts are people 
working to develop and find methodologies to break the cryptographic techniques [7, 
167].  
The original goal of cryptography is to protect data from unauthorized people by 





protect data from eavesdroppers and hackers [11]. In cryptographic terms [6, 11], the 
plaintext is the original text which can be read and understood by humans and the 
ciphertext is the original message after the encryption process; the ciphertext is 
apparently random and ambiguous to humans. The basic idea of encryption is to 
scramble the secret information in such a way that it cannot be understood by 
unauthorised people [13]. Encryption is the process of encoding data in such a way 
that hides them from any outsider; it is a simple transfer of plaintext to ciphertext 
while decryption is the reverse process of encryption, transferring ciphertext to  
plaintext [6, 7].  
2.5 Cryptography Main Areas 
 In recent years, cryptography has been employed to deal with some important 
security issues, such as confidentiality, authentication, message integrity and non-
repudiation [6]. According to Menezes et al. (1997), cryptography can be divided 
into three areas of study: symmetric primitive, asymmetric primitive and unkeyed 
primitive. Symmetric cryptosystems use one key to encrypt and decrypt messages. 
On the other hand, asymmetric cryptosystems use two keys; the first key is called the 
public key and is used to encrypt a message, while the second key is called the 
private key and is used to decrypt the scrambled message into its original state. The 
cryptographic hash functions can be divided into keyed hash functions, as part of 
symmetric primitive, and un-keyed hash functions, as part of unkeyed primitive. 
Hash functions is a part of the unkeyed primitive that is mainly a mechanism to 
calculate hash value from a given message for cryptography applications, such as 
message integrity [7]. In the following subsections we will illustrate asymmetric, 
symmetric and hash function primitives in more detail. 
2.5.1 Asymmetric Key Primitives 
 Asymmetric encryption, also called two-key encryption or public key 
encryption, uses two keys: the first key is called public key and the second key is 
called private key. Typically, the public key is used to encrypt a message and the 
private key is used to decrypt the encrypted message into its original state; the two 





it will be decrypted by the public key, which is used to verify the sender signature by 
decrypting the message successfully using his/her public key. In general, the sender 
produces the ciphertext from the plaintext based on an encryption algorithm and 
public key and then sends the ciphertext to the receiver. On the receiver side, the 
receiver produces the plaintext from the ciphertext based on the decryption algorithm 
and his/her private key [6, 7]. If the decrypted message is understood, the receiver 
will assume that the received message has been encrypted by the sender’s public key; 
otherwise, the receiver will decline the received message (see Figure 2-1) [8, 11]. 
The simple encryption and decryption equations are as follows: 
CME
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         ( 2-2) 
where E is the encryption function, D is the decryption function, M is the plaintext, C 
is the ciphertext, KR is the private Key, and KU is public Key. 
 
Figure  2-1: Encryption and decryption processes using asymmetric key primitives 
In asymmetric key primitives, each party in the network should generate a pair of 
keys, the private key and the corresponding public key, to communicate with others; 
each party publishes his/her public key in the public register and keeps the private 
key secret and hidden from any other party [6-8]. Therefore, the security of 





keys. Examples of asymmetric encryption algorithms are RSA, Elgamal public key, 
and Rabin’s public key [168-170].  
2.5.2 Symmetric Key Primitive 
Symmetric encryption, also called single-key encryption or conventional 
encryption, uses the same secret key to encrypt and decrypt the information (see 
Figure 2-2) [6]. Typically, the sender produces the ciphertext from the plaintext 
based on encryption algorithm and secret key; the receiver produces the plaintext 
from the ciphertext based on the decryption algorithm and the secret key [6, 7]. 
Therefore, the sender and the receiver should use the same encryption and decryption 
algorithm and share the same secret key before they start the communication. The 
security of symmetric key encryption is based on the algorithm itself and the shared 
secret key [7]. The main drawback of this primitive concerns how to agree on the 
shared secret key. Some well-known symmetric encryption algorithms are DES, 
IDEA, AES, and Blowfish [171-174]. The simple encryption and decryption 
equations are as follows: 
CMEk )(           ( 2-3) 
MCDK )(          ( 2-4) 
where E is the encryption function, D is the decryption function, M is the plaintext, C 
is the ciphertext, and K is the secret key. 
 





After the sender and the receiver agree on the secret key, the sender will prepare the 
message that he/she is willing to send and process it as an input to the encryption 
algorithm with the secret key to generate the ciphertext; then the ciphertext will be 
sent to the receiver side  [7, 8]. On the receiver side, the receiver will process the 
ciphertext as input to the decryption algorithm with the secret key to generate the 
plaintext. If the decrypted message is understood by the receiver, the receiver will 
assume the received message is from the intended sender. Otherwise, the receiver 
will decline the received message, as shown in Figure 2-2 [11]. The symmetric key 
encryption can be further divided into block cipher and stream cipher.  
Stream cipher is one of the encryption methods based on the secret key which 
encrypts a stream of data, such as one bit or one byte at a time [13]. It encrypts 
individual characters at the same time, while a block cipher encrypts groups of 
characters simultaneously. Ordinarily, block cipher is used to encrypt large blocks 
(e.g. n ≥ 64), while stream cipher is used to encrypt small units [175]. Stream cipher 
is compulsory for certain applications that use small buffers and/or require no error 
propagations. In general, stream cipher generates pseudorandom bit sequences that 
can be XORed with plaintext to produce the correspondence ciphertext; the same 
sequence can be XORed with ciphertext to produce the corresponding plaintext. 
Stream cipher is much simpler than block cipher and faster in hardware 
implementation. A block cipher is an encryption method based on the secret key 
which encrypts one block (ex. 64-bit) of data at the same time; a block cipher 
processes blocks of n-bit (group of bits) plaintext to produce n-bit of ciphertext [6]. 
Thus, the block cipher encryption process should be reversible in order to decrypt the 
encrypted data. 
2.5.3 Cryptography Hash Function 
Cryptography hash function is mainly a mechanism to produce a hash value 
of a given message for cryptography applications such as message integrity, 
authentication, and other security services [6]. Hash function accepts variable input 
message lengths and produces fixed-length output as hash value, which is also called 
hash code or message digest [7, 8]. The hash value depends on all bits in the input 





hash value. The cryptographic hash functions can be divided into two main parts: 
hash functions depending on secret key are called keyed hash functions, and hash 
functions not depending on secret key are called un-keyed hash functions [8, 11]. 
The general idea of hash function is to use an iteration procedure that processes 
whole messages to produce hash value (see Figure 2-3).  
 
Figure  2-3: General model for an iterated hash function 
Having explained the fundamental principles and concepts of cryptography, in the 
following sections we will focus on and explain in detail block cipher, cryptography 
hash function, and random number generators. 
2.6 Block Cipher   
Block cipher is an encryption method that divides input plaintext into blocks 
of equal lengths and then encrypts one block of data simultaneously under the control 
of the secret key [6, 176]. In another words, block cipher is a transformation function 
that maps units of plaintext bits to ciphertext bits of the same unit size under the 
control of the secret key. The decryption method divides the input ciphertext into 
blocks of equal length and then applies the decryption function to each block using 
the same shared secret key [10]. In general, the decryption process is the reverse of 
the encryption process. The lengths of the plaintext block and the corresponding 
ciphertext block are equal. Different modes of operations are applied if the size of 





To evaluate block cipher security, we assume that the attacker can access all 
transmitted cipher and knows encryption algorithm details without knowing the 
shared secret key [10]. A block cipher is considered totally broken if the shared 
secret key is recovered, and it is considered partially broken if part of the plaintext is 
retrieved [177]. In a well-designed encryption algorithm, the plaintext and the 
ciphertext should be statistically independent to provide high security. The 
encryption algorithm aims to hide and complicate the relation between the ciphertext 
and the plaintext, and between the ciphertext and the secret key. Therefore, block 
cipher encryption algorithms should have very high confusion and diffusion 
properties [177]. The confusion is the process of hiding the relation between 
ciphertext and secret key, and the diffusion is the process of hiding the relation 
between plaintext and ciphertext [14].   
Symmetric key encryption primitive is considered one of the most important parts of 
many cryptographic systems. In many cryptographic systems, block ciphers are 
considered the most popular and important encryption technique [8]. Some well-
known block cipher encryption algorithms are DES, 3-DES, IDEA, FEAL, Blowfish, 
and AES [178]. The adaptability of block ciphers can be used to construct stream 
ciphers, MACs, hash function, and pseudorandom number generator [6]. Moreover, 
they can be used as core components in data integrity mechanisms, digital signature 
schemes and authentication protocols.  
1.6.1 Block Cipher Evaluation 
The following criteria are used to evaluate block ciphers [8, 10, 14]: 
1- Key size: longer key size is more secure than shorter key size, but this will add 
to the cost of creation, storage, and communication transmission.  
2- Block size: block size affects the security, complexity and performance levels. In 
general, longer block size will be more secure, but implementation cost will be 
higher. 
3- Algorithm complexity: a more complex algorithm adds to implementation cost 





4- Throughput: the algorithm complexity and the implementation flexibility directly 
affect the throughput. 
5- Security level: in general, the confidence level of security increases the longer 
the algorithm is studied by cryptanalysis without any successful attacks. 
6- Data expansion: the process of increase the size of encryption data by processing 
it through expansion function.  
7- Error propagation: the error bits may affect the decryption result of current and 
succeeding blocks of data. Some error propagation characteristics can be 
tolerated in some applications. 
2.6.1 Modes of Operation 
The simplest block cipher approach partitions the input message into equal 
fixed-length blocks and then encrypts/decrypts each block individually. The process 
of partitioning the input message into equal blocks and then encrypting each block 
separately is called the electronic codebook (ECB) mode of operation. There are 
several different modes of operation such as electronic codebook (ECB), cipher-
block chaining (CBC), cipher feedback (CFB), output feedback (OFB) and 
propagating cipher-block chaining (PCBC) [10, 179-181].  
A. Electronic Codebook (ECB) 
Electronic codebook is the most basic and simplest mode of operation that encrypts 
each block separately, without overlapping between blocks (see Figure 2-4) [182]. 
Thus, with a large input message size the patterns of input information/image will be 
shown [183]. Therefore, this mode of operation is not recommended for messages 
larger than block size. The main advantage of this mode is that the 
encryption/decryption function can be implemented in sequential mode only. ECB 
mode of operation has the following properties [10, 177, 179]:  
1- Identical pair of plaintext and shared secret key produces identical ciphertext. 
2- Each block is encrypted independently of other blocks. 
3- Single or multiple errors in an encrypted block affect the deciphered result of 






Figure  2-4: Electronic codebook (ECB) mode 
B. Cipher-block Chaining (CBC) 
In CBC mode, each plaintext block is XORed with a ciphertext block of a former 
block [182]. Thus, each block cipher depends on all previous blocks and every 
unique message has a unique corresponding ciphertext (see Figure 2-5). In this mode 
of operation, changing one bit or multiple bits in plaintext blocks will affect the 
results of the ciphertext of this block and the following blocks. Moreover, changing 
one bit in ciphertext affects the current block and the following block. This mode of 
operation is the most widely used. The main disadvantage of this mode is that the 
encryption function can be implemented in sequential mode only, but the decryption 
function can be implemented in parallel. CBC mode of operation has the following 
properties [10, 179]:  
1- Identical plaintext with pair of key and IV producing identical ciphertext. 
2-  Each block is encrypted depending on results of previous encrypted blocks. 
Therefore, rearranging the cipher blocks’ positions will affect the decryption 
result. 
3- Single error in encrypted block affects the following encrypted results and 










Figure  2-5: Cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode 
C. Cipher Feedback (CFB) 
Cipher feedback mode was designed to implement stream cipher by block cipher 
[184]. In this mode, the initialization vector (IV) and secret key are processed 
through encryption function to produce keystream bits that are XORed with plaintext 
blocks (see Figure 2-6) [182]. Decryption operations of cipher feedback mode are 
very similar to reverse encryption operations of CBC mode. The ciphertext of the 
previous block is used as input for the encryption algorithm of the current block. In 
this mode, the encryption can be implemented in sequential mode only, but the 
decryption can be implemented in parallel [175]. Changing one bit in a ciphertext 
block of CFB mode of operation will affect two blocks only. Moreover, the effect of 
changing one bit in plaintext will propagate to all the following ciphertext blocks.  
CFB mode of operation has the following properties [10, 179, 184]:  
1- Changing the value of IV to a different value using the same plaintext input 
results in enciphering the input plaintext to a different ciphertext. 
2- Changing one bit in plaintext will affect all the following ciphertext blocks. 
This means that the ciphertext depends on all the previous plaintext. 
3- Single error in ciphertext block affects the results of two blocks (current and 






Figure  2-6: Cipher feedback (CFB) mode 
D. Output Feedback (OFB) 
The output feedback (OFB) mode of operation is illustrated in Figure 2-7. In this 
mode, the initialization vector (IV) and the secret key are processed through the 
encryption function to produce keystream bits that are XORed with the plaintext 
blocks to obtain the ciphertext. The encryption and the decryption operations are 
exactly the same. In the encryption function the generated keystream is XORed with 
plaintext to obtain the ciphertext, and in the decryption function the keystream is 
XORed with the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext. The main difference between CFB 
and OFB modes is that, in OFB mode, the output of encryption function is used as 
feedback [182]. This mode is used in many applications that need to avoid error 
propagations. The main disadvantage of OFB mode is that it can be implemented in 
sequential mode only. OFB mode of operation has the following properties [10, 179]:  
1- Identical plaintext with pair of key and IV producing identical ciphertext. 
2-  The keystream is not affected by the plaintext, where the output of the 
previous keystream is the input of current keystream before being XORed 
with plaintext. 
3- Changing one bit or multiple bits in ciphertext affects only one plaintext 






Figure  2-7: Output feedback (OFB) mode 
E. Propagating Cipher-block Chaining (PCBC) 
In PCBC mode, the first plaintext block is XORed with the initialization vector and 
is then processed through the encryption function to obtain the corresponding 
ciphertext block [181]. In the second block, the plaintext and the ciphertext blocks 
are XORed together and the result is then XORed with plaintext of the current block 
(see Figure 2-8) [185]. In this mode of operation, changing one bit or multiple bits in 
plaintext blocks will affect the results of the ciphertext of this block and all the 
following blocks.  Moreover, changing one bit in ciphertext affects the current block 
and the following block. This mode was designed to infinitely propagate the effect of 
changing one bit or multiple bits in the encryption/decryption process. Therefore, 
encryption and decryption of this mode can be implemented in sequential mode only. 
PCBC mode of operation has the following properties [10, 179]:  
1- Identical plaintext with pair of key and IV producing identical ciphertext. 
2-  Each block is encrypted depending on plaintext and ciphertext of the 
previous block. Therefore, rearranging the cipher blocks’ positions will affect 
the encryption/decryption result. 
3- Single errors in encrypted/decryption block affect the following 






Figure  2-8: Propagating cipher-block chaining (PCBC) mode 
2.6.2 Encryption Using Multiple Modes of Operation 
Multiple modes of operation are constructed by combining more than one 
single mode of operation together. For example, concatenation of two single ECB 
modes provides double-ECB mode of operation, and concatenation of three single 
ECB modes provides triple-ECB mode (see equations 2-5 and 2-6). The double and 
triple modes of operation can be implemented in parallel mode to provide better 
encryption performance [179]. Using multiple modes of operation does not always 
provide higher security than single mode of operation. For instance, under some 
types of attacks multiple ECB modes are not stronger than a single mode of 
operation [10].  
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2.6.3 Block Cipher Encryption Algorithms 
In the following subsections, we will give brief details of three well-known 







A. Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
Data encryption standard is a block cipher algorithm based on the symmetric key 
principle that encrypts 64-bit amounts of plaintext and generates ciphertext of the 
same size using secret key of size 56-bit [171]. DES was developed by IBM and 
approved by the National Bureau of Standards [159]. It was designed based on 
product cipher and Feistel cipher. Product cipher performs various simple operations 
to build a complex encryption function. The internal function of block cipher is 
called a round function that is iterated a number of times sequentially. Feistel cipher 
is an iterated block cipher that maps n-bits of plaintext into n-bits of ciphertext by 
dividing the plaintext into two equal halves (Li, Ri) and then processing it through t-
round using several subkeys (K1, K2, ..., Kn) (see Figure 2-9) [10].  In encryption 
function, the plaintext is processed through 16 rounds and each round has a subkey 
of size 48-bit that is generated from the secret key of size 56-bit. The input plaintext 
is divided into two equal halves each of size 32-bit (Li, Ri) (see equations 8 and 9). 
The decryption process is performed using the same number of rounds with reverse 
order of the keys (Kn, Kn-1, ..., K1). 
 
Figure  2-9: Overall DES feistel structure 
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where E is the expansion permutation map Ri-1 from 32 to 48 bit and P is permutation 





The left and right halves (L15 and R15) in the last round change positions and the final 
output is the inverse permutation of the last round result. The decryption process 
applies the same function and rounds, but applies the subkey in reverse order (Kn, Kn-
1, ..., K1).  In secure block cipher algorithm, changing one bit in the plaintext or the 
key should change each bit in the ciphertext with a probability of 0.5, and changing 
one bit in the ciphertext should result in unpredictable changes in the plaintext [8]. 
Thus, secure block cipher encryption algorithms should have high confusion and 
diffusion properties (see section 2.10).   
Several analyses and attacks have been mounted on DES. The first demonstrated 
successful differential cryptanalysis on a reduced version of DES was described in 
1991 with eight rounds [159]. Later on, three other types of attacks on a reduced 
version of DES were proposed [14, 160, 161]. Moreover, there have been many 
proposals for designing DES-machine secret key attack to search all possible keys 
within a short period of time [186-188]. Therefore, an alternative encryption 
algorithm was needed by the end of the1990s. In 2001, the Rijndael block cipher 
algorithm (AES) was approved as the Federal Information Processing 
Standards (FIPS) symmetric key block cipher algorithm [173]. One of the other 
suggested alternatives was to apply DES encryption three times for each block 
(triple-DES), but this would make the encryption and decryption processes slow.   
B. International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) 
International data encryption is a block cipher algorithm that was developed as a 
new block cipher encryption algorithm to overcome DES problems [183, 189]. IDEA 
converts a plaintext block of 64-bit to a block of ciphertext of the same size using a 
secret key of size 128-bit (see Figure 2-10) [172]. It is designed based on the Feistel 
structure with eight identical rounds, each round using six subkeys of 16-bit size. The 
last round of output is an input of the transformation function. Transformation 
function uses 4 subkeys that are used to produce the final cipher. All subkeys are 
derived from the main secret key K. The main three mathematical operations are 
bitwise XOR, addition mod 2n, and multiplication mod 2n+1. The decryption 





decryption subkeys with a few changes. IDEA was designed to be immune to 
differential cryptanalysis under certain assumptions and other types of attacks [8]. 
Since 1991, it has no longer been recommended for many applications because of the 
availability of other, faster encryption algorithms.  
 
Figure  2-10: Overall IDEA structure 
C. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
In 1997, after DES was proved to be an insecure encryption algorithm, NIST 
announced the need to design a new alternative cipher encryption algorithm. Fifteen 
candidate algorithms were accepted and, later on, in October 2000, the Rijndael 
algorithm was selected [183]. The Rijndael algorithm is a block cipher algorithm 
based on symmetric key primitive. It has three versions, AES-128, AES-192 and 
AES-256, of 128-bit block size and key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 bits respectively. 
Since October 2000, it has been used globally in many applications and many  
cryptanalysis studies have focused on its security [8]. This algorithm was designed 
based on iterative rounds procedure and,  in each round, several operations are 
performed on the entire block of data [10]. It has a very simple design with high 
speed and resistance to known types of attacks. The reverse round operations are 
applied using the same encryption key to transfer the ciphertext into the plaintext.  
A high-level description of AES-128 encryption process is illustrated in Figure 2-11. 
The first step is to calculate the rounds’ subkeys from the shared secret key using the 





XORed with byte of state [14]. Subsequently, four transformation functions 
(SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKeys) are performed in each 
round.  The number of rounds depends on the AES version: AES-128 has 10 rounds, 
AES-192 has 12 rounds and AES-256 has 14 rounds [8]. In the SubBytes step each 
value of state array is updated using Rijndael S-box. The values of state array are 
updated in the ShiftRows step by shifting to the left each row value by different 
amounts based on the number of the row. In the MixColumns step, four vertical 
values of state array are multiplied by fixed polynomial. ShiftRows and MixColumns 
steps are intended to provide high diffusion to the ciphertext. The subkeys are mixed 
with the state array in the AddRoundKeys step. In the last round, all steps are 
performed except the MixColumns step; then the values of the state array are 
unloaded as ciphertext. In 1998, a reduced version of Rijndael was attacked with 6 
rounds [162]. Two years later, another attack with 7 rounds was described [163]. In 
2000, an improvement in the cryptanalysis of the Rijndael algorithm with 8-rounds 
of AES-198 and 9-rounds of AES-256 was described in detail [164].     
 
Figure  2-11: High-level description of AES-128 encryption process 
2.7 Hash Functions 
In modern cryptography, hash functions are playing a primary role due to 
their efficiency and performance [10]. A well-designed hash function with slight 
differences in the input messages will produce different hash values. Thus, any 
change or changes in the input message will produce different hash values. The 





person’s identity by verifying fingerprint, Id, name, height, weight, age, facial 
characteristics and so on [6, 7]. Like the human fingerprint, which is a unique and 
small piece of data which authenticates the human identity, the hash value is used to 
authenticate the whole message [7].  Cryptography hash functions are different from 
the conventional hash functions (henceforth, the cryptography hash function will 
simply be called the hash function). Hash functions are used to produce a fixed-
length code from any variable-length message; this is known as a hash value where a 
large domain is mapped onto a small range [8]. Hash value is known as message 
digest, hash code, digital fingerprint and cryptography checksum [7, 8, 11]. The 
cryptographic hash functions can be divided into keyed hash functions and un-keyed 
hash functions. 
Hash functions are one-way functions used to produce fixed-length hash values from 
variable-length messages, where it is very hard to find the original message from a 
given hash value [11]. One-way function is a function f from a set X to a set Y that is 
easy to calculate f(x) for all x X but it is computationally infeasible for all y in the 
range f to find any x X such that f(x)=y. There are two main types of one-way 
function: weak and strong one-way functions [8]. The weak one-way function is 
always easy to compute, but it is sometimes hard to find the inverse. On the other 
hand, it is always impossible or virtually impossible to find the inverse of a strong 
one-way function. One-way functions play significant roles in cryptography where 
they are fundamental to most cryptography algorithms, such as public key and hash 
function [7-10]. In cryptography, hash functions are one-way functions; thus we are 
unable to derive the original message for a given hash value [8].  
2.7.1 Un-keyed Hash Function 
  As we mentioned before, there are two types of cryptography encryption: 
public key encryption and secret key encryption. The public key encryption can be 
up to 1,000 times slower than the secret key encryption and that is not ideal for e-
commerce applications [7]. On the other hand, the secret key is very difficult to 
manage when one is communicating with many people, and one should share 
different secret keys with each person each time [8]. Therefore, cryptographers have 







private key signing much faster and more efficient. In general, the hash value is 
much smaller than the message and needs a much shorter time to be encrypted [6].  
Un-keyed hash functions are cryptographic checksums used to provide message 
integrity and other security services, such as authentication using digital signature. 
The two most popular hash functions are Message Digest-5 (MD5) and Secure Hash 
Algorithm–1 (SHA-1) [7]. In general, the hash function accepts a single input 
message M of variable length to produce a fixed-length hash value H(M) of X bits. 
Hash function is a one-way encryption function in the sense that the hash value can 
be derived from the input message, but the original message can’t be derived from 
the given hash value. Figure 2-12 shows that the one-way hash function can be used 
to provide message integrity and digital signature [6, 10].  
 
Figure  2-12: Hash function and digital signature 
According to Menezes et al. (1997), un-keyed hash functions can be divided into 
three broad categories based on the internal structure. The first type is hash functions 
based on block cipher which are reusing an existing system, such as MDC-2 (with 
DES) and MDC-4 (with DES).  The second type is customized hash functions based 
on MD4, such as MD5, Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1), RIPEMD-128 and 
RIPEMD-160. The third type is hash functions based on modular arithmetic, such as 
MASH-1 and MASH-2 [10]. Henceforth, un-keyed hash function will simply be 
called hash function. 
2.7.2 Keyed Hash Function: Message Authentication Code (MACs) 
Keyed Hash Function (Message Authentication Code) is a combination of 





as checksum or )(MCMAC K that serves as authenticator [7]. This method assumes 
that the sender and the receiver share the secret key K to calculate the correct MAC 
value [7, 8]. The sender calculates the MAC value based on the message and secret 
key, and then sends the message appended with encrypted MAC to the receiver. 
After the receiver receives the message combined with encrypted MAC value, he/she 
will compute the MAC value based on the received message and shared secret key K. 
Finally, the receiver will compare the calculated result with the decrypted MAC 
value, as shown in Figure 2-13 [8, 11]. If the received MAC(K, M) value and the 
computed MAC value are equal the receiver can be assured that the received 
message has not been altered and that it is definitely from the supposed sender. The 
MAC does not provide the digital signature because both the communication parties 
are sharing the secret key [11]. To conclude, the security of keyed hash functions 
depends on the secret key, while the security of the un-keyed hash functions depends 
on the internal structure. 
 
Figure  2-13: Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
2.7.3 Hash Function Properties  
A hash function H is a function that accepts an input message M of arbitrary 
bits length and produces a hash value h, such as h=H(M). A secure cryptography 
hash function must satisfy the following properties [6, 8, 10]: 
1. H (Hash Function) can apply to any block size of data. 
2. H (Hash Function) should produce a fixed length of output data (ex.160 bits). 
3. H(M) (Hash Value) is quite easy to calculate for any given message M of any 





4. One-Way (2n) property, aka Pre-image Resistance, means it is computationally 
infeasible to find the message M for any given hash value h. In other words, it is 
easy to produce the hash value h of any given message (M), but it is almost 
impossible to produce a message from a given code. 
5. Weak Collision Resistance (2n), aka Second Pre-image Resistance means that, 
given block M1 , it is computationally infeasible to find M2 where M1 ≠ M2 with 
H(M1) = H(M2). 
6. Strong Collision Resistance (2n/2), aka Collision Resistance means it is 
computationally infeasible to find any pair of blocks M1, M2 where H (M1) = H 
(M2). 
Collision resistance means it is computationally infeasible to find two different input 
messages that are hashed to the same hash value [190]. The weak collision resistance 
guarantees that the opponents will not be able to find another message hashing to the 
same hash value of the given message. This property prevents message falsification, 
as the calculated hash code is encrypted (see Figure 2-14). In general, the sender will 
send the message concatenated with its encrypted hash value to the sender’s private 
key. Therefore, an attacker can read and modify the message, but can’t read or 
modify the hash value. The attacker could calculate the hash value of the sent 
message, whereas the sent message and the hash function could be known. 
Moreover, if the private key is known, the attackers are able to modify the original 
message and calculate the new hash value to be encrypted with the private key, and 
then will send the modified message with its hash value to the receiver [6].   
The strong collision resistance differs from the weak collision resistance. In strong 
collision resistance, the attacker would be able to choose both x and y, not just y, and 
could compute the hx = H(x) and hy = H(y). If hx is equal to hy, the attacker can send 
to one side x and to the other side y; when the other side checks the H(y) they will 
find it equal to hx. So, the receiver will think the message is authenticated, but in 







Figure  2-14: An example of a weak collision resistance. 
 
Figure  2-15: An example of a Strong collision resistance. 
2.7.4 Hash Function Applications 
Hash functions are used to produce “Fingerprints” of the message, which can 
be useful for message authentication [6]. The hash value should be protected before 
it is sent to another party where the hash functions are not considered to be secret. 
There are various ways of using hash value to provide message authentication. 
Digital signature is an important type of authentication, which can be achieved by 
computing the hash value of the message on the sender’s side and then encrypting it 
by the sender’s private key to provide digital signatures. Then, the sender will 
append the digital signature to the message and send it to the receiver. The receiver 
will separate the digital signature from the message and decrypt it with the sender’s 





and check whether the two are matched; then he/she can verify whether the message 
is authenticated or not [6].  
Hash function plays an elementary role in modern cryptography [10]. It is employed 
in many different cryptography protocols and security issues such as encryption, data 
integrity and simple digital signature schemes. A typical use of hash function is data 
integrity to detect message modification, thus providing error detection capability. In 
a well-designed hash function, any bit or bits change in the input message will 
produce a totally different hash value (final output) [6]. Hash functions can be used 
to generate a pseudorandom number generator that is used to generate shared secret 
keys [11]. Moreover, the security of digital signatures mainly depends on the security 
of the hash functions [158]. Hash functions are widely used in many different 
standards and applications such as message integrity, password verification, message 
authentication, SSL/TLS, IPSec and S/MIME [191]. Therefore, the Internet mainly 
depends on hash functions to provide web security, key management, password 
login, e-payment and many other cryptography protocols. Simply put, without hash 
functions the Internet will not work. 
2.8 Brief History of Hash Functions 
In 1990 [192], Ralph Merkle designed a one-way hash function called Snefru, 
which accepts an arbitrary message length and produces 128-bit or 256-bit hash 
values. In 1993 [193],  Biham and Shamir attacked the two-pass of Snefru-128 using 
differential cryptanalysis by finding a collision of two messages within minutes. 
They can attack two, three and four passes with less than the birthday attack. In 
addition, the same people were able to attack Snefru-256 two, three and four passes 
with less than the birthday attack [8]. Later, Merkle recommended using Snefru with 
at least 8 passes to provide higher security, but that would be slower than other hash 
functions. 
Modifications Detection Codes (MDC-2 and MDC-4) are hash function algorithms 
developed by IBM which allow the use of any n-bit block cipher E and provide hash 
values of 2n bits length [10]. Both MDC-2 and MDC-4 were originally designed to 





required 2-block cipher operations per block of hash input, while MDC-4 required a 
4-block cipher. Modular Arithmetic Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (MASH-1) is a hash 
function algorithm based on modular arithmetic [167]. NASH-1 compression 
function is based on a modular squaring operation. MASH-1 uses the modulus M, 
where M is long enough for it to be very difficult or infeasible for anyone to factorize 
it [10]. MASH-2 is the same as MASH-1, with a slight difference in the modular 
exponent, e = 28 +1 instead of e = 2; the security against collision attack of MASH-1 
is 2n and for MASH-2 it is 2n/2 [167]. In general, the hash functions that are based on 
modular arithmetic are slower than the other hash functions. 
RIPEMD-160 is another hash function algorithm which accepts arbitrary message 
length and produces 160-bit hash value [190]. It is a more developed and 
strengthened version of RIPEMD-128 after the first two rounds of RIPEMD-128 
were attacked by H. Dobbertin [6, 194]. The general design and structure of 
RIPEMD-160 follow the design and structure of MD5 in a different way. Therefore, 
RIPEMD-160 has 10 rounds and each round consists of 16 steps. RIPEMD-160 is 
more secure than RIPEMD-128, but its performance is reduced by a factor of two 
[190].  
Message Digest-4 (MD4) is a hash function algorithm designed by Ron Rivest in 
1990 and published as an RFC 1321. In 1992, a revised version of MD4 was 
published in RFC 1320 with slight modification of the original version [6]. MD4 has 
three rounds and each round has 16 steps; it is based on a simple operation performed 
on 32-bit words. In 1996 [195], H. Dobbertin found a collision attack on MD4 with a 
complexity of 220 hash operations. In 2005, Wang et al. found a collision attack on 
MD4 with a complexity of less than 28 hash operations [196]. In the following two 
subsections, we will describe in detail two popular hash functions: Message Digest-5 
(MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1).  
2.8.1 Message Digest-5 (MD5) 
 Message Digest-5 (MD5) was developed by Ron Rivest, the ‘R’ in RSA 
[Rivest-Shamir-Adleman] [168], which  is a further development and improvement 





public cryptosystem that very slowly encrypts a large message instead of encrypting 
its hash value. MD5 accepts an arbitrary-length message as an input and produces 
128-bit hash value [198]. After development of the MD5 algorithm, it was widely 
used and known as a secure hash algorithm [6]. The algorithm divides the input 
message into 512-bit blocks after which the last block is padded by (100...0) to be of 
size 448-bit; the last 64-bit is padded by the message size mod 264 [11]. MD5 has a 
compression function consisting of four rounds, and each round has 16 operations to 
mix the state of the message with the message block (see Figure 2-16). MD5 uses 32-
bit words and each round has non-linear mixing functions: XOR, AND, OR, 
Addition mod 32, and Rotation operation on 32-bit words [11].  
 
Figure  2-16: Basic Operations of One MD5 round [199]  
There have been several attacks on MD4 and MD5 [158, 195, 196, 200, 201]. In 
1993 [202], B. Boer and A. Bosselaers found two collision attacks for MD5 with two 
different Initial Values (IV) of the same message. Later, in 1996 [195], H. Dobbertin 
found a collision attack of MD5 compression function. Then, in 1998 [201], H. 
Dobbertin found that the first two rounds of MD5 are not one-way. In 2005, Wang et 
al. found a differential attack on MD5 with 15-60 minutes of computations [158]. 
MD4 and MD5 were two very popular hash functions, but their popularity declined 
as a result of the development of computing power and cryptanalysis techniques [6]. 
Therefore, in 1993 the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
designed Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA) with bigger hash values to be used as 
standard hash function. In the following subsection, we will explain in detail Secure 





2.8.2 Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1) 
 NIST designed the Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA) for use with Digital 
Signature Standard [8]. SHA-0 was the first member of the SHA family to be 
developed by the NIST and was the original algorithm to be published as a Federal 
Information Processing Standard (FIPS 180) in 1993 [6]. The National Security 
Agency (NSA) withdrew it shortly after it was published. In 1995, FIPS published 
SHA-1 algorithm as a replacement, having corrected the flaw in the original 
algorithm [203]. SHA-1 was recommended by governments and cryptographers as it 
provides greater resistance to attacks than other algorithms [6]. SHA-1 has been 
adopted by many governments and industry security standards.   


















SHA-224 264 512 32 224 2114 
SHA-256 264 512 32 256 2128 
SHA-384 2128 1024 64 384 2192 
SHA-512 2512 1024 64 512 2256 
 





SHA-1 is a one-way hash function that processes an input message of length less 
than 264 bits to generate a hash value of 160-bit length. It is used to provide message 
integrity as it is very sensitive to any change/changes in input message. This property 
is useful for digital signature, message authentication codes, and generating random 
bits. Four more SHA variants have been published with longer hash values and a 
slightly different design: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512, sometimes 
collectively referred to as SHA-2 (see Table 2-1) [7, 204].  
SHA-1 algorithm processing steps are as follows [6, 8]: 
1. Append padding bits. 
There are many padding modes are employed in cryptography algorithms such as 
Zero padding, Bit padding and Byte padding modes. Zero padding mode pads the 
message with the required number of zeros. The Bit padding mode pads the message 
by one (1)2 followed by number of zeros (00…0)2 and the last 64-bit with the length 
of the message mod by 264. In Byte padding mode the message is padded by zeros 
and last bit with number of padded bytes, with random bytes, or with number of 
padded bytes. Now we will explain the Bit padding mode that is used in many 
cryptography algorithms including SHA-1 and MD5. 
This process pads the input message (M) before hash computations begin. The 
message is padded to ensure that it will be a multiple of 512 or 1024 based on the 
algorithm [6]. Suppose the length of the input message M is L of length less than 264 
bits; the first step is to append a single 1-bit to the end of the original message 
followed by k zeros bits where k+1+L = (448 mod 512), then k = (448 mod 512) – 
(L+1) (see Figure 2-17) [8].     
2. Append length.  
In this step, a 64-bit block is appended to the end of the message. This block is 
treated as an unsigned 64-bit integer, which contains the length of the message 






3. Initialize MD buffer. 
In SHA-1, the five registers (A, B, C, D, and E) are initialized with the 32-bit 
hexadecimal values 0x67452301, 0xEFCDAB89, 0x98BADCFE, 0x10325476, and 
0xC3D2E1F0, respectively.  
4. Process the message in 512-bit blocks. 
 The main part of the SHA-1 algorithm is the module which consists of four rounds, 
each round consisting of 20 steps and one different function of (f1, f2, f3, f4). These 
functions are non-linear functions on three buffers (B, C, and D) [8]. In each round, 
the algorithm processes a 512-bit as one block from the existing message input that is 
being processed (Yq), and continues according to how many 512-bits there are in the 
input message. Each round takes input of 160-bit buffer values (A, B, C, D, and E) 
and updates the contents of the buffers [6]. 
5. Output 
The final output is 160-bit hash value (CVq+1) that comes from the processing of all 
512-bit blocks [6]. 
Now we will give details of the SHA-1 compression function. We will look at the 
function logic in each of the 80 steps, each of which operates on three 32-bit words 
(B, C and D) and produces a 32-bit word as output, F (t, B, C, D). We can summarize 
this as follows [6, 8]: 
    F (t; B, C, D) = (B   C)   ((  B)   D)                         (0 ≤ t ≤ 19) 
    F (t; B, C, D) = B   C   D                                                (20 ≤ t ≤ 39) 
    F (t; B, C, D) = (B   C)   (B   D)   (C   D)          (40 ≤ t ≤ 59) 
    F (t; B, C, D) = B   C   D                              (60 ≤ t ≤ 79) 
A sequence of constant words K(0), K(1)...K(79) are used in the SHA-1.  In 





      K (t) = 0x5A827999              (0 ≤ t ≤ 19) 
      K (t) = 0x6ED9EBA1            (20 ≤ t ≤ 39) 
      K (t) = 0x8F1BBCDC            (40 ≤ t ≤ 59) 
      K (t) = 0xCA62C1D6             (60 ≤ t ≤ 79) 
The 16 32-bit word values are transformed into 80 32-bit words(W0 to W79) using the 
following algorithm Wt  = (Wt-16   Wt-14   Wt-8   Wt-3) [8]. A, B, C, D and E are 
32-bit words of the state, F is a non-linear function that varies, <<<s denotes a left bit 
rotation by s places, s varies for each operation, ( ) is addition modulo 232, and Kt is 
a constant (as shown in Figure 2-18). 
 
Figure  2-18: SHA Operation of Single Step [205] 
 SHA-1 Attack  
Recently, significant advanced studies and analyses of hash functions have 
developed a set of very effective new techniques for searching for collisions in SHA-
1 [165]. In 2005, Rijmen and Oswald wrote a paper to describe an attack on a 
reduced version of SHA-1; in 53 out of 80 rounds they found a collision attack in 
less than 280 hash operations [206]. Wang et al. (February, 2005) found collisions in 
the full version of SHA-1 with less than 269 hash operations [165]. In August 2005, 
another research group of cryptanalysts found an improved attack on SHA-1 with 





less than the 280 theoretical bound. Researchers use the term ‘broken’ whenever they 
can demonstrate the vulnerability rather than using a simple brute-force attack. 
According to Wang et al. (2005), the analysis of SHA-1 was based on the original 
differential attack on SHA-0. The SHA-0 attack was based on an algebraic method, 
whereby the researchers were able to find a real collision with less than 239 hash 
operation [208]. A simple and important observation made about SHA-0 was that it 
has a 6-step local collision that can start at any step and that also applies to SHA-1 
[165]. In addition, the group used the message modification techniques of collision 
search attacks on HAVAL-128, RIPEMD, MD4 and MD5 [156, 158, 196, 208]. 
Since August 2005, researchers have been looking for a new hash function that is 
more secure than SHA-1 and that would represent a good alternative. There have 
been many different suggestions from many researchers on finding a new hash 
function to replace SHA-1. Some researchers have pointed out that a new hash 
function based on chaos theory would be a good candidate to replace SHA-1.  In 
January 2007, the NIST announced a competition to create and design a new hash 
function to replace the current hash function SHA-1 in the year 2012 [209, 210]. 
2.9 Random Number Generators 
There are two main types of random number generators: random number 
generator and pseudorandom number generator. Random number generator is an 
algorithm or device that generates a sequence of binary bits that are statistically 
independent [10]. A pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) is a deterministic 
procedure that produces a binary bits sequence that is approximately random [6, 
211]. The input parameter of PRNG is called seed and the output is called binary 
sequence. Random number generators are used in many cryptography algorithms and 
applications [212, 213]. They are used to provide high security for many 
cryptographic systems such as DES secret key, prime numbers in RSA algorithm, 
and prime numbers in digital signature [214]. The PRNG output of length l is not 
random but takes a small truly random bit and expands it to a larger sequence of 
length l [10]. In this way the PRNG sequence cannot be distinguished from the truly 





tests and analysis should be applied. Several statistical tests and analyses have been 
designed to test random and pseudorandom number generators [211]. 
Generating truly random sequences using hardware devices or software programs is 
considered a difficult task [10, 213]. Hardware-based bit generators exploit the 
randomness of physical phenomena, such as energy and input sound from a 
microphone. Many processes can be used with software-based bit generators, such as 
system clock, mouse movement, and content of input/output buffer as a seed [213]. 
The behaviour of these processes depends on several factors. Designing a software-
based bit generator is harder than designing a hardware-based bit generator. One-way 
function is used to generate a sequence of pseudorandom bits by choosing random 
seeds and then generating the sequence for these seeds (s, s+1, s+2, ...) [211]. 
Moreover, hash function and block cipher algorithms can be implemented to 
generate random bit sequences [6, 8]. 
2.10 Confusion and Diffusion 
 In 1949, Claude Shannon introduced the terms ‘confusion’ and ‘diffusion’, 
which are considered the foundation for designing a secure cipher [215]. Shannon’s 
theory aims to deduce the possibility of ciphertext attack based on plaintext statistical 
analysis. Some cryptanalysts base their attacks on knowledge of plaintext statistical 
characteristics. In some languages, plaintext of different letters or words has a 
frequency distribution, which could be the starting point to find the used key or part 
of it [6]. Therefore, Shannon suggested that the ciphertext be independent of the used 
key and that the ciphertext be independent of the plaintext. Diffusion is hiding the 
relationship between the plaintext and ciphertext; changing one bit in plaintext 
affects more than half of the ciphertext bits. Confusion is hiding the relationship 
between the statistics of ciphertext and the used key so that it is sufficiently 
complicated to foil any attempt to find the key [7, 11]. 
The principle of diffusion prevents the cryptanalyst from finding any relationship 
between the plaintext and the ciphertext, while confusion prevents the cryptanalyst 
from finding any relationship between the ciphertext and the used key [7]. In general, 





Hash functions are similar to conventional encryption methods in that they require 
the influence of the whole input message to be spread into the hash value space 
[217]. In an ideal hash function, the relationship between bits in input message and 
corresponding bits in hash value should be complex. Therefore, any bit change in the 
input message should affect at least half the hash value bits, and each bit has a 50% 
probability of changing. 
2.11 Cryptanalytic Techniques 
Cryptanalysis, aka code-breaking, is the science of studying the methods of 
deciphering the ciphertext without knowing the used key; this depends on the nature 
of the algorithm, and some knowledge of the properties of the plaintext and/or pairs 
of plaintext and ciphertext. Cryptanalysis exploits the properties of the algorithm to 
conclude a specific plaintext or used key. Once the opponent succeeds in concluding 
the identity of the used key, all past and future communication will be vulnerable. A 
MAC algorithm will require a cryptanalysis effort greater than or equal to the brute-
force effort. It would be impracticable to try to find a collision with a very large key 
space. Cryptanalysis of the hash functions focuses on the internal structure of the 
compression algorithm (f) and is based on attempts to find efficient techniques for 
producing collisions for a single execution of the compression. In hash functions, 
collisions must exist if the length of the message is longer than the length of the hash 
code; while it is computationally infeasible to try to find a collision [6]. In 
cryptology, various attacking techniques are applied to cryptographic algorithms. We 
will explain the types of attack briefly in the following subsections. 
2.11.1  Brute-force Attacks 
Brute-force attack, aka exhaustive search attack, is one of the attacking 
techniques that aim to break the cryptography algorithms by searching all possible 
keys until the right key is found. A longer key size is more difficult to attack than the 
shorter key size, as the key size affects the needed resources exponentially. In 
general, the attackers use this kind of attack when it is very difficult to find 
weaknesses in cryptography algorithms.  The security of a cryptography algorithm 





find all possible keys using available resources. Therefore, the length of key size is 
very important in symmetric key, public key, and hash function algorithms. In 
cryptography systems any technique that can find the secret key faster than the brute-
force attack is considered a successful attack.  
A collision in hash function means to have two different input messages (M1, M2) 
that produce the same hash value [H(M1) = H(M2)] [11]. If a strong collision is 
required, then the value 2n/2 determines the strength of the hash code against brute-
force attacks. Oorschot and Wiener presented a design for a $10 million collision 
search machine for MD5; they found that the same machine with a hash code length 
of 160 bits would require over four thousand years to find a collision [6]. Hash 
function is never collision-free because the number of possible inputs of the hash 
function is infinite and the number of possible outputs is finite  [11]. The length of 
the hash value makes the job of the opponents more difficult as the opponents need 
to find two messages of different lengths that hash to the same hash value [6]. Hash 
function strength against brute-force attack depends on the length of the algorithm 
hash value [6]. 
2.11.2 Birthday Attack  
 Birthday attack is a type of cryptography attack that is based on the birthday 
problem. The birthday problem is the probability of finding at least two equal values 
within one group of values [218]. The goal of this attack is to find two different 
inputs (x1, x2) to a given function f(x) that produce the same output value f(x1) = 
f(x2); this is known as collision and the fastest way to find a collision is the birthday 
attack [8, 11, 190]. If the function is collision-resistance, then it is computationally 
infeasible to look for two different inputs that have the same output. A simple 
definition of birthday attack is to find one value two times within the same set of 
elements, which is simply collision [11]. Cryptographers are interested in the 
birthday attack, because it is computationally infeasible to find collisions for most of 
the hash functions with large hash values, such as 160-bit and greater hash value 
size. According to Mihir et al. 2004, this is true only if the hash function is random 
or regular; regular means that all values in the range have the same number of pre-





operations where n is the size of the hash value in bits [190]. The secure hash 
algorithm-1 (SHA-1) produces a 160-bit message digest; thus the birthday attack 
needs 280 hash operations.  
2.11.3 Meet-in-the-middle Attack 
Meet-in-the-middle attack, aka plaintext attack, is a type of cryptographic 
attack that is used to deduce double encryption secret key of block cipher algorithms. 
The attacker is assumed to have access to pairs of plaintext and ciphertext. The 
attacker then starts encrypting the plaintext by various keys and at the same time 
decrypting ciphertext by various keys, seeking to match intermediate values of the 
encrypted plaintext and the decrypted ciphertext. If the intermediate value is found, 
then it is highly probable that the secret keys are the used key in the double 
encryption process. This type of attack exponentially reduces the time required in a 
brute-force attack to deduce the double encryption keys.            
2.11.4 Other Attacking Techniques 
In this section, we recap other three well-known attacking techniques: 
ciphertext- only attack, known-plaintext attack, and chosen-plaintext attack [6, 8, 10, 
14]. Attacks on cryptography algorithms aim to break the algorithm to add, delete, 
change, and/or read important information. The attacker performs a certain type of 
attack based on available information and resources. 
1- Known-plaintext attack is one of the attacking models that can be applied to 
encryption algorithms. In this mode, the attacker is assumed to have access to 
pairs of plaintext and ciphertext. The attacker uses the pairs of plaintext and 
ciphertext to retrieve the secret key. 
2- Chosen-plaintext attack is one of the attacking models used to collect 
information to reduce the security of the encryption scheme. In this model of 
attack, the attacker is assumed to be able to encrypt plaintext and obtain the 
corresponding ciphertext. The attacker encrypts different plaintext and obtains 
the corresponding ciphertext to study and analyse these pairs in order to retrieve 





3- Ciphertext-only attack is a cryptanalysis attacking technique for breaking 
encryption algorithms. In this type, the attacker is assumed to have access to 
ciphertext only. The attack is considered successful if the attacker can retrieve 
the some information about the plaintext or the secret key.  
Differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis are two general forms of attacking 
techniques based on known-plaintext attack. The differential cryptanalysis is a 
method used mainly for breaking block ciphers, but it can be used for breaking 
stream cipher and hash function [159, 220]. In general, this method studies the 
relationship of the differences between the input and output for the function. For 
encryption algorithm, this method studies the relationship of differences of pairs of 
plaintext with differences of corresponding pairs of ciphertext. For the hash function, 
a collision of hash function can be found if the difference between the input and 
output of the compression function is equal to zero. Linear cryptanalysis is a known-
plaintext attack that uses linear approximation for non-linear operations [188]. This 
type of cryptanalysis is used to break block cipher and stream cipher algorithms. 
Many studies on digital chaotic cryptography have been conducted to design new 
cryptography primitives based on chaotic map [30, 52, 60, 63, 64, 221-227]. In the 
next chapter, we will discuss in detail chaos theory, cryptographic systems based on 
chaos theory, and a literature review of chaotic cryptography.  
2.12 Summary 
This introductory chapter has presented the basic concepts and principles of 
security, electronic commerce and cryptography primitives. The focus of this chapter 
is on block ciphers and hash functions. Block cipher principles, evaluation, modes of 
operation, and encryption using multiple modes of operation are explained in detail. 
Three well-known block cipher algorithms (DES, IDEA, and AES) are discussed. 
Cryptographic hash functions’ principles, characteristics, applications, and security 
are also explained in detail. Descriptions of two popular hash functions (MD5 and 
SHA-1) are given. Moreover, confusion and diffusion properties and well-known 
attacking techniques on block ciphers and hash functions are discussed. Finally, we 
discussed concepts, types and applications of random number generators.  







3. Chaos and Cryptography 
3.1 Introduction 
ver the last several years, many researchers have studied chaos theory in 
numerous fields, such as electronic systems, fluid dynamics, lasers, 
weather and climate [25-29]. Chaos theory is a branch of mathematics that 
studies the behaviour of complex dynamic systems which are highly sensitive to 
change in their parameters and give unpredictable results. There are several popular 
examples of chaotic systems such as Lorenz attractor, Rossler attractor, Logistic 
map, Henon map, Tent map, and Piecewise linear chaotic map. In general, the 
security of cryptography systems was built based on difficult or unsolved 
mathematical problems. Chaos theory has attracted the cryptography field due to its 
characteristics, such as deterministic nature, unpredictability, random-look nature 
and its sensitivity to initial value [30]. Chaotic systems have potential applications in 
such cryptography algorithms as block cipher, stream cipher, hash function, and 
pseudorandom number generator. Over the last two decades, there has been 
tremendous interest in utilizing chaotic systems to design secure cryptographic 
algorithms [13, 30, 32-117, 228-236]. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In section 3.2, we will introduce chaos 
theory, chaotic maps and the Lyapunov exponent. We will focus on and explain the 
details of a logistic map as a simple non-linear chaotic map using several tests and 
analyses. We will briefly introduce Lorenz attractor, Rossler attractor, Henon map, 
O 




Tent map, and Piecewise linear chaotic map. In section 3.3, we will explain the 
relationship between chaotic systems and cryptography algorithms. In section 3.4, we 
will provide a comprehensive review of chaotic block ciphers, chaotic hash functions 
and chaotic pseudorandom number generators. In sections 3.5 and 3.6, we discuss 
implementation issues and give a summary of this chapter, respectively.  
3.2 Chaos Theory  
      Chaos is derived from a Greek word ‘Xαos’, meaning a state without order or 
predictability [237]. A chaotic system is a simple, non-linear, dynamical, and 
deterministic system that shows completely unpredictable behaviour and appears 
random [26]. Moreover, it is a deterministic system with great sensitivity to initial 
conditions, such that a computer system can give an amazingly different result when 
the value of an input parameter is changed. On the other hand, in classical science 
small changes in an initial value might generate small differences in the result [238]. 
A system is called a chaotic system if it is sensitive to initial conditions, topology 
mix, and if periodic orbits are dense.  
According to Alligood et al. (1996), a dynamical system contains all the possible 
states and regulations that control the next state from the current state. On the other 
hand, the deterministic regulations are those that determine the current state uniquely 
from the previous states, whereas there is always a mathematical equation to 
determine the system evolution [239, 240]. From the previous definitions of 
deterministic and dynamical systems, we cannot say that the randomness is not 
allowed. The bifurcation in dynamic differential equation changes the number of 
solutions as the parameters are changed [241]. 
In 1890 Poincaré published his article [242] (On the equations of the dynamics and 
the three-body problem) of 270 pages, which simplified the way of looking at the 
complicated continuous trajectories from differential equations [239]. Then,  in 1898 
Hadamard observed the sensitivity to initial conditions and unpredictability of 
special systems, calling this the geodesic flow [26]. Later, in 1908, Poincaré noted 




that chaos sensitivity depends on initial conditions and gives unpredictable results 
[26]. Later on, Edward Lorenz (1963) examined chaos theory and described a simple 
mathematical model of weather prediction [240, 243]. Lorenz’s model was the first 
numerical model to detect chaos in a non-linear dynamical system [241]. Lorenz’s 
findings were very interesting in that some equations rise to some surprisingly 
complex behaviour and chaos behaviour dependent on the initial condition [27, 244]. 
In 1975, Li and Yorke were the first to introduce the word ‘chaos’ into mathematical 
literature,  where system results appear random [26]. 
Chaotic maps have been the subject of an extremely active research area due to their 
characteristics, such as sensitivity to the initial value, complex behaviour, and 
completely deterministic nature. The chaotic behaviour can be observed in many 
different systems, such as electronic systems, fluid dynamics, lasers, weather, climate 
and economics [25-29, 245, 246]. Our intuition tells us that a small change in input 
parameters should give a small change in output, but chaotic systems show us that 
this is not necessarily the case. Usually, chaotic maps define infinitely large fields of 
real numbers. The most important characteristics of chaotic systems are as follows: 
1. Apparently random behaviour but completely deterministic: the behaviour of 
chaotic systems seems to be random but actually it is purely deterministic. 
Hence, if we run the chaotic system many times with the same initial value, 
we will obtain the same set of output values. Furthermore, the chaotic 
systems are dynamical systems that are described by differential equations or 
iterative mappings, and the next state is specified from the previous state (see 
equation 3-1 [26, 238, 239, 247]. 
 ),.....,( 1 nii xxFxdt
d
   ni ,...,2,1               ( 3-1) 
2. Sensitivity dependence on the initial conditions (The state from which the 
system starts): Dynamical systems evolve completely differently over time 
with slight changes in the initial state [29, 248, 249]. 




3. Unpredictable (difficult or impossible to predict the behaviour in the long 
term): In chaotic maps, even if one knows the current state of the chaotic 
system it is useless trying to predict the next state of the system. In other 
words, it is very difficult to predict the future states of the chaotic system in 
the long term [238, 240]. 
3.2.1 Lyapunov Exponents  
A Lyapunov number is the divergence rate average of very close points along 
the orbit, which is the natural algorithm of the Lyapunov number (see Figure 3-1) 
[239, 250]. Therefore, the Lyapunov exponent may be used with chaotic behaviour to 
measure the sensitive dependence on the initial condition [241]. This means that, in 
one-dimensional chaos maps, the Lyapunov numbers are used to measure separation 
rates of nearby points along the real line.  The Lyapunov exponent is used to help 
choose the initial parameters of chaotic maps that fall in chaotic areas. For example: 
suppose we have two nearby points ( 1x , 2x ) in a one-dimensional map f and
1,)(' 1  zzxf , then 2x  orbit will separate from 1x  at approximately rate z per 
iteration, until the orbit of 2x  moves significantly far away from 1x [239].  The 
Lyapunov exponent has three different cases of dynamics as follows [238]: 
1. If all Lyapunov exponents are less than zero, the orbit is attracted to a fixed 
or stable point. 
2. If the Lyapunov exponents are zero, there is an ordinary attractor, which is 
simpler than a fixed point. This mean that the system is neutrally stable and in 
steady state mode, where the attractor maintain constant separation.  
3.  If at least one of the Lyapunov exponents is positive, the dynamical is 
chaotic and vice versa. 
Lyapunov number =  








  ,             ( 3-2) 
where nxxx ,...., 21  is the orbit of the map f on the real line R. 
If the limit of the Lyapunov number exists, the Lyapunov exponent is defined as 
follows: 
Lyapunov exponent = 
 )('ln....)('ln)1(lim)( 11 nn xfxfnxh             ( 3-3) 
 
Figure  3-1: Lyapunov exponent principle 
3.2.2 Chaotic Maps  
According to Alligood et al. (1996), a chaotic map is a function of its domain 
and range in the same space, and the starting point of the trajectory is called the 
initial value (condition). Chaotic dynamics have a unique attribute that can be seen 
clearly by imagining the system starting twice with slightly different initial 
conditions [241]. Chaos theory attempts to explain the result of a system that is 
sensitive to initial conditions, complex, and shows unpredictable behaviour. Chaotic 
dynamical systems increase communication security with higher dimensions and 
more than one positive Lyapunov exponent [251]. A Lyapunov exponent is used to 
help select the initial parameters of chaotic maps that fall in chaotic areas. A chaotic 
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system exhibits some chaotic behaviour and often occurs in the study of dynamical 
systems. In the following subsections, we will give a brief induction to some chaotic 
systems: Logistic map, Lorenz attractors, Rossler attractors, Henon map, Tent map, 
and Piecewise linear chaotic map. 
3.2.2.1 Logistic Map 
In 1845, Pierre Verhulst proposed a logistic map, which is a simple non-linear 
dynamical map. A logistic map is one of the most popular and simplest chaotic maps 
[241]. Logistic map became very popular after it was exploited in 1979 by the 
biologist Robert M. May [252]. The logistic map is a polynomial mapping, a 
complex chaotic system, the behaviour of which can arise from very simple non-
linear dynamical equations, as shown in Figure 3-2 [239]. The logistic map equation 
is written as:  
)1()( 1 nnnn xrxxxg   ,          ( 3-4) 
where nx  is a number between zero and one, 0x  represents the initial population, and 
r  is a positive number between zero and four. 
 
Figure  3-2: Bifurcation diagram of the Logistic map [253] 
The logistic map is one of the simplest chaotic maps; it is highly sensitive to change 
in its parameter value, where a different value of the parameter r will give a different 




map f [254]. Its transformation function is F:    1,01,0   which is defined in the 
above equation. From the onset of chaos, a seemingly random jumble of dots, the 
behaviour of the logistic map depends mainly on the values of two variables (r, x0); 
by changing one or both variables’ values we can observe different logistic map 
behaviours. The population of a logistic map will die out if the value of r  is between 
0 and 1, and the population will be quickly stabilized on the value (1- r )/r if the 
value of r is between 1 and 3 [239]. Then, the population will oscillate between two 
values if the value of parameter r is between 3 and 3.45.  After that, with values of 
parameter r between 3.45 and 4 the periodic fluctuation becomes significantly more 
complicated. Finally, most of the values after 3.57 show chaotic behaviour. 
In the logistic map )1()( nnn xrxxg  , the function result depends on the value of 
parameter r, where different values of r will give quite different pictures. We can 
note that g(x1) = x2 and g(x2) = x1, that mean g(g(x2)) = x1 and g(g(x1)) = x2. 
According to Alligood et al. (1996) the periodic fluctuation between x1, x2 is steady 
and attracts orbits (trajectories). Therefore, there are a minimum number of iterations 
of the orbit to repeat the point. There are obvious differences between the behaviour 
of the exponential model and the logistic model’s behaviour. To illustrate the 
difference between the two functions, we take an example of the exponential 
function nn xxf 2)( 1  and an example of logistic function )1(4)( 1 nnn xxxg  ; the 
initial value for both functions is 0.0090, and we then calculate the population for n = 
0, 1, 2, ….., 10 resulting in an accuracy of five decimal places. We can notice that 
the output values of the exponential function are always increasing as time 
progresses, while the output values of the logistic function are fluctuating between 
zero and one [239].   
3.2.2.2 Lorenz Attractor  
  The Lorenz attractor is one of the most popular three-dimensional chaotic 
attractors; it was examined and introduced by Edward Lorenz in 1963 [238, 239, 
243]. He showed that a small change in the initial conditions of a weather model 




could give large differences in the resulting weather. This means that a slight 
difference in the initial condition will affect the output of the whole system, which is 
called sensitive dependence to the initial conditions. The non-linear dynamical 
system is sensitive to the initial value and is related to the system’s periodic 
behaviour [26]. Lorenz’s dynamic system presents a chaotic attractor, whereas the 
word chaos is often used to describe the complicated manner of non-linear dynamical 
systems [240]. Chaos theory generates apparently random behaviour but at the same 
time is completely deterministic, as shown in Figure 3-3. The Lorenz attractor is 
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Figure  3-3: A plot of the trajectory of the Lorenz system, (Modified from [255]) 
3.2.2.3 Rossler Attractors 
In 1976 [256],  O. Rossler created a chaotic attractor with a simple set of non-
linear differential equations [238, 239]. Rossler attempted to write the simplest 
dynamical system that exhibited the characteristics of a chaotic system [238]. The 
Rossler attractor was the first widely-known chaotic attractor from a set of 
differential equations; defined by a set of three non-linear differential equations, the 




system exhibits a strange attractor for a = b = 0.2 and c = 5.7 (see equation 3-6) 
[239, 257]. Rossler attractor is a system of three non-linear differential equations, 
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A, B, and C are constants. 
 
Figure  3-4: Rossler Attractor [257] 
3.2.2.4 Henon Attractors 
The Henon map is one of the dynamical systems that exhibit chaotic 
behaviours. The Henon map is defined by two equations; the map depends on two 
parameters a, b, and the system exhibits a strange attractor for a = 1.4 and b = 0.3 
(see equation 3-7). A Henon map takes one point (x, y) and maps this point to a new 
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Figure  3-5: Henon attractor for a = 1.4 and b = 0.3 [257] 
3.2.2.5 Tent Map 
A Tent map is an iterated function of a dynamical system that exhibits chaotic 
behaviours (orbits) and is governed by equation 3-8. It has a similar shape to the 
logistic map shape with a corner (Figures 3-6 and 3-7) [239]. The Tent map exhibits 
the Lyapunov exponents on the unit interval  1,0)( xT  and  2,0 . It is a simple 
one-dimensional map generating periodic chaotic behaviour similar to a logistic map.   
 
Figure  3-6: Bifurcation diagram for the tent map [258] 
 
Figure  3-7: Graph of tent map function 




















         ( 3-8) 
3.2.2.6 Piecewise Linear Chaotic Maps  
Piecewise linear chaotic maps (PWLCMs) are simple non-linear dynamical 
systems with large positive Lyapunov exponents. In [259], the authors  show that 
PWLCMs have several brilliant chaotic properties that can be exploited in chaotic 
cryptographic algorithms. PWLCM has perfect behaviour and high dynamical 
properties such as invariant distribution, auto-correlation function, ergodicity, large 
positive Lyapunov exponent, and mixing property [260]. Iterations of PWLCM with 
initial value and control parameters generate a sequence of real numbers between 0 
and 1, which is called an orbit. A large positive Lyapunov exponent means that the 
system shows chaotic behaviour over large orbits [261]. Correlation functions are a 
very important test of the correlation over time and space between random variables 









































            
( 3-10) 
where x0 is the initial condition value, P is the control parameter, xn [0, 1], and P 
(0, 0.5).  
PWLCMs are the simplest kind of chaotic systems, which need one division and few 
additions. A skew Tent map is a PWLCM defined by a generalized form of Tent map 
that is very similar to a Tent map with small differences (see equation 3-9). A more 




complex example of PWLCMs is defined by equation 3-10. It is very clear from 
equation 3-8 that f(0, p) = 0, f2(0.5, p) = 0, f3(1, p) = 0 for any P   (0, 0.5). Thus, we 
should avoid those values as initial parameters of xn.  
3.3 Chaos-based Cryptography 
Chaotic systems and cryptography algorithms have similar properties 
including sensitivity to any change or changes in the initial parameters, 
unpredictability over long periods, and random-like behaviour [225, 262, 263]. 
Therefore, understanding the relationship between conventional cryptography 
algorithms and chaos-based cryptography algorithms is very important [264]. The 
similarities and differences between cryptography algorithms and chaotic systems are 
shown in Table 3-1 [31, 224, 264, 265]. The main difference between chaotic 
systems and cryptography algorithms is that encryption transformations are defined 
on finite sets of integers, but chaotic systems are defined on floating point numbers 
[224]. The parameters in chaotic maps are meaningful if they are real numbers, 
which can be used in the cryptographic algorithms as encryption and decryption 
keys. 
Table  3-1: Comparison between chaotic systems and cryptographic algorithms [31, 
224, 264, 265] 
Chaotic Systems Cryptographic  Algorithms 
 Parameters (Real)   Key (Boolean)  
 Sensitive to change the control 
parameters or initial conditions 
 Diffusion  
 Ergodicity  Confusion 
 Using set of real numbers   Finite set of integers  
 Iterations   Rounds  
 Deterministic dynamical  Deterministic Pseudorandom 
 Structure complexity   Algorithm complexity  




In well-designed cryptographic algorithms, the influence of changing one bit of the 
plaintext or the key spreads over the ciphertext. On the other hand, chaotic systems’ 
iterations are used to spread the initial region over the entire chaotic system space. 
Cryptography confusion and diffusion properties aim to complicate the statistical 
relation between the ciphertext and the key and between the plaintext and the 
ciphertext, respectively [14, 177]. The chaotic mixing property and sensitivity to 
initial condition are very close to the diffusion property of a cryptographic 
encryption system [266]. The ergodicity property indicates that it is very difficult to 
predict the system behaviour based on the values of the initial conditions, which is 
similar to the confusion property [60]. Rounds in cryptography algorithms are very 
similar to iteration in chaotic systems.  
3.4 Chaos Applications in Cryptography 
Chaos theory has attracted the cryptography field due to its characteristics such 
as deterministic nature, sensitivity to initial conditions, unpredictability, and complex 
structure [224]. Over the past two decades, a vast number of papers have been 
published on chaos-based cryptography including chaotic block ciphers [13, 32-68], 
chaotic cryptography hash functions [30, 63, 69-89], and chaotic pseudorandom 
number generators [34, 62, 68, 90-117]. Simultaneously, many cryptanalytic 
researchers have analyzed the proposed chaos-based cryptographic algorithms and 
found that some of them are not secure enough and/or are slow algorithms [118-155]. 
Therefore, the main challenge in this research area is to design secure and fast chaos-
based cryptography algorithms. In the last chapter of this dissertation, we will make 
some suggestions for future research in this area. 
The first published paper on a cipher-based dynamical system was by Wolfram in 
1985; this is a stream cipher algorithm based on cellular automation [105]. Two 
years later another paper was published on a public-key cryptosystem based on 
cellular automation in [267]. In 1989, Matthews published the first chaos-based 
stream cipher algorithm, which attracted the attention of many researchers [103]. The 




proposed stream cipher design was based on a generalized logistic map. From 1989 
to 1992, many papers on chaos-based cryptography were published [55, 102, 268-
270]. Unfortunately, later on some researchers showed that proposed chaotic 
cryptography algorithms have certain problems [118-120]. Consequently, in the next 
five years very few chaos-based cryptography algorithms were designed. In 1997, a 
considerable number of chaos-based cryptographic algorithms were proposed [13, 
227-236, 265]. The three most common cryptography primitives are block cipher, 
hash function and pseudorandom number generator [271]. In the following 
subsections, we will give a comprehensive review of previous work on chaotic block 
ciphers, chaotic cryptographic hash functions and chaotic pseudorandom number 
generators. 
3.4.1 Block Cipher Based on Chaotic Systems 
As we discussed before, a block cipher is a transformation function that maps 
units of plaintext bits to ciphertext bits of the same unit size under the control of the 
secret key. The decryption method divides the input ciphertext into blocks of equal 
length and then applies the decryption function to each block using the same shared 
secret key. To evaluate the security of a block cipher, we assume that the attacker can 
access all transmitted ciphers and knows the encryption algorithm details without 
knowing the shared secret key. A block cipher is considered totally broken if the 
shared secret key is discovered, and it is considered partially broken if part of the 
plaintext is retrieved [177]. A well-designed block cipher encryption algorithm 
should have very high confusion and diffusion properties.  
Over the past two decades, many researchers were utilized a chaotic system to design 
block cipher algorithms in order to provide high security [13, 32-68]. Unfortunately, 
some of the proposed algorithms are described as insecure and/or slow algorithms 
[119, 121-136]. Therefore, further research is still needed to design fast and secure 
chaotic block cipher algorithms. In this section, we will review chaos-based block 
cipher cryptosystems and give brief details of insecure and slow algorithms.  




In 1991 [55], Habutsu et al. suggested a new secret key cryptosystem based on 
iterating a one-dimensional chaotic map using a generalized form of tent map (see 
equation 3-9).  They used the parameter α as secret key where the value of p [0.4, 
0.6]. The algorithm encrypts blocks of 64-bits of plaintext each time, and the initial 
value is a part of the plaintext between zero and one. The encryption process 
involves iterating the plaintext 75 times to produce the ciphertext. The main 
disadvantage of Habutsu et al.’s algorithm is that the ciphertext size is much larger 
than the plaintext size [55]. At the same conference, Eli Biham published a paper to 
describe the two attacks on Habutsu et al.’s algorithm: chosen-ciphertext attack and 
known-plaintext attack [119]. In addition, he pointed out some disadvantages of the 
suggested algorithm, such as the large size of the plaintext and small range of 
ciphertext, which could help an attacker to find the linear relationship between the 
plaintext and the ciphertext.  
Several modified versions of Habutsu et al.’s algorithm were suggested to improve 
its security [13, 56-59]. In [56], the use of cellular automata to design a new 
cryptosystem was suggested. In [57], a new block cipher was designed based on a 
skew tent map as a one-to-one chaotic map. In [58], the authors proposed a new fast 
communication system based on a multiple piecewise linear chaotic map instead of 
using one only. In [59], the authors proposed a chaotic cryptosystem based on a tent 
map to provide higher security. In 2003, the proposed system in [58] was attacked by 
G. Alvarez et al. [122] using different attack techniques.  
In 1998, M.S. Baptista published a new cryptographic system based on an iterated 
logistic map [60]. Baptista’s method works by dividing the domain of the logistic 
map from 0.2 to 0.8 to 256-site with each region assigned to one character of the 
English language. The sender will choose the initial value of the logistic map and 
iterate it until it reaches the correspondence region of the first character. Then it will 
take the result of the iterated logistic map of the previous character as the initial 
value for the next character and iterate it until it falls in the region of the next 




character and so on, until the whole message has been processed. The number of 
iterations of each character will be the correspondence ciphertext of the plaintext.  
There have been several researchers attacks on Baptista’s cryptographic system [123, 
131-134]. According to W. Wang et al. [61], this method has two main drawbacks. 
First, the distribution of ciphertext is not sufficiently spread out and it has too few 
iterations. The second drawback is that it is too slow and random numbers are 
repeated early. In 2001, Jakimoski et al. show two attacks on the algorithms of 
Baptista and Alvarez using known-plaintext attack, and they point out that they are 
not competitive for standard algorithms [133]. 
E. Alvarez et al. presented a new symmetric block cipher encryption approach based 
on a tent map [62]. The encryption algorithm can be described as follows: firstly 
choose the control parameter k as secret key, then choose plaintext block of size bmax 
size in integer for each plaintext block, bi = bmax. Next, choose the threshold Ui to 
generate the chain Ci according to the rule: xn ≤ Ui  0 and xn ≥ Ui  1. As the 
chain is generated, keep looking for the pattern bi in C; when it is found, record the 
(Ui, bi, xni) as the ciphertext of plaintext of the block size bi, and so on until the entire 
plaintext has been encrypted. Thus, this algorithm encrypts each block of plaintext to 
triple blocks cipher based on a d-dimensional chaotic system. A few months after 
this method was proposed, G. Alvarez et al. [121] showed that E. Alvarez’s method 
can be easily broken by four different methods and found some other weaknesses. He 
attacks the method using four methods: chosen-plaintext attack, chosen-ciphertext 
attack, ciphertext-only attack and known-plaintext attack. 
In [63], Wong proposed a new cryptography block encryption based on Baptista’s 
method. He proposed a cryptography system using a dynamical look-up table instead 
of a static one. Therefore, during the encryption/decryption process, the look-up table 
contents will be continuously updating. This update will lead to the building of a 
complicated relationship between plaintext and ciphertext. Wong’s method works by 
building a look-up table by dividing the interval range of the logistic map to match 
each possible input to equal the width range. Then, the ith message block is 




encrypted by iterating the logistic map until it falls in the corresponding region, as in 
Baptista’s method.  If the number of iterations is large enough to be secure, it will be 
sent as ciphertext of the input plaintext. To encrypt the next block of data, one must 
change the position of the ith with the jth block based on a certain formula and so on 
until the end of the message.  
Wong’s algorithm is considered fast and secure compared to Baptista’s method, but 
the ciphertext length is still twice that of the plaintext. As the final look-up table does 
not depend on a key, this is main source of attacks on the system. Later on, G. 
Alvarez et al. pointed out that Wong’s algorithms [63] are inefficient and insecure 
and Baptista’s algorithm’s weakness is reproduced in Wong’s algorithms [132]. 
Moreover, using the same secret key twice helps the attacker to break the system.  
In 2003, Pareek et al. proposed a new cryptosystem based on a logistic map as a 
chaotic system [32]. The secret key in this scheme is generated externally to prevent 
successful attacks on the chaotic system. The initial conditions and the control 
parameters of the chaotic system are not used explicitly in the subkeys generation to 
provide a more secure cryptosystem. In [124], the authors explained how to attack 
Pareek et al.’s block cipher cryptosystem using a known-plaintext attack, choosing 
plaintext attack and ciphertext attack. Moreover, they pointed out that Pareek et al.’s 
cryptosystem has low encryption speed, and it would be inexpensive to attack it.  
In [64], the author presented a chaotic encryption scheme for digital communication 
based on a Baker map that encrypts wave signal instead of symbolic sequence at the 
physical level. In 2005, Guan et al. proposed an image encryption algorithm using an 
Arnold map to shuffle the positions of the image pixels and Chen’s chaotic system to 
change the grey levels of the shuffled pixels [65]. Later on, Cokal and Solak wrote a 
short paper that described chosen-plaintext and known-plaintext attacks on Guan et 
al.’s algorithm [135]. Another two image encryption algorithms based on chaotic 
maps have been proposed with permutation operation and XOR-like transformations 
of shuffled pixels in encryption functions [66, 67]. In [136], Arroyo et al. have 
discussed and shown the weakness of the two schemes and described how to attack 




them using the chosen-plaintext attack method. A chaotic block cipher algorithm for 
wireless sensor network was proposed; it was claimed to be a very secure algorithm 
that can be used in confidential communications [35]. Afterwards a group of 
researchers attacked the proposed algorithm using differential cryptanalysis and 
proved it to be a very weak algorithm [129].  
In 2005, Pareek et al. proposed another cryptosystem using multiple one-dimensional 
chaotic systems with external secret key of variable length [33]. This scheme is a 
block cipher-based encryption algorithm of variable-length block size; the number of 
chaotic iterations and initial conditions depend on the session key and cipher of the 
previous block. In 2007, Wei et al. [125] explained the fundamental flaw of  Pareek 
et al.’s cryptosystem and showed how to attack it through its flaw. Moreover, they 
suggested some modification to avoid the flaw and to overcome security problems. 
Later on, Chengqing pointed out that there are still some security problems in the 
modifications by Wei et al. [125], such as the existence of weak keys, the fact that 
some intermediate ciphers are not random, and that the secret key can be attacked 
using known-plaintext attack technique [126]. Moreover, they showed that the 
proposed modification is not secure and suffers from the same problem as the 
original scheme. 
In 2006 [34], Xianga et al. proposed a novel block cipher algorithm using a chaotic 
logistic map to provide a fast and secure encryption algorithm. In the same year, 
Wang et al. [127] explained how to break this encryption algorithm using chosen-
plaintext attack. Furthermore, they suggested a remedial solution to avoid this type of 
attack. In 2009 [128], Wang and Yu showed that the original algorithm in [34] and 
the modified version in [127] are not secure and suffer from the same fatal flaws. 
They could recover the plaintext by applying chosen-plaintext attack. Furthermore, 
they proposed an improvement to avoid this flaw and enhance the security without 
losing the original advantages.  
In 2008 [35], Shuai et al. proposed a new block cipher based on chaotic systems. The 
subkeys are generated through logistic mapping and Feistel discrete encryption 




structure based on chaos operations. One-turn permutation is used to encrypt/decrypt 
every single block (8-bit). They used small encryption and decryption block size to 
be visible for implementing a wireless sensor network. The proposed algorithm is 
described in [129] as an insecure algorithm due to the small number of rounds and 
because the calculation precision is too small. They presented how to attack the 
encryption scheme using differential cryptanalysis and deduced the related subkeys 
of r rounds using chosen-plaintext attack and brute-force attack together.  
In 2009 [43], Yang proposed a novel block cipher based on iterating chaotic map 
with output feedback. He used the output feedback instead of simply mixing the 
chaotic signal to provide better security than other cryptosystems. A logistic map is 
used as a binary sequence generator with the secret key the initial parameter; he then 
used the current state of logistic map as the value of three binary values. XOR and 
mod operations are utilized to provide high confusion and diffusion properties. The 
first step is to divide the input message into a number of sequences of length 8 bytes, 
and the value of Aj is computed based on seven simple equations. The next step is to 
permute the message block pi by applying circle left shift on Di bits. The last step is 
to calculate the cipher by XORing the permutated plaintext with Aj variable value. 
The decryption process is similar to the encryption process, but in the last step the 
ciphertext is XORed with Aj instead of the plaintext with Aj (more details can be 
found in [43]). 
In 2010 [50], Huang and Lin presented a new block cipher algorithm based on a 
combination of logistic map and substitution permutation encryption network. A 
logistic map is used as a chaotic system to utilize its characteristics in S-boxes and P-
boxes. A chaotic system is used with S-boxes and P-boxes to ensure the confusion 
and the diffusion properties. This algorithm encrypts 64-bits into the same length of 
ciphertext. The secret key is a combination of logistic map initial condition and user 
master key, which is used to generate the other eight subkeys. In each iteration, 8 × 8 
S-boxes and 64 × 64 P-boxes are used as substitute transformation and replacement 
transformation, respectively (more details can be found in [50]).  





Figure  3-8: Encryption and decryption processes of [68] 
In 2011, a Mexican research group proposed a new block cipher encryption 
algorithm based on a tent map [68]. The tent map was chosen to generate a sequence 
of bits as it does not have stability islands such as the islands in a logistic map. 
Stability islands are the non-chaotic areas in the chaotic systems with some values of 
the control parameter over the chaotic interval. A tent map is scaled to [0, 2n] to 
provide higher precision and easier computer implementation; this means that, with a 
bigger value of n, a better encryption approach will be given. The encryption 
function consists of r rounds of chaotic map that processes blocks of size 64-bit. The 
encryption result is assigned to variables xi+1,0, xi+1,1, xi+1,2, xi+1,3 as shown in Figure 3-
8 (a). The decryption process consists of inverse r rounds of the chaotic map using 
respective decryption subkeys, and from Bi+1 the value Bi is calculated. The result of 
Bi is assigned to the variable xi,0, xi,1, xi,2, xi,3 as shown in Figure 3-8 (b).  
3.4.2 Hash Function Based on Chaotic Systems 
SHA-1 is one of the most widely-used hash functions employed in numerous 
security applications and protocols. Collisions of well-known hash functions such as 
PIREMD, MD4,  MD5 and SHA-1 have been found [156-158]. Since SHA-1 was 
attacked in 2005, many researchers have been working on designing a new, 
alternative secure hash function [165]. Designing a secure hash function based on 
chaotic systems has increasingly attracted researchers’ interest due to its 
characteristics which are analogous to hash function requirements [30, 70, 76, 81, 87, 
88].  




Over the past decade, many researchers have utilized chaotic systems to design a 
cryptography hash function to provide high security [30, 63, 69-89]. Unfortunately, 
some of the proposed algorithms are described as insecure and/or slow algorithms 
[132, 137-146]. Therefore, further research is still needed to design a fast and secure 
chaotic cryptography hash function. In this section, we will review the chaos-based 
cryptography hash functions and give brief details of insecure and slow algorithms.  
To the best of the present researcher’s knowledge, in 2003 Wong was the first to 
propose hash function-based chaotic systems. Wong published a paper that combined 
chaotic cryptosystem with cryptography hash function [69]. The proposed chaotic 
encryption scheme with dynamic look-up table in [63] uses a dynamical look-up 
table instead of a static one. He found the final look-up table depends only on the 
input message. Therefore, he suggested using the final look-up table as the hash 
value of the encrypted message to check the authentication and completeness of the 
input message. Later on, G. Alvarez et al. point out that Wang’s algorithms [63, 69] 
are inefficient and insecure, and Baptista’s algorithm weakness was reproduced in 
Wang’s algorithms [132]. They showed how to break the system in special cases 
without knowing the secret key. Moreover, they pointed out that the proposed hash is 
not considered as a MAC function which should depend on the key, as the final look-
up table does not depend on the key.  
In 2005 [86], a hash function based on a chaotic tent map was proposed; this  
processes arbitrary input messages to produce hash values of twice the length of the 
input message block length. Several statistical security analyses were applied, and 
these showed that the proposed hashing scheme is strong enough against all types of 
attacks and more efficient than Wang’s hashing scheme [69].  
Xiao et al. (2005) proposed a new keyed hash function based on chaotic map with 
changeable parameters [70]. They proposed a new keyed hash function based on a 
one-dimension piecewise chaotic system in which the secret key is X0, H0 [0, 1].  
The algorithm accepts any message with different sizes to produce 128-bits as the 
final hash value. It calculates the final hash value without padding to produce a faster 




keyed hash function than other functions. The hash value in Xiao et al.’s algorithm is 
produced directly from three fixed positions in chaotic trajectory. Therefore, it is 
consider to have weak collision resistance where the hash space is not fully covered 
from these three points; also, if the message is too short the key could be attacked 
[87]. 
In 2007, J. Zhang et al. proposed a chaotic keyed hash function based on a 
feedforward–feedback non-linear digital ﬁlter [87]. They designed a feedforward–
feedback non-linear ﬁlter as a chaotic dynamical system with uniform distribution in 
which they introduced chaotic shift keying (CSK) and cipher block chaining (CBC) 
modes to expedite diffusion and confusion. This filter is exploited in designing the 
proposed keyed hash function. They claimed that the proposed hash scheme has good 
cryptography properties and is easy to implement by hardware and software. (For 
more details about this hashing scheme, please see reference [87]). 
In 2008, a parallel keyed hash function was proposed based on piecewise linear 
chaotic map and 4-dimension cat map (see Figure 3-9) [76]. In 2009, another 
research group proposed an improvement on the original hashing scheme to provide 
higher security [84]. In the same year, another research group analyzed the security 
of the original parallel algorithm [140]. They showed how to attack the scheme with 
differential cryptanalysis and pointed out the problem of five special pairs’ weak 
keys. Wang and Zhao proposed a parallel keyed hash function based on a chaotic 
neural network [81]. One year later, the security of the proposed algorithm was 
analyzed [143]. In 2011, Huang analyzed the hashing scheme vulnerability and 
proposed an enhancement to remove the security problems [84].  
 
Figure  3-9: Simplified structure of encryption scheme in [76] 




In 2008, a research group published a paper on designing a new hash function using 
chaos theory (CHA-1) built based on two simple functions and chaos theory [30]. 
They proposed an unkeyed hash function called CHA-1 that produces 160-bit hash 
value, with a security factor equal to 280 brute-force attacks. CHA-1 accepts any 
message length shorter than 284 bits and it is sensitive to any change in the input 
message. On average, SHA-1 execution time is three times faster than CHA-1, but 
CHA-1 provides 217 more security than SHA-1. In terms of input message length, 
CHA-1 accepts any message shorter than 284 while SHA-1 accepts only messages 
shorter than 264. From the present researcher’s point of view, CHA-1 may have two 
disadvantages. Firstly, it has simple functions similar to SHA-1 functions and it 
could be vulnerable to Wang et al.’s attack. Secondly, CHA-1 is three times slower 
than SHA-1 and will become slower as the message size increases; therefore it is 
unsuitable for e-commerce applications. Thus far, there have been no known 
successful attacks on CHA-1.  
 
Figure  3-10: Overview of CBHF structure 
In March 2009, M. Amin et al. suggested a simple implementation of un-keyed hash 
function using a tent map (see Figure 3-10) [88].  They explained the general idea of 
their algorithm in one paragraph without giving sufficient details of how it works. 
The general idea shows that it was designed based on a tent map and XOR operation. 
In general, the algorithm works by dividing the input message into n blocks of 
size1024-bits. If the last message block is less than 1024-bits, it will be appended by 
one bit ‘1’ followed by n number of ‘0’s. The tent map accepts two main inputs: the 
initial value Ki and the message block Mi. Each block in the message will process 
through the chaotic tent map to produce an intermediary hash value and so on until it 




has processed all message blocks. The final output will be 128-bits representing the 
hash value of the input message.  
In June 2009, we described how to attack the keyed and unkeyed versions of CBHF 
[137]. The details of our attack are described in chapter 4 .We proofed the attack 
very robustly, both theoretically and practically. In case of keyed hash function, we 
were able to append many blocks to the end of any original message without 
changing the final hash value. On the other hand, we were able to attack the un-
keyed version of CBHF by having two totally different messages hashing to the same 
hash value. In conclusion, CBHF is a very weak hash function and the keyed and 
unkeyed functions are totally insecure. In 2010, another research group analyzed a 
computational collision problem in the proposed algorithm [144].  
In 2010 [89], Xiao et al. proposed a hash function based on a piecewise linear chaotic 
map, which has modification detection and localization capabilities. It supports a 
parallel processing mode to provide higher performance. The input message is 
divided into 2048-bits and each block is inserted into a look-up table of 256-blocks. 
PWLCM chaotic map is iterated to process the look-up table array. The look-up table 
values are grouped into 16 vertical and 16 horizontal groups. The final hash value is 
the result of XORing the 16 vertical and 16 horizontal groups with each other. In 
2011, the security of the proposed algorithm was analyzed [145]. It was shown that 
this hashing scheme is not secure, with weak confusion and diffusion properties, and 
the parallel structure resulted in collision. Moreover, the cost of breaking this scheme 
using the birthday attack is low.  
3.4.3 Random Number Generators Based on Chaotic Maps 
Since chaotic systems generate unpredictable results, many researchers have 
been attracted by chaotic systems to design pseudorandom number generators [34, 
62, 68, 90-117]. Pseudorandom number generators’ (PRNGs) results are mainly used 
on stream cipher algorithms as key streams that simply XOR with plaintext to 
generate the correspondence ciphertext using any mode of operation [108]. 




Moreover, it is very important to generate the secret keys and initialization variables 
by PRNGs [272]. In the literature, many cipher algorithms have been implemented 
based on chaotic pseudorandom number generators (CPRNGs) to generate the 
keystream. In CPRNGs, many chaotic systems have been utilized including 
Piecewise non-linear chaotic map, Logistic map, Tent map, and Henon attractor. 
Some researchers have proposed using multiple chaotic systems to enhance the 
PRNG security [105]. 
Over the past two decades, many researchers have utilized chaotic systems to design 
pseudorandom number generators to provide high security [34, 62, 68, 90-117]. 
Unfortunately, some of the proposed generators are described as insecure and/or 
slow algorithms [118, 120, 121, 136, 147-155, 270]. Therefore, further research is 
still needed to design fast and secure chaotic pseudorandom number generators. In 
this section, we will review chaotic pseudorandom number generators and give brief 
details of insecure and slow algorithms.  
As we mentioned before, the first published paper on ciphers based on a dynamical 
system was that of Wolfram in 1985; this was a stream cipher algorithm based on 
cellular automation [105]. Cellular automation is used to generate a random binary 
sequence that is XORed with the plaintext to produce the correspondence ciphertext. 
In 1989, Matthews published the first chaos-based stream cipher algorithm, which 
attracted the attention of many researchers [103]. He suggested using a chaotic 
function to generate a random sequence as system keys instead of pads. Matthews 
utilized chaotic system characteristics to generate a random (unpredictable) sequence 
with sensitivity to any change in the initial conditions or system parameters.  
In 1999, E. Alvarez et al. presented a new symmetric block cipher encryption 
approach based on chaotic systems [62]. The proposed algorithm explained the use 
of a tent map as a chaotic system. They used chaotic systems to generate a 
pseudorandom sequence from its orbit using a certain threshold. Then, they searched 
for the position of the plaintext in the generated sequence and took its information to 
represent the correspondence ciphertext. A few months later, G. Alvarez et al. [121] 




pointed out that E. Alvarez et al.’s method with a tent map can be easily broken by 
four different methods, and also found certain other weaknesses.  
In 2001, Shujuna et al. proposed a pseudorandom binary sequence generator based 
on coupled chaotic systems (see Figure 3-11) [108]. They claimed that they were 
using two different chaotic systems instead of one just to provide higher security. In 
the same year, another new stream cipher based on a logistic map was proposed 
[110]. This uses two or more chaotic systems to generate pseudorandom sequences. 
The authors used two nearby logistic map trajectories to generate the pseudorandom 
sequence with high complexity. The plaintext is XORed with the generated sequence 
to give the ciphertext. In 2007, Skrobek showed how to break the proposed system 
and pointed out that using binary representation of some chaotic systems with XOR 
operation would help the attacker to predicate the ciphertext [151].  
 
Figure  3-11: Pseudorandom number generator based on couple chaotic systems 
[108] 
In 2003, Lee et al. proposed a chaotic stream cipher based on the composition of 
multiple chaotic systems [106]. The proposed algorithm generates pseudorandom 
bytes sequences based on a chaotic system, and then applies certain permutations 
using a two-dimensional chaotic map. Thus far, there have been no successful attacks 
on this algorithm. In the same year, new chaos-based pseudorandom number 
generators were proposed for cryptography applications [91]. In 2005, another 
research group proposed a pseudorandom number generator derived from a discrete 
chaotic map that defined over long interval [116]. 




In 2006, three chaotic pseudorandom number generators were proposed for 
cryptography applications [34, 109, 111]. Wang et al. proposed a new pseudorandom 
binary generator based on n-dimensional non-linear digital filter and chaotic systems 
[109]. They used this filter to increase the randomness and security of the proposed 
generator. In the same year, Xiang proposed a cipher encryption algorithm based on 
a logistic map combined with XOR operation, which can be considered an improved 
version of Baptista’s scheme [34]. They used a combination of XOR and circular bit 
shift in the encryption and the decryption processes. A modified version of Xiang’s 
scheme was proposed by Yu and Cao; they replaced the logistic map with a chaotic 
neural network with time-varying delay and some other modifications [111]. They 
generated a pseudorandom sequence using a chaotic neural network.  
In 2007, Li et al. showed how to break Yu and Cao’s scheme and Yiang’s scheme 
using chosen-plaintext attack and differential known-plaintext attack [155]. The core 
of the two schemes’ security is the pseudorandom number generator. They proved 
that the pseudorandom number generator does not have uniform distribution and 
sufficient randomness. In 2007, chaotic image encryption was proposed based on 
high-dimensional cat map and tent map as chaotic systems to generate a 
pseudorandom key stream with stream cipher architecture [113].  Thus far, there 
have been no successful attacks on this algorithm.  
In 2008, a new chaotic stream cipher for digital communication was proposed using 
one-dimensional chaotic systems such as Tent map and Logistic map [112]. This 
scheme utilized the symbolic dynamics of chaotic system-based synchronization to 
generate a pseudorandom sequence as a keystream based on the value of the secret 
key. The plaintext is encrypted using the symbolic dynamics of the logistic map or 
tent map with certain values of its parameters and initial conditions. In 2011 [153], a 
research group analyzed the proposed stream cipher encryption scheme. They were 
able to deduce and estimate chaotic systems’ parameters with low error rate, and 
pointed out that a tent map is not a good source for a pseudorandom number 




generator and that the logistic map key stream has to be generated from a positive 
Lyapunov exponent.  
Later on, researchers proposed two pseudorandom number generators based on a 
logistic map to generate pseudorandom binary sequence for cryptography stream 
cipher [117]. The first generator is based on one logistic map and the second is based 
on two logistic maps. In the second generator, the initial conditions of the two maps 
should be independent (r0≠r0, x0≠y0), where x0, y0 (0, 1) and r0, r0 (3.99996, 4]. 
They calculate the remainder by dividing the sum of the two output values (xn+1, 
yn+1) by 1 (see equation 3-12). The algorithm generates the binary pseudorandom 
sequences based on equation 3-13. They tested their proposed pseudorandom number 
generator using Beker and Piper’s suite [273] and FIPS 140-1 suite [274]. They 
claimed that the proposed random number generator passed all FIPS 140-1 and 
Beker and Piper’s suites with sequence length of 100,000 bits and significance level 
α = 0.05.  In this thesis, we refer to logistic map pseudorandom number generator as 
LPRNG. The randomness of this generator is analyzed in this research in chapter 8. 
    )1(1 nnn yryy  .           ( 3-11) 














SumFZ      ( 3-13) 
In 2009 [114], Patidar et al. proposed a novel chaos-based cryptosystem with simple 
mixing operation. Intermediate chaotic keystreams are generated based on a logistic 
map and chaotic standard map to provide high confusion and diffusion properties. In 
2010 [154], Rhouma et al. analyzed Patidar et al.’s chaotic cryptosystem with only 
one pair of plaintext or ciphertext. In the same year [115], Patidar et al. proposed a 
modified version of the proposed algorithm. They claimed to have overcome the 
security problems in the original algorithm. In 2011 [155], Li et al. analyzed the 
modified version and showed that it is still insecure to known-plaintext and known-




ciphertext attack. They showed that the generated sequence based on logistic map is 
not random and very weak. 
In 2011,  a new encryption algorithm based on a tent map was proposed [68]. As the 
tent map does not has Stability Island, it was chosen as a chaotic map to generate a 
sequence of pseudorandom bits in this algorithm. The tent map was scaled to [0, 2n] 
to have a higher precision and easier computer implementation; this means that, with 
a bigger value of n, a better encryption approach will be given. This approach 
encrypts blocks of 64-bit length, which is divided into 4 equal sub-blocks. The 
encryption process consists of r rounds of chaotic map using encryption key. The 
result will be assigned to variables xi+1,0, xi+1,1, xi+1,2, xi+1,3. The result of the proposed 
chaotic pseudorandom number generator was tested using NIST statistical test suite, 
and it confirmed its randomness by passing all the tests. 
3.5 Implementation Issues 
Implementing chaotic systems on digital computers using finite-precision 
may cause dynamical degradation as the result of implementing dynamical system on 
a computer is not exactly the same with the theoretical one [264]. Therefore, chaotic 
systems’ properties may become non-ideal as the cycle length is shorter and degrades 
orbit distribution and correlation [236, 275, 276]. Consideration of this issue is very 
important for the performance and security of the chaotic cryptography. This issue 
has been studied intensively in the last two decades and many different solutions 
have been proposed in the literature [59, 118, 120, 259, 270, 275, 277-283].  The 
three main solutions were proposed by several researchers using higher precisions 
[59, 118, 120, 282, 283], cascading multiple chaotic maps [275, 281], and random 
perturbation of the chaotic systems [278-280]. The GNU multiple-precision 
arithmetic library (GMP) is used with chaotic cryptography systems to solve the 
deterioration problem by providing higher precisions [284, 285]. The perturbation of 
system variables is found to be better than the perturbation of control parameters, 
which is performed by generating pseudorandom sequences and then XORing with 
variable parameters every iteration to increase the cycle length or using other mask 




operations [259]. In order to obtain a longer periodic, we suggest using two chaotic 
maps that are independent of the initial values and the control parameters, and then 
XORing the results of the two systems. Moreover, cascading multiple chaotic maps 
could affect the performance of the cryptographic systems and would not be 
appropriate for many applications.  
The two most important requirements of any cryptographic system are high security 
and low implementation cost. Therefore, a well-designed cryptographic system is 
one with simpler hardware and software implementation at low cost with very high 
security. A secure cryptography system with very high implementation cost could be 
easily achieved with a combination of very complicated mathematical equations, but 
many applications require a high-security cryptography system at low 
implementation cost. The following issues should be considered in designing and 
implementing chaotic cryptography systems:   
1. A lower implementation cost is achieved by selecting a simpler chaotic 
system. 
2. Chaotic system parameters should be carefully chosen with a large positive 
Lyapunov exponent and no stability islands. 
3. Using one or two simple operations in chaotic cryptography systems could be 
useful to break the systems more easily. 
4. A well-designed cryptography system provides high security and fast 
computational speed. 
5. Parallel implementation will be useful to implement complex chaotic systems 
that provide fast and secure cryptography systems for many applications such 
as e-commerce and online banking. 
6. Higher precisions, cascading multiple chaotic maps, or random perturbation 
of chaotic systems could be used to solve the digital degradation problem. 





Chaos theory has attracted the cryptography field due to its characteristics, 
such as deterministic nature, sensitivity to initial conditions, unpredictability, and 
complex structure. In recent years, several cryptographic systems based on chaotic 
systems have been proposed, such as cipher encryption algorithms, hash functions, 
and pseudorandom number generators. Unfortunately, some of the proposed 
algorithms suffer from security problems or slow performance. The main challenge 
in this research area is to design a secure and fast chaos-based cryptography 
algorithm. In this chapter, we gave an overview of chaos theory and presented a 
literature review of chaotic cryptography. We explained in detail about chaos theory, 
chaotic maps and Lyapunov exponent. Moreover, we explained the relationship 
between chaotic systems and cryptography algorithms. In the rest of this chapter, we 
briefly reviewed the literature and past efforts to utilize chaotic maps in cryptography 
to design cipher encryption algorithms, cryptography hash functions, and 
cryptography pseudorandom number generators. Finally, we discussed some 
implementation issues.  
To conclude, the existing work on chaos-based cryptography by other researchers is 
still suffering from security and performance problems due to the incorrect choice of 
chaotic system, chaotic system stability, simplicity of design at the expense of 
security, and complexity of design at the expense of performance. Therefore, there is 
still room for further improvement by finding new chaotic cryptography algorithms 
with high security and performance. Additional advanced research is needed on new 
chaotic cryptography algorithms, especially block ciphers, hash functions, and 
pseudorandom number generators for e-commerce and other applications. In this 
chapter, we explored the literature on chaotic cryptography algorithms.  In the next 
chapters, we propose novel chaotic cryptography algorithms, including chaotic block 
cipher, hash function, and chaotic pseudorandom number generator, which handle 
performance and security problems. Moreover, we analyze the security of one of the 
proposed chaotic hash functions and other chaotic pseudorandom number generators. 







4. Cryptanalysis of Chaos-based Hash Function 
(CBHF) 
In 2009, Amin et al. proposed a new hash function based on chaotic systems for 
cryptography applications (CBHF). In the same year (2009), we published a paper 
that describes how to break keyed and unkeyed versions of Amin et al.’s hash 
function. In this chapter, we show how to break both keyed and unkeyed versions of 
CBHF hash function in detail with two real collision examples.  
4.1 Introduction 
n 2009, Amin et al. suggested a new hash function based on chaotic systems for 
cryptography applications (CBHF). In the same year (2009), we published a 
paper that describes how to break keyed and unkeyed versions of Amin et al.’s 
hash function [137]. One year later (2010), another research group analyzed the 
security of the unkeyed version of Amin et al.’s hash function [144]. In this chapter, 
we show how to break both keyed and unkeyed versions of CBHF hash function in 
detail with two real collision examples.  
In this chapter, we analyze the security of the recently proposed hash function 
(CBHF). The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes details 
of the CBHF hash function. Section 4.3 discusses details of our analysis of CBHF 
hash function. Section 4.4 describes Xaio et al.’s analysis of CBHF hash function. 
I 




Section 4.5 comments on future research on hash function. Finally, the conclusion of 
this chapter is provided in section 4.6. 
4.2 Details Chaos-based Hash Function (CBHF) 
In 2009 [80], Amin et al. proposed a new chaos-based hash function for 
cryptography applications. They suggested a simple design of unkeyed hash function 
based on a well-known chaotic tent map. They claimed that they could construct a 
keyed version of the proposed hash function (CBHF) by treating the initial values in 
the unkeyed hash function (CBHF) as the secret key. The general design structure of 
the proposed hash function is illustrated in Figure 4-1.  Amin et al. explained the 
general idea of their hash function in one paragraph without giving much detail on 
how it works. The algorithm’s general description shows that the design is mainly 
based on tent map and XOR operations. In general, any hash function mainly based 
on XOR operation is not secure at all. A well-designed hash function should be 
collision-free and public, where the security of the hash function should not depend 
on hiding the details [8].  
 
Figure  4-1: Overview of CBHF structure 
A tent map is a simple one-dimensional map that generates periodic chaotic 
behaviour similar to a logistic map; it is governed by equation 4-1. It is an iterated 
dynamical system function that exhibits chaotic behaviours (orbits).  
௥ܶ(ݔ) = ൝ ݎݔ          , 0 ≤  ݔ < 1 2⁄ 
ݎ(1 − ݔ), 1 2⁄ < ݔ ≤  1           ( 4-1) 




where r is the control parameter and x is the initial condition, ݎ ∈ [0, 2]and ݔ ∈[0, 1]. 
The proposed hash function works by dividing the input message into 1024-bit 
blocks ܯ௜, 0 ≤  ݅ ≤  ݊ − 1. If the last message block size Mn-1 is less than 1024 bits, 
it will be padded by adding a single one bit followed by the necessary number of 
zero bits (100…0)2. Then, the value of the secret key is assigned either to the tent 
map’s control parameter (r) or to the initial condition (x), and then the message 
blocks are assigned to the other variable. Finally, all message blocks are encoded and 
the final hash value (Hn) is generated (see equation 4-2).  The core function of the 
proposed algorithm is shown in figure 4-2. 
ܪ௡ = ܭ଴   ܪଵ   ܪଶ  …   ܪ௡ିଵ                     ( 4-2) 
 
Figure  4-2: Core of chaotic hash function 
4.3 Collision Analysis  
The tent map has two input variables: the control parameter (x) and the initial 
condition (r). One of them is assigned by intermediate value Ki and the other is 
assigned by message block Mi. It is not clear from the paper which one corresponds 
to x and which one to r so, in our analysis, we shall work the two cases separately. In 
any case, we work under the following assumptions: 
1. The initial value K0 is public as CBHF is unkeyed hash function. 
2. We will study the two cases:  
a)   ܪ௜ = ெܶ೔(ܭ௜)  




b) ܪ௜ = ௞ܶ೔(ܯ௜) 
݂݋ݎ 0 ≤  ݅ ≤  ݊ − 1 as it was explained above. 
3. ܭ௜ = ܭ௜ିଵ  ܪ௜ିଵ ݂݋ݎ 1 ≤  ݅ ≤  ݊ − 1 and inally ܪ௡ = ܭ௡ିଵ   ܪ௡ିଵ. 
Thus, the final hash value is calculated using equation 4-2. 
Now, we will show how to break CBHF in a very strong sense. Indeed, given any 
(partial) messageܯ଴ᇱܯଵᇱ … …ܯ௡ିଶᇱ , we can compute the last block ܯ௡ିଵ ᇱ so that the 
hash value of ܯᇱ is the same as the hash value of ܯ. For this end, we first calculate K୬ିଵᇱ  which depends from ܯ଴ᇱܯଵᇱ … …ܯ௡ିଶᇱ , only. Then, we want to have the last 
block ܯ௡ିଵ ᇱ satisfying equation 4-3.  
  ܪ௡ = ܭ௡ିଵᇱ    ܪ௡ିଵᇱ                                 ( 4-3) 
Now, both ܪ௡ and ܭ௡ିଵᇱ  are known, so ܪ௡ିଵᇱ  is calculated by the following equation:  ܪ௡ିଵᇱ = ܭ௡ିଵᇱ   ܪ௡       ( 4-4) 
We know that ܪ௡ିଵᇱ  is obtained by one of the following two ways, which we 
consider separately. 
1.  ܪ௡ିଵᇱ = ܶெ೙షభᇲ (ܭ௡ିଵᇱ ) =  ܯ௡ିଵᇱ ܭ, 
where K (which either ܭ௡ିଵᇱ or 1− ܭ௡ିଵᇱ ) is known, so we can solve it for 
ܯ௡ିଵ
ᇱ  to get: 
              ܯ௡ିଵᇱ =  ு೙షభᇲ௄                            (4- 1) 
2. ܪ௡ିଵᇱ = ܶ௄೙షభᇲ (ܯ௡ିଵᇱ ) =  ܭ௡ିଵᇱ ܯ,  
where M is either ܯ௡ିଵᇱ  or 1−ܯ௡ିଵᇱ . In any case, we can solve it for M to get  
     ܯ =  ு೙షభᇲ
௄೙షభ
ᇲ                           (4- 2)            
and then calculate the value of ܯ௡ିଵᇱ based on equation 4-7. 




      ܯ௡ିଵᇱ = ൝M      , & ܯ ≤  1 2⁄ 1 − M,  ܯ > 1 2⁄               (4- 3) 
Now we will give real collision examples for the unkeyed and keyed versions of the 
CBHF that have been calculated based on our analysis. The collisions were analyzed 
on a Laptop Intel Core(TM) 2 Duo 2.00 GHz CPU with 3 GB RAM running on 
Linux Operating System, using GMP (GNU Multi-Precision Library). The following 
example shows a real collision attack on the unkeyed version of the proposed hash 
function (CBHF) as follows:  
Example 1: In the case of unkeyed hash function we will suppose the initial values 
of M0 and K0 are equal to the value of the first block sequence; also, when we 
compute the final hash value we will take the first 128-bit of Hn to be the final hash 
value.  In this case, we select randomly the first sequence as message M and then we 
calculate its hash value based on CBHF hash function. Then, we select randomly 
another (partial) message ܯ଴ᇱܯଵᇱ … …ܯ௡ିଶᇱ  and based on our analysis we calculate 
the value of the last block ܯ௡ିଵ ᇱ to get construct the second message that has the 
same hash value of the original message M, where HM = HMˈ. Both messages (M and 
Mˈ) and the correspondence hash values are given in hexadecimal representation. 
Now, we show how to break the keyed version of CBHF. In this setting, the initial 
value K0 is the unknown key. However, the final hash value Hn (of the original 
message M = M0 M1... Mn-1) is, of course, known. Therefore, we can append any new 
part to the end of the original message M, say ܯᇱ = ܯ௡ܯ௡ାଵ … …ܯ௡ା௠ିଶ and then 
use the procedure above to determine the value of the last block ܯ௡ା௠ିଵ. Thus, the 
hash value of the new message ܯܯᇱܯ௡ା௠ିଵ and the original message M are equal, 
Hn+m = Hn. In the following example, we will show a real collision on the attack 
keyed version of the hash function (CBHF). 
 
 




 Sequence number one (M): 
49 6E 20 74 68 65 20 6C 61 73 74 20 73 65 76 65 72 61 6C 20 79 65 61 72 73 20 72 
65 73 65 61 72 63 68 65 72 73 20 75 74 69 6C 69 7A 65 64 20 63 68 61 6F 73 20 74 
68 65 6F 72 79 20 69 6E 20 63 72 79 70 74 6F 67 72 61 70 68 79 20 1C 66 69 65 6C 
64 20 20 64 75 65 20 74 6F 20 69 74 20 63 68 61 72 61 63 74 65 72 69 73 74 69 63 
73 2C 20 73 75 63 68 20 61 73 20 73 65 6E 73 69 74 69 76 69 
 Sequence number two (Mˈ): 
54 68 65 20 67 65 6E 65 72 61 6C 20 64 65 73 63 72 69 70 74 69 6F 6E 20 73 68 6F 
77 73 20 74 68 61 74 20 74 68 65 20 64 65 73 69 67 6E 20 69 73 20 62 61 73 65 64 
20 6D 61 69 6E 6C 79 20 6F 6E 20 74 65 6E 74 20 6D 61 70 20 61 6E 64 20 65 78 
63 6C 75 73 69 76 65 20 6F 72 20 28 64 65 6E 6F 74 65 74 20 62 79 20 58 4F 52 29 
20 68 61 73 68 20 6F 70 65 72 61 74 69 6F 6E 73 2E 2E 2E 2E 2E F1 98 AF DE 1D 
A8 A3 70 33 DF D5 5A 6A DA B5 ED 94 65 01 21 95 05 B3 34 53 DD C9 C2 BA 
FE F8 55 A9 E2 03 06 83 B1 74 50 6D B9 66 8E 7C 66 B0 E0 A7 74 65 CD 78 61 
86 9F D2 E2 6E 91 A0 34 B2 AB F4 D3 43 44 54 7E 66 A0 22 15 D8 0B A5 AB BC 
47 C5 2C E4 F8 E5 4E 88 59 B1 D6 BF 80 4E 21 FB B0 22 8A DE 94 29 7E AB 78 
0D 13 E1 24 F8 71 B7 DD 10 A7 5F B9 8B 80 8E 50 28 22 ED 3E 94 0D 61 50 
 Both produce CBHF Hash Value: 
6C B3 05 F6 FE 9F 9B 9F DF 45 F0 90 CE 0F 5D 7E 
Example 2: In the case of keyed hash function, we can add two or more blocks at the 
end of the original sequence without changing the final hash value. In this case, we 
can find collisions easily without knowing the used secret key. Messages (M and 
Mˈ), secret key, and the correspondence hash values are given in hexadecimal 
representation. 
 




 Sequence number one (M): 
49 6E 20 74 68 65 20 6C 61 73 74 20 73 65 76 65 72 61 6C 20 79 65 61 72 73 20 72 
65 73 65 61 72 63 68 65 72 73 20 75 74 69 6C 69 7A 65 64 20 63 68 61 6F 73 20 74 
68 65 6F 72 79 20 69 6E 20 63 72 79 70 74 6F 67 72 61 70 68 79 20 1C 66 69 65 6C 
64 20 20 64 75 65 20 74 6F 20 69 74 20 63 68 61 72 61 63 74 65 72 69 73 74 69 63 
73 2C 20 73 75 63 68 20 61 73 20 73 65 6E 73 69 74 69 76 69 
 Used Key (K): 
4D 61 6E 79 20 6F 66 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 73 68 20 66 75 6E 63 74 69 6F 6E 73 20 67 65 
6E 65 72 61 74 65 20 74 68 65 20 6D 65 73 73 61 67 65 20 64 69 67 65 73 74 20 74 68 72 
6F 75 67 68 20 61 20 72 61 6E 64 6F 6D 69 7A 69 6E 67 20 70 72 6F 63 65 73 73 20 6F 66 
20 74 68 65 20 6F 72 69 67 69 6E 61 6C 20 6D 65 73 73 61 67 65 2C 20 62 65 66 6F 72 65 
20 6D 6F 64 69 66 69 63 61 74 69 6F 
 Sequence number two (Mˈ): 
49 6E 20 74 68 65 20 6C 61 73 74 20 73 65 76 65 72 61 6C 20 79 65 61 72 73 20 72 
65 73 65 61 72 63 68 65 72 73 20 75 74 69 6C 69 7A 65 64 20 63 68 61 6F 73 20 74 
68 65 6F 72 79 20 69 6E 20 63 72 79 70 74 6F 67 72 61 70 68 79 20 1C 66 69 65 6C 
64 20 20 64 75 65 20 74 6F 20 69 74 20 63 68 61 72 61 63 74 65 72 69 73 74 69 63 
73 2C 20 73 75 63 68 20 61 73 20 73 65 6E 73 69 74 69 76 69 54 68 65 20 67 65 6E 
65 72 61 6C 20 64 65 73 63 72 69 70 74 69 6F 6E 20 73 68 6F 77 73 20 74 68 61 74 
20 74 68 65 20 64 65 73 69 67 6E 20 69 73 20 62 61 73 65 64 20 6D 61 69 6E 6C 79 
20 6F 6E 20 74 65 6E 74 20 6D 61 70 20 61 6E 64 20 65 78 63 6C 75 73 69 76 65 
20 6F 72 20 28 64 65 6E 6F 74 65 74 20 62 79 20 58 4F 52 29 20 68 61 73 68 20 6F 
70 65 72 61 74 69 6F 6E 73 2E 2E 2E 2E 2E 69 00 91 5A 25 78 55 C2 96 7F BE 8C 
B2 3F B4 18 91 DE CE 35 78 97 A6 3F 44 73 0C 63 14 EB 37 02 1A 5A 99 B6 81 
37 60 06 2F DD 10 99 3E B7 E8 36 E3 02 58 7B 7B B1 82 FD 35 E9 AF 4D 4E 9E 
70 6A 81 8B 6F 4B 26 86 B5 0D EA A9 5F 27 57 ED 79 15 B9 2B 34 B2 99 4E 33 
73 BB 89 E0 0F 19 24 86 C7 21 67 FB E7 B1 62 50 E8 A7 D2 D5 7F 69 D3 B8 F3 
05 44 49 61 CC A1 43 8C E6 AA CC 78 9B 96 88 




 Both produce CBHF Hash Value: 
6A 87 F0 C3 E2 E6 DC 55 4F C3 9F 8A 12 D8 1A 5D  
4.4 Xiao et al.’s Analysis  
We published the result of our analysis a few months after the (CBHF) hash 
function was published [137]. In 2010 [144], Xiao et al. published a paper that 
describes how to attack the unkeyed version of Amin et al.’s hash function. Xiao et 
al. pointed out that the details of the proposed hash function are not clear and they 
explained how it works in general. They claimed that they would be able to find two 
different messages as the first two sequences are not equal and the rest of the 
message sequences are equal, such as M = (a, z, p3, …pn-1, pn), (Mˈ = b, y, p3, …pn-1, 
pn), pi represent an 8-bit character, a ≠ b, and z ≠ y. The intermediate hash value is 
calculated based on a tent map for each 8-bit and then it maps to “0” if it is less than 
0.5, otherwise it maps to “1”. Moreover, they used the initial condition x = 0.3 and 
the control parameter r = 1.8 to clarify the attack.   
The first two orbit values of the first message M are as follows: 
ݔଵ =  ܶଽ଻(0.3) = 0.2635, 
ݔଶ =  ܶଵଶଶ(0.2635) = 0.8645. 
The first two orbit values for the second message Mˈ are as follows: 
ݔଵ
ᇱ =  ܶଽ଼(0.3) = 0.4743, 
ݔଶ
ᇱ =  ܶଵଶଵ(0.4743) = 0.8645. 
Since the current orbit initial value of the first two sequences of the two messages are 
equal and the rest of the message sequences are the same, the subsequent 
intermediate hash value and final hash value for both messages would be the same, 
ܪଵ = ܪଵᇱ ,ܪଶ = ܪଶᇱ , … ܪ௡ = ܪ௡ᇱ . Therefore, even though the first two sequences of 




the messages are not equal they were able to find collisions. In addition, they pointed 
out that the padding process of adding one “1” followed by a number of zeros “0” 
(100…0)2 could help to find collisions. Our analysis applies for two the descriptions 
of the CBHF hash function. 
4.5 Remarks on Chaos-based Hash Function Future Research 
Some important issues should be considered in future for designing new hash 
functions based on chaotic maps based on CBHF analyses. In general, a well-
designed chaotic hash function should satisfy the cryptography requirements and 
characteristics such as high security and speed. The CBHF hash function and some 
other proposed chaotic hash functions were found to be insecure or slow algorithms. 
Therefore, advanced research on chaotic hash functions is needed to design a new 
family of secure hash functions for cryptography and e-commerce applications. 
Remarks on future research into chaotic hash functions are listed below: 
1. Security and performance of chaos-based unkeyed hash function mainly 
depend on the chaotic system and the algorithm’s internal structure. 
2. Security of chaos-based keyed hash function mainly depends on chaotic 
system, algorithm internal structure and secret key. 
3. Cascading multiple chaotic systems could provide highly secure hash 
function, but at the expense of computation time. Small computational cost 
can be achieved by selecting a simple chaotic system. 
4. A padding process that add one “1” followed by a number of zeros “0” 
(100…0)2 could help attackers to find collisions; this could be resolved by 
padding the length of the input message at the end of the last block. 
5.  In chaos-based hash function, using a single simple operation such as XOR 
operation with chaotic systems as a mixture could help attackers to break the 
system. 





In conclusion, we have shown in strong sense how to break the recently 
proposed unkeyed hash function based on chaos theory (CBHF). Our attack shows 
that we can easily find two different messages that have the same hash value. In 
addition, we have shown how to break the keyed version of CBHF by adding 
different blocks at the end of the original message without changing the final hash 
value. We can find a large number of collisions for each message using our analysis 
technique. One year later, in 2010, Xiao et al. analyzed the security of the unkeyed 
version of the proposed algorithm. Therefore, neither keyed nor unkeyed hash 
versions of CBHF are at all secure. Advanced research on chaotic hash function is 
needed to design a new family of secure hash functions for cryptography and e-
commerce applications. 







5. Fast Parallel Hash Functions Based on Chaotic 
Maps for eCommerce (PHFC) 
In the last decade, various hash functions based on chaotic maps have been 
proposed. Some of the proposed hash function algorithms have proved to be as 
insecure or slow speed. In this chapter, we propose novel parallel hash functions 
based on couple chaotic systems. Hereafter, we will referee to the proposed chaotic 
hash function in this chapter as PHFC. PHFC consists of four main sub-functions: 
segmentation and padding, hash round function, subkeys generation, and hash 
mixing function.  It can be implemented in parallel mode to provide fast hashing 
scheme. Several analyses and computer simulations are applied on PHFC hash 
function. Moreover, comparisons between the PHFC and other hash functions are 
presented. The analyses and comparisons confirm that the proposed hash function 
satisfies the cryptographic hash function characteristics. 
5.1 Introduction 
ver the last decade, various hash functions based on chaotic systems have 
been proposed [30, 70, 76, 81, 87, 88, 286, 287]. Some of the proposed 
chaotic hash functions have been proved as insecure or slow speed 
algorithms [87, 137, 140, 143, 144]. It would be difficult based on the iteration 
structure of the hash function to construct a parallel hash function to have faster 
speed [140, 143]. Therefore, the iteration structure of the hash function needs to be 
changed to construct a parallel hash function (see equations 5-1 and 5-2). Moreover, 
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in the recent years, most of the personal computers manufactured with 2-core 
processors. Consequently, designing parallel hash function helps to exploit the 2-core 
processers more efficiently and construct a faster chaotic hash function. In this 
chapter, we propose a parallel hash function based on chaotic maps.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 describes details of the 
proposed keyed hash function. A discussion on performance analysis is presented in 
section 5.3. Finally, the conclusion is given in section 5.4. 
5.2 Parallel Hash Function (PHFC) 
The general designs of the sequential and parallel chaotic hash functions are 
illustrated in Figures 5-1 and 5-2, respectively. In the following subsections, we will 
explain the details of the proposed hash function. 
5.2.1 Message Padding and Segmentation  
All the cryptography padding modes can be used, for more details see section 
2.8.2. In PHFC, we will use the bit padding mode that is defined in RFC1321 and 
employed in many cryptography algorithms. The first step in PHFC padding is to 
partition the input message into n number of blocks. The length of each block equal 
is equal the length of the final hash value l. Therefore, the input message should be a 
multiple of l: otherwise, the input message needs to be padded to be a multiple of l. 
Let us assume the input message length is M and the hash length l=160. Then, the 
block length is l=160 and the padded M should be a multiple of 160. The message M 
is padded by one (1)2 followed by number of zeros (00…0)2 such that length of 
padding bits (100…0)2 is p, where (M + p) mod l = l-64. The last 64 bits are filled up 
by the length of the input message mod by 264, lM = M mode 264.This padding 
scheme is adopted to prevent collision flaw [144].  
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where h() is the round function, Mi is the ith message block, Hi-1 is the intermediate 
hash value of the previous hash round function, and H0 is the initial value of the first 
hash round function.  
 
Figure  5-1: Structure of sequential chaotic hash function 
5.2.2 Keys Generations 
The next step, after partition of the padded message is to generate the rounds’ 
subkeys. In each round one subkey of length l is needed, where the minimum number 
of rounds is defined by the variable t, such that t ≥ 8. Thus, t+1 subkeys is needed to 
be generated using a chaotic map, one subkey for each round and one for the final 
mixing process, see Figure 5-2. In PHFC, several chaotic maps (Logistic map, Tent 
map, Skew Tent map, and other PWLCMs) can be used as chaotic systems in 
subkeys generation function, but we have to consider few important issues such as 
sensitivity of secret key and subkey space. The chaotic system’s initial condition x0 
and the control parameter r are used as the secret key of the PHFC.  Then, chaotic 
system is iterated n times, where the minimum number of iterations is 50 to prevent 
predication of generated values, as chaotic system gives unpredictable values in the 
long-term run. The resulted value (xn+1) is used as the value of the first subkey (K1), 
and then the second iteration is applied to generate the second subkey K2 and so on 
until all subkeys have been generated.  





Figure  5-2: Structure of the proposed parallel chaotic hash function 
In well-designed hash function, the secret key is sensitive to any change(s) so that 
resulting two different hash values. Chaotic system is sensitive to the initial 
conditions and/or the control parameters within the chaotic areas. The non-chaotic 
areas must be avoided from the secret key space as it not very sensitive to changes. 
In case the PWLCM, which is defined in equation 5-2, is used as one of the chaotic 
systems for subkey generation, its initial condition x0 and the control parameter p are 
used as the secret key. In the PWLCM, the non-chaotic areas are avoided, since all 
its control parameters have positive Lyapunov exponent values.  Moreover, we must 
to exclude the xn = 0, xn = 0.5, or xn = 1 from the key space, as the system with these 
initial parameters will end in the same fixed-point xn+1 = 0,  f(0, p) = 0, f3(0.5, p) = 0, 
f2(1, p) = 0 for any P  (0, 0.5).  
5.2.3 Hash Rounds Functions 
Hash round functions are processed input messages in parallel mode as 
shown in Figure 5-2. In each round function, the initial parameters’ values of 
variables x0 and r are the round secret key Ki and the first message block, 
respectively (see Figure 5-3). In a round function with a logistic map as a chaotic 
system, the value of the subkey is assigned to initial condition x0 and the message 
block value is added to the chosen value of r such that r  (3.9, 4). Transform every 
message block of the input message Mi = (p1 p2...pn) into binary fractions Miˈ = (0.0 
p1 p2...pn). The result from the previous message block is set as the initial value of the 
current block and so on until all the input message blocks have been processed. As 
the proposed hash function is designed parallel, all hash rounds functions h() process 
the input message simultaneously.  





Figure  5-3: Block diagram of round function 
5.2.4 Chaotic Hash Mixing 
After all rounds have calculated the final intermediate values (Hn1, Hn2,…, 
Hnt), the next step is processing chaotic hash mixing function. In case of using 
PWLCM as chaotic map in the Hash Mixing function, the value of the first-round 
intermediate hash Hn1 is set as the value of parameter r and the secret key Kt+1 is set 
as x0, where r  (0, 0.5) and xi  (0, 1). Then, the PWLCM is iterated to produce the 
intermediate hash mixing value xn (HR1), which is used as the initial condition to mix 
the next round intermediate hash (Hn1), and so on until all the intermediate hash 
values are mixed. The final hash value of the input message is the final resulted value 
form chaotic hash mixing function based on the all intermediate hash values (Hn1, 
Hn2,…, Hnt), as shown in Figure 5-2.  
5.3 Security and Performance Analyses  
In this section, the performance and statistical analyses are studied on the 
calculated hash values based on PHFC hash function. The logistic map is used as the 
chaotic maps with r=3.999999 and x=0.50, the length of hash value is 160-bit, 
number of initial iterations is 50, and the number of rounds is 8.  
5.3.1 Sensitivity of Hash Values  
In order to investigate the sensitivity of generated hash value based on PHFC 
hash function to the input message, we accomplished 10 different hash simulations 
tests on the following message: "A cryptographic hash function is a deterministic 
procedure that takes an arbitrary length block of data as input and produces fixed-
length bits of string as an output." [288], see appendix C. The simulation result 
shows that PHFC are very sensitive to any slight (bit or bits) changes in the input 




message or the used key and will cause significant changes in the final hash value. 
The binary hash values under the 10 different conditions are shown in Figure 5-4. 
 
Figure  5-4: Calculated hash values under different conditions 
5.3.2 Statistical Analysis of Diffusion and Confusion 
Cryptographic algorithms are designed based on the confusion and diffusion 
properties [216]. Hash functions are similar to the conventional encryption methods, 
which require the spreading influence of the full input message to be spread into the 
hash value space. In an ideal hash function, the relationship between input message 
and correspondence hash value bits must be complex. Therefore, any bit change in 
the input message should affect at least half of the bits in the hash value, and each bit 
has a 50% changing probability. A message is chosen randomly and then the 
correspondence hash value is calculated. Subsequently, one bit is selected and 
toggled randomly to generate a new hash value in binary format. Afterward, we 
compare the two hash values (original and new) and count the number of changed 
bits at the same locations Bi. This test is performed 3000 times and the 
correspondence distributions of the numbers of bits changes are shown in Figure 5-5.  
Similar to [70, 87, 286, 287], the following are six statistics for the proposed hash 
function algorithm: 
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where N is the total number of statistics, Bi is the number of changed bits in the ith 
test, and ΔB and ΔP indicate the stability of diffusion and confusion. 
Table 5-1 shows the statistical results for different numbers of tests N = 3072, 2048, 
and 1024. From Table 5-1, the mean changed number of bit and the mean changed 
bit probability are 80.15 and %50.09, respectively, which is very close to the ideal 
values 80 and 50%. Meanwhile ΔB and ΔP indicate the stability of diffusion and 
confusion and show that PHFC algorithm is very stable. In conclusion, this analysis 




shows that the proposed hash function is a secure enough against statistical attacks 
and it will be very difficult to be attack it. 
Table  5-1: Statistic of number of changed bit Bi 
 N = 3072 N = 2048 N = 1024 Mean 

B 
80.00813802 80.01611328 80.44238281 80.16 
P (%) 50.00508626 50.0100708 50.27648926 50.10 
ΔB 6.348566433 6.257558918 6.05954492 6.22 
ΔP (%) 3.967854021 3.910974323 3.787215575 3.89 
Bmax  102 102 98 100.67 
Bmin 55 57 62 58 
 
Figure  5-5: Distribution of changed bit number Bi 




The proposed hash function algorithm is compared with the typical traditional hash 
function algorithm (SHA-1) and other two chaotic hash functions algorithms (Ref. 
[287] and Ref. [74]). These hash function algorithms generate the same length of 
hash value (160-bit). Table 5-2 shows the statistical results of the comparison with a 
value of N = 2048. From Table 5-2, it is very clear that the means of bit number 
changes and probability changes are very close to the ideal values, 80 and 50%, 
respectively. Meanwhile ∆B and ∆P are very small that indicating that the diffusion 
and confusion capabilities are very stables. In conclusion, the proposed hash function 
statistical performance is very close to the ideal performance and resistant to against 
statistical attacks. 
5.3.3 Hash Value Distribution  
One of the most important conditions in hash functions security is the 
uniformity distribution [81]. The uniform distribution test is performed on the 
following randomly selected sentence: “A cryptographic hash function is a 
deterministic procedure that takes an arbitrary length block of data as input and 
produces fixed-length bits of string as an output.” [288]. Figure 5-6 shows the 
difference between the ASCII distribution of the original message and the 
hexadecimal distribution of hash value. The simulation result shows that the ASCII 
distribution of the original message is focused on very small areas, but the hash value 
distribution is irregularly distributed and scattered in most areas of the space. 
Therefore, the simulation shows that it is very difficult for the attackers to find 
information from the original message after it has been processed through the 
proposed hash function. 
Similar to [87, 286], another hash space uniform distribution is performed to check 
hash space distribution property. We generated a message randomly and then 
calculated its hash value. After that, we toggled one bit randomly and calculated the 
correspondence hash value. Finally, we compared and counted the number of bits 
toggled in the hash space for the two hash values. This test was performed 3000 
times, by fixing the first message, then toggling one bit randomly and calculating the 
number of toggled bit at the same location in hash space, as shown in Figure 5-7.  




The mean of toggled bits is 1501, which is very close to the ideal mean value (1500). 
Therefore, PHFC is collision-resistant and strong enough against the statistical 
attacks.  
 
(a) ASCII distribution of the original message 
  
(b) Hash values distribution in hexadecimal format 
Figure  5-6: Distribution of original message and hash value 
5.3.4 Analysis of Collision Resistance 
To investigate PHFC collision resistance capability the following test was 
performed. First, we selected a message randomly and then calculated its hash value 
and stored it in ASCII format. Then, we selected and toggled one bit randomly to 


































Hexadecimal code sequence number




difference between the two ASCII hash values in the same position was calculated. 
Finally, the summation of all differences for all characters of the two hash values was 
calculated, which is called absolute difference (d), as shown by Equation 5-11.  
Table  5-2:  Comparison of Statistics performance 
 SHA-1 [81] Ref. [287] Ref. [74] PHFC 

B 
79.86 80.04 80.01 80.02 
P (%) 49.91 50.02 50.01 50.01 
ΔB 6.24 6.18 6.34 6.26 
ΔP (%) 3.91  3.86 3.97 3.91 
Bmax  60 60 57 57 
Bmin 100 100 102 102 
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where ei and e`i is the ith entry of the original message and ith entry of the new 
message after being toggled, respectively, and t(.) is a function converting the entry 
to the equivalent decimal value of the ASCII.  
This kind of test is performed 3000, 2000, and 1000 times and the maximum, 
minimum, mean and mean/character for each case are calculated. Figure 5-8 shows 
the distribution of the number of ASCII characters with the same value at the same 
location in the hash value with number of tests being 3000, 2000, and 1000 (see 
equation 5-12). The maximum number of equal ASCII characters in the same 
location is only two. Therefore, the possibility of collision is very low meaning that 
most of the entries are different in the ASCII format. The result of this test is 
compared with other six other different hash function algorithms (see Table 5-3). The 
comparison result shows that the proposed hash function’s absolute differences are 
very close to the two typical traditional hash function algorithms (MD5 and SHA-1). 
Table  5-3: Absolute differences of two hash values 
 Maximum  Minimum  Mean  Mean/C 
Xiao’s et al. scheme [70] 2221 696 1506 94.12 
Zhang’s et al. scheme [87] 2022 565  1257 78.56 
Akhavan’s et al. scheme [286]  2431  744  1371 85.68 
Akhshani’s et al. scheme [287] 2731  866 1706 85.30 
MD5 [74]  2074    590   1304 81.5  
SHA-1 [287] 2730  795 1603 80.15 
PHFC 2602 775 1600 80.02 
5.3.5 Number of Hash Rounds 
The number of hash rounds (R) was not set as a part of the secret key to avoid 
timing-attack based on calculating the elapsed time in processing one block of data. 
It was chosen a very carefully by selecting the input message and the secret key 
randomly, and then the hash value is calculated using the PHFC with different 
numbers of rounds. For the resulted hash value, the confusion and the diffusion 




properties were tested, as it is explained in details in section 5.3.2. We found that the 
proposed algorithm has high confusion and diffusion properties with number of 
rounds equal eight.  
  
Figure  5-6: Distribution of number of ASCII characters with the same value at the 
same location in the hash value with number of tests 3000, 2000, and 1000 
5.3.6 Speed Analysis 
Chaotic hash functions are based on a complex system and typical traditional 
hash functions (SHA-1 and MD5) are based on simple mathematical operations. 
Therefore, some of the proposed chaotic hash functions are slower than the typical 
traditional hash functions. Several speed tests are performed on sequential and 
parallel modes of PHFC hash functions with different input messages lengths. The 
experiment’s result shows that the parallel mode is demonstrated a much higher 
efficiency than the sequential mode, as shown in Figure 5-9. Moreover, a comparison 
in execution time is performed between SHA-1, CHA-1, sequential mode of PHFC, 
and parallel mode of PHFC.  
The execution times of the four hash function algorithms with different message 
lengths are plotted in Figure 5-10. It can be observed from Figure 5-10, SHA-1 and 
PHFC with parallel mode show very short average execution times are compared 
with execution times of the CHA-1 and sequential mode of PHFC. Parallel mode of 
PHFC and SHA-1 average execution times are very short and close to each other, but 
SHA-1 shows a slightly better performance with a bigger message size. At the same 
time CHA-1 speed with the same input message length is much faster than the other 
three algorithms (SHA-1, parallel mode of PHFC, and sequential mode of PHFC).  




The speed tests were analyzed on a Laptop Intel Core(TM) 2 Duo 2.00 GHz CPU 
with 3 GB RAM running on Linux Operating System, using GMP (GNU Multi-
Precision Library). Although SHA-1 with a bigger message length is slightly faster 
than the parallel mode of PHFC in small differences, the parallel mode of PHFC is 
much better in terms of security than SHA-1 (see Table 5-4). SHA-1 security 
reduced down to only 253, while security of the proposed hash function is 280 (hash 
operations brute-force) [289]. The qualitative analysis between SHA-1, CHA-1, 
sequential mode of PHFC, and parallel mode of PHFC is described in Table 5-4. In 
conclusion the parallel mode of the proposed algorithm demonstrated fast speed and 
high security, thus PHFC would be a good candidate for use in e-commerce 
applications over broadband networks.  
 
Figure  5-7: Comparison between sequential and parallel versions of PHFC hash 
algorithm in the execution time (millisecond) 
 
Figure  5-8: Comparison between SHA-1, CHA-1, sequential and parallel version of 
PHFC with rounds in the execution time (millisecond) 




5.3.7 Implementation and Flexibility  
In PHFC hash function, the chaotic map is iterated with arbitrary precision 
floating-point arithmetic. Since GNU multiple precision arithmetic library (GMP) is 
a free library operating on floating-point numbers, and rational and signed integer 
number [290], it is suggested that the proposed algorithm is implemented by GMP 
precision floating-point arithmetic. The GMP is mainly used in algebra systems, 
Internet security, and cryptography applications and research. GMP is considered as 
faster big-numbers library than other libraries. It runs over all platforms such as, 
MAC OS, GNU/Linux, BSD, AIX, and Windows 32-bit and 64-bit mode.  
PHFC is a hash function that processes different input message lengths and produces 
different lengths of final hash value. It was designed as a very fixable hash function 
algorithm which through simple modifications of the block size, and secret key 
length it can then produce different lengths of hash values (see Table 5-4). To 
produce high sensitive hash function to any change(s) in the input message, the entire 
input message is processed through each hash round function. Moreover, Logistic 
map, tent map, and PWLCM can be use as chaotic system in one function of the 
PHFC: subkey generation, round hash function, and chaotic mixing hash function. 
The proposed hash function produces variable lengths of hash values such as, PHFC-
128, PHFC-160, PHFC-224, PHFC-256, PHFC-384, and PHFC-512.  
Table  5-4: Comparison between SHA-1, CHA-1, and PHFC Properties 
Properties MD5 SHA-1 CHA-1 PHFC 
Message Size (bits) 264 263 280 280 
Block Size (bits) 512 512 160 128, 224,352, 480 
Word Size (bits) 32 32 32 8, 16, 32 
Message Digest Size 128 160 160 160, 256,384, 512 
Security (bits) 224[291] 251[289] 280 280, 2128, 2192, 2256 
Found Collisions Yes Yes No No 




The proposed hash function provides high security, speed and adaptability comparing 
with MD5, SHA-1, and CHA-1 hash functions. In addition, different versions of the 
proposed hash functions are proposed using different chaotic maps, block length and 
number of rounds.  PHFC is aimed to construct keyed hash function based on chaotic 
systems, meanwhile we can construct unkeyed hash function by processing the input 
message through one of the chaotic maps and the result is used as the secret key. The 
proposed hash function is high-potential candidate in many different standards and 
applications due to its characteristic such as security, flexibility, and performance.  
5.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter, we proposed a fast parallel chaos-based hash function called 
PHFC. A couple of chaotic maps with high chaotic behaviour are used in designing 
PHFC functions: subkey generation, round hash function, and chaotic hash mixing 
function. PHFC is a very flexible hash function that generates different lengths of 
hash values using different chaotic maps: PHFC-128, PHFC-160, PHFC-224, PHFC-
256, PHFC-384, and PHFC-512. The proposed hash function can be implemented as 
keyed and unkeyed hash function based on chaotic systems. We compared the 
proposed hash function with two well-know hash function (SHA-1, MD5) and other 
five chaos-based hash functions; the comparison results showed that the PHFC is 
outperform than many other existing hash functions. Several computer simulations 
and theoretical analysis on PHFC hash function are performed which showed that the 
it is satisfying the characteristics and conditions of cryptography hash functions such 
as, collision resistance, high bit confusion and diffusion, uniform distribution, 
ﬂexibility, and fast speed. PHFC is high-potential for adoption in e-commerce 
applications and protocols. 





6. Fast Encryption Algorithm Based on Chaotic 
Maps for eCommerce (BCCM) 
In recent years, many researchers have proposed new block cipher encryption 
algorithms based on chaotic systems. Some of the proposed chaotic encryption 
algorithms had major problems such as lack of security against different types of 
attacks, poor flexibility and slow speed. In this chapter, a novel fast block cipher 
encryption algorithm based on chaotic maps (BCCM) is proposed with high bit 
confusion and diffusion, sensitivity and flexibility. BCCM encryption and decryption 
functions are designed based on product cipher structure, that is similar to design of 
DES, IDEA, MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms. BCCM encryption and decryption 
functions use simple non-commutative operations: XOR, addition mod 2n, 
subtraction mod 2n, and w-bit left and right circular shifts. Chaotic key-generation 
function is used to generate eight subkeys for each round that are also used to 
generate the values of the rows shifting and the columns mixing to provide high 
confusion and diffusion properties. Therefore, the encryption and decryption 
functions architectures are depend on the secret key. Analyses and computer 
simulations were applied on the BCCM encryption algorithm. Moreover, 
comparisons between the BCCM and well-known hash functions are presented. 
BCCM is a high-potential candidate for practical texts encryption, images 
encryption and e-commerce applications and protocols.  




ecently, many researchers have developed chaotic block cipher encryption 
algorithms by utilizing chaotic maps’ characteristics [35, 62, 65-67]. Some 
of the proposed encryption schemes based on chaotic maps have been 
found to be insecure or very slow [31]. In the present chapter, a novel block cipher 
encryption algorithm based on chaotic systems is proposed; it is called BCCM. The 
rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 gives details of the proposed 
chaotic block cipher. Experimental results are discussed in section 6.3. Finally, the 
conclusion is given in section 6.4. 
6.2 Details of the Proposed Block Cipher Algorithm (BCCM)  
The overview of the BCCM is illustrated in Figure 6-1. BCCM is a simple 
block cipher algorithm designed based on chaotic systems for texts/images 
encryption. The proposed algorithm works with variable numbers of round R, word 
size w, and key length (see Table 6-1). In each round there are eight registers of 
plaintext as input and eight registers of ciphertext as output of the same size (w-bit). 
It has two main functions: one for encryption and the second for decryption (see 
Table 2.) In the following subsections, we will explain the details of the BCCM 
algorithm functions. 
 
Figure  6-1: Overview of BCCM encryption function 
R
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Table  6-1: BCCM parameters 
Parameter Meaning Values Range 
R Number of rounds 1,2,3,........512 
W Word size in bits 8, 16, 32, 64 
SK Secret key in bytes 1,2,3,........512 
C Chaos theory 1D Chaotic maps 
Table  6-2: BCCM primitive operations  
Notation Meaning 
X + Y        The 2nd complement addition of words  
X - Y        The 2nd complement subtraction of words  
X >>> Y        Circle right shift Y bits 
X <<< Y        Circle left shift Y bits 
X  Y        Bit wise exclusive OR of words 
X % Y        The modulus, or remainder, operator 
6.2.1 Initialization  
In this step we need to choose the chaotic map and then set the values of the initial 
condition, the control parameter and the number of initial iterations. In BCCM, 
several chaotic maps (Logistic map, Tent map, Skew Tent map, and other PWLCMs) 
can be used as chaotic systems in subkeys generation function. The chaotic system 
initial condition x0 and the control parameter r within chaotic interval are used as the 
secret key of the BCCM.  
6.2.2 Subkeys Generations  
In a well-designed block cipher encryption algorithm, the secret key is 
sensitive to any change(s).  Subkeys generation function is considered the most 
important function in BCCM algorithm. The generated subkeys values are also used 
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in subkeys orders, shifting rows and mixing columns functions. Subkeys generation 
is designed based on one of the chaotic system to be very sensitive to any change(s) 
in the secret key (initial conditions and/or control parameters). The next step after 
one of the chaotic maps has been chosen as the chaotic system and the values of 
initial condition, the control parameter and the numbers of initial iterations are set is 
to apply the Subkeys generation function. The first step in it is iterating the chaotic 
system n times to produce a chaotic sequence and hide any relationship between the 
initial value and subsequent values, where the minimum number of iterations is 50. 
Then, the value of xn of the chosen chaotic map is used as the initial value to generate 
the next value (xn+1). The binary transformation of the resulting value (xn+1) is used 
as the value of the first subkey and initial value to the following iteration (n+2) and 
so on until all subkeys have been generated (see the below pseudo-code of subkeys 
generation).  
In the encryption/decryption function each round needs eight different subkeys. 
Therefore, the total number of subkeys is eight times the number of rounds (8*R). 
The size of subkeys is equal to the size of sub-block in the encryption function. The 
algorithm generates eight different subkeys for each round and the same set of 
subkeys are used twice, at the beginning of each round and at end of each round in 
different orders. Subkeys orders (SOi) at the end of each round are calculated based 
on equation 6-1.  
1)%]][[(  RiRSKiSOi ;         ( 6-1) 
 where i the subkey index, R is rounds number, and β is number of sub-blocks. 
 
Pseudo-code of Subkeys Generation 
1. //An example of Subkeys generation with logistic map as chaotic map, 
number of initial iterations=50, r=0.59 and x0 =3.95. 
2. secret-key_1=3.95; // within chaotic interval 
3. secret-key_2=0.95; //within chaotic interval 
4. r= secret-key_1; 
5. x0 =secret-key_2; 




7.         for n from 1 to 50 // 50 initial iterations 
8.           ); x-r(1 x= xdo nn1n  
9.       endfor 
10. //To generate 8×R subkeys 
11. x0 = x50;  
12. R=8; 
13. n=0; 
14.         for R from 1 to 8 // 8 rounds 
15.        for i from 1 to 8  // 8 subkeys for each round 
16.          ); x-r(1 x=   xdo nn1n  
17.                    1]][[  nxiRSK ; 
18.       endfor 
6.2.3 Rows Shifting and Columns Mixing 
The values of rows shifting (RSi) and columns mixing (CMi) are generated 
based on the generated subkeys using equations 6-2 and 6-3, respectively. The 
BCCM algorithm performs left circular shift and right circular shift on a number of 
sub-blocks in encryption and decryption functions, which we refer to it as rows 
shifting (RSi). The number of shifting bits is calculated based on equation 6-2. 
Furthermore, the last step in each round of the encryption function is mixing and 
swapping between different sub-blocks to increase output randomness, which we 
refer to it as columns mixing (CMi).  
1)%]][[(  LRiRSKiRSi ;      ( 6-2) 
1])%][[(  iRSKiCMi ;       ( 6-3) 
where i the subkey index, R is round number, L is half sub-block size, and β is 
number of sub-blocks. 
6.2.4 Encryption Process 
BCCM encryption function internal design is similar to DES, IDEA, MD5 
and SHA-1 algorithms design. The encryption function is designed based on four 
non-linear operations: addition, exclusive-OR, circle left shift, and circle right shift 
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(see Figure 6-2). In BCCM, after we generate the subkeys, subkeys orders, shifting 
rows and mixing columns values, the next step is to apply the encryption function. 
The first step is to divide the input message into n-bit blocks after which each block 
will be further divided into eight sub-blocks. The next step is to encrypt each block 
of the input message by applying the encryption function R times to generate the 
correspondence ciphertext.  Finally, the encryption process will continue until the 
entire input message has been processed through the encryption function. In case the 
last block of the input plaintext is less than the full block, we can use any of the 
cryptography padding modes that explained in section 2.8.2. The recommended 
block size for BCCM algorithm is 256. The variable X[i] is the plaintext sub-block 
number i, Y[i] is the ciphertext sub-block number i, SK[i] is the subkey number i, R 
is the number of rounds, RSi is the value of row shifting number i, CMi is the value 
of column mixing number i and SOi is the value of subkey order number i. 
 
Figure  6-2: BCCM encryption function  
6.2.5 Decryption Process 
To decrypt the encrypted message using the BCCM encryption function, we 
need to use the BCCM decryption function and shared secret key. The decryption 
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function is the inverse of the encryption function, using four non-linear operations: 
subtraction, exclusive-OR, circle left shift, and circle right shift, as shown in Figure 
6-3. In BCCM decryption function, we need to use the same selected chaotic map 
and the same set values of the initial condition, the control parameter and the number 
of initial iterations in the encryption function. Then, we generate the subkeys, 
subkeys orders, shifting rows and mixing columns values. Now, we can apply the 
decryption function. The first step in the decryption function is to divide the input 
message into n-bit blocks after which each block will be further divided into eight 
sub-blocks. The next step is to decrypt each block of the input message by applying 
the decryption function R times to generate the correspondence plaintext.  Finally, 
the decryption process will continue until the entire input message has been 
processed through the decryption function. Any parameters values are used in the 
encryption function should be the same that will be used in the decryption function. 
 
Figure  6-3: BCCM decryption function 
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6.3 BCCM Parameters and Structure 
The number of encryption rounds (R) was not set as part of the secret key in 
order to avoid a timing-attack based on a calculation of the elapsed time in an 
encryption/decryption single block of data. It was chosen very carefully by selecting 
input message and secret key randomly, and then encrypting it using the BCCM with 
different numbers of rounds. Then, several tests were performed: histogram analysis, 
correlation coefficient analysis and information entropy analysis, as explained in 
detail in 6.4.3, 6.4.4, and 6.4.5 subsections, respectively. The proposed algorithm has 
high confusion and diffusion properties with number of rounds equal to or greater 
than 4. In case of chosen the Logistic map as the chaotic system the value of initial 
condition x0 should be x0 [0.15, 0.95] and r [3.87, 4] and in case of chosen the 
PWLCM as the chaotic system the value of initial condition x0 should be xn (0, 1), 
and P (0, 0.5), where we must to exclude the some of the xn values (xn ≠ 0, 0.5, and 
1) to make sure it would be within the chaotic intervals. The minimum length of the 
secret key should be 160-bit, which would be very hard to attack using brute-force 
attack (see section 2.11.1). The recommended block length for BCCM algorithm is 
128 or 256, as it has 8 sub-blocks of size 16 or 32 bits.  
BCCM encryption and decryption functions are designed based on product cipher 
structure. The product cipher structure is used in the design several cryptography 
algorithm such as DES, IDEA, MD5 and SHA-1 algorithms. Many brute-force 
attacks have been proposed for DES algorithm because of using short length secret 
key (64-bit). Therefore, we proposed to use secret key of 160-bit minimum length to 
be very hard to attack using brute-force attack. IDEA has very simple key schedule 
as they derived the subkeys directly from the secret key and using circle left shift, 
which would be subjective to weak key attack. In BCCM the key generation is based 
on chaotic system to have unpredictable subkeys as chaotic systems are 
deterministic, unpredictability and random-look systems with very high sensitivity to 
initial values. In AES (Rijndael) algorithm the row shifting values are pre-calculated 
and it would be easier for attacker to track the encryption process rather than using 
dynamical row shifting. Moreover, SHA-1 and MD5 are using pre-calculated circle 
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shift values that have helped the researchers to attack these algorithms. The row 
shifting and column mixing in BCCM algorithm are mainly depend on the values of 
the generated subkeys, therefore different secret key would generate different row 
shifting and column mixing values and would be very hard to figure-out these values 
with a large number possibilities without knowing the value of the secret key.  
6.4 Experimental Results 
In this section, analyses and computer simulations on the BCCM block cipher 
algorithm is presented. The following analyses and simulations are performed on 
original, encrypted and decrypted images. In these experiments, the algorithm 
parameters are set as follows: the block length is 256-bit, sub-block length is 32-bit, 
secret key length is 160-bit, number of rounds is 8, and logistic map is used as the 
chaotic map with x0 = (0.54875623541788954994655445875)10 and r = 
(3.99999999)10. 
6.4.1 Images Encryption and Decryption Using BCCM Algorithm 
In this test, several images of different types and patterns are encrypted with 
the BCCM algorithm using cipher-block chaining (CBC) block cipher mode of 
operation. Then, the same set of images are decrypted with the BCCM decryption 
algorithm using the same parameters and mode of operation as shown in Figures 6-4, 
6-5, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8 and 6-9. This test shows that the proposed algorithm encrypts and 
decrypts images successfully using the same parameters. Moreover, the details of the 
encrypted images are totally invisible. BCCM algorithm is very sensitive to any 
change/changes in input parameters such as value of secret key, number of rounds, 
and word size. Figures 6-10, 6-11 and 6-12 show the decrypted images’ sensitivity to 
any change in word size, number of rounds and value of secret key, respectively.  




A) Original          B) Encrypted   C) Decrypted 
Figure  6-4: Application of BCCM algorithm with CBC to Eiffel Tower 
plainimage/cipherimage with repeated patterns and large areas of the same colour 
abound the Tower in the picture 
 
 
A) Original          B) Encrypted   C) Decrypted 
Figure  6-5: Application of BCCM algorithm with CBC to Ayham 
plainimage/cipherimage with similar details in the Boy blouse (lines) 
 
 
A) Original          B) Encrypted   C) Decrypted 
Figure  6-6: Application of BCCM algorithm with CBC to Taj Mahal 
plainimage/cipherimage repeated patterns and large areas of the same colour around 
the castle 




A) Original          B) Encrypted   C) Decrypted 
Figure  6-7: Application of BCCM algorithm with CBC to Petra 
plainimage/cipherimage with overlap texture 
 
 
A) Original          B) Encrypted   C) Decrypted 
Figure  6-8: Application of BCCM algorithm with CBC to Lion 
plainimage/cipherimage with repeated patterns and large areas of the same colour 
 
 
A) Original          B) Encrypted   C) Decrypted 
Figure  6-9: Application of BCCM algorithm with CBC to Penguin 
plainimage/cipherimage with repeated patterns and large areas of the same colour 





A) Original          B) Encrypted   C) Decrypted 
Figure  6-10: Application of BCCM algorithm with CBC to Durham University Logo 
plainimage/cipherimage with decreasing the value of secret key during the 
decryption process by 10-144 
 
 
A) Original          B) Encrypted   C) Decrypted 
Figure  6-11: Application of BCCM algorithm with CBC to Fruit 
plainimage/cipherimage with changing number of rounds from 8 to 4 during the 
decryption process  
 
 
A) Original          B) Encrypted   C) Decrypted 
Figure  6-12: Application of BCCM algorithm with CBC to Grey 
plainimage/cipherimage with changing the word size during the decryption from 32 
to 16 bits.  
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6.4.2 Modes of Operation Effects on BCCM Algorithm  
The BCCM encryption algorithm is tested with the main five modes of 
operation: electronic codebook (ECB) mode, cipher-block chaining (CBC) mode, 
propagating cipher-block chaining (PCBC) mode, cipher feedback (CFB) mode, and 
output feedback (OFB) mode. To show the proposed encryption algorithm with 
different modes of operation, Sunflower and Lion images were selected of sizes 500 
× 500 and 500 × 375 pixels; these have repeated patterns and large areas of the same 
colour (see Figures 6-13 and 6-14). The parameters values in the encryption function 
are exactly the same values that mentioned in section 6.4. The BCCM encryption 
algorithm using ECB mode did not hide all the information and it gave a template 
and general idea about the encrypted image, which is similar to many other 
encryption algorithms. On the other hand, the result of the encrypted images showed 
that the BCCM algorithm hid all the information and is completely secure using 
CBC, PCBC, CFB or OFB modes. It can thus be concluded that these modes of 
operation are suitable for very highly secure applications.  
 
Figure  6-13: Encryption of Sunflower original image by BCCM algorithm with the 
five modes of operation 




Figure  6-14: Encryption of Lion original image by BCCM algorithm with the five 
modes of operation 
6.4.3 Histogram Analysis 
A histogram analysis test was performed on several coloured images by 
showing the pixel intensity histogram distribution of plainimage and cipherimage. In 
general, highly secure encryption algorithms produce uniform histogram distribution 
regardless of the plainimage distribution to prevent the statistical analysis of 
plainimage and cipherimage. Figure 6-15 shows the histogram analysis of original 
and encrypted images using the same secret key. Frames (c), (d) and (e), 
respectively, show the histograms of red, green and blue channels of the original 
image. Frames (f), (g) and (h), respectively, show histograms of red, green and blue 
channels of the encrypted image. It is very clear from Figure 6-15 that the 
cipherimage has a fairly uniform distribution contrast with distribution of 
plainimage. 




Figure  6-15: Histogram analysis of plainimage and cipherimage: (a) shows original 
image, (b) shows encrypted image, (c-e) show channels histogram of original image, 
(f-h) show channels histogram of encrypted image. 
6.4.4 Correlation Coefficient Analysis 
Cryptography algorithms should have high capabilities of confusion and 
diffusion properties [292]. The confusion is the process of hiding the relationship 
between ciphertext and used secret key while the diffusion is the process of hiding 
the relationship between plaintext and ciphertext [14].  The cipherimage shows high 
diffusion property by normal distribution of the pixels with small correlation and it 
shows confusion property by hiding the relationship between cipherimage and used 
key. Coloration coefficients and distribution tests were carried out on the Fruits 
image of size 500 × 468 pixels with plainimage and cipherimage. Firstly, 2000 pairs 
of adjacent pixels have been selected randomly in each of the three directions, 
horizontal, vertical and diagonal. Then, correlation coefficients have been calculated 
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with two different keys defined by formula 6-8. The coloration distributions of the 
red channel of two horizontally adjacent pixels of plainimage and cipherimage are 
shown in Figure 6-16. From Table 6-3, it is very clear that the coloration distribution 
of cipherimage is nearly uniform and much better than the histogram of plainimage; 
the correlation coefficients of the cipherimage are very small. Therefore, the 
correlation between plainimage and cipherimage is negligible and the experiment 
confirmed that the proposed algorithm has high confusion and diffusion properties 
with high security against statistical analysis attack. 
 
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where x and y are grey level values of two adjacent pixels in the input image, that 
can be performed on horizontal, vertical, and diagonal.   
6.4.5 Information Entropy Analysis 
One of the most important tests of randomness is the entropy test. The 
entropy H(x) of the input message is defined by equation 6-8. The entropy values are 
calculated for different encrypted images with BCCM algorithm using different 
modes of operation. Most of the calculated entropy values for different greyscale 
images with different modes are very close to the optimal value (8) as shown in 
Table 6-4. Therefore, the BCCM encryption algorithm shows a high security factor, 
and the possibility of obtaining secret information is negligible, especially with CBC, 
PCBC, CFB, OFB modes of operation.   




Figure  6-16: Correlation of two horizontally adjacent pixels in plainimage and 
cipherimage, respectively 
 
Table  6-3:  Correlation coefficients of two adjacent pixels in plainimage and 
cipherimage 
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Table  6-4: Entropy analyses of original and encrypted images with different modes 
of operation











              ( 6-8)     
   where p(xi) is the probability of occurrence the symbol xi. 
6.4.6 Execution time of BCCM with Different Parameters 
Some of the proposed encryption algorithms provide high security at the 
expense of execution time. A well-designed block cipher encryption algorithm 
demonstrates very high security and speed. Several tests were performed on BCCM 
encryption/decryption execution time with different parameters, such as number of 
rounds and size of input texts/images. The speed of the proposed algorithm was 
analyzed on Laptop Intel Core(TM) 2 Duo 2.00 GHz CPU with 3 GB RAM running 
on Linux Operating System, using GMP (GNU Multi-Precision Library) and 
OpenCV-2.0.0. As shown in Tables 6-5 and 6-6, the execution time average is very 
short for different texts/images with different parameters, which confirmed that the 
proposed encryption algorithm can be described as a fast encryption algorithm. 
Therefore, the BCCM algorithm demonstrated that the encryption/decryption 
Image Original ECB CBC PCBC CFB OFB 
Eiffel 
Tower 
7.2908 7.9989 7.9988 7.9989 7.9989 7.9988 
Lion 5.3953 7.6459 7.9991 7.9989 7.9989 7.9991 
Fruit 7.5494 7.9990 7.9991 7.9991 7.9991 7.9992 
Flowers 4.8413 7.6903 7.9991 7.9992 7.9992 7.9993 
Ayham 7.2835 7.9989 7.9991 7.9991 7.9990 7.9992 
Petra 7.8719 7.9991 7.9991 7.9992 7.9992 7.9993 




execution time is very short, and it would be a good candidate for use in e-commerce 
applications over broadband networks.  
Table  6-5: BCCM text execution encryption/decryption time(s) 
Text size 
(in bits) 
BCCM Encryption/Decryption Time(s) in Seconds 
R = 4 R = 8 R = 12 R = 16 
1024 0.000074 0.000089 0.000108 0.000121 
6656 0.000173 0.000195 0.000218 0.000273 
10752 0.000245 0.000272 0.000298 0.000321 
19200 0.000394 0.000430 0.000463 0.000494 
29952 0.000582 0.000632 0.000673 0.000714 
64512 0.001190 0.001280 0.001348 0.001423 
92160 0.001676 0.001798 0.001888 0.001992 
114688 0.002072 0.002225 0.002328 0.002454 




on disk (in 
bytes) 
BCCM Encryption/Decryption Time(s) in 
R = 4 R = 8 R = 12 R = 16 
64 x 64 629 0.000143 0.000203 0.000262 0.000325 
128 x 128 881 0.000433 0.000638 0.000852 0.001057 
256  x 256 1649 0.001580 0.002414 0.003204 0.003992 
512 x 512 4721 0.006384 0.009420 0.012620 0.015752 
1024 x 1024 17009 0.025065 0.038630 0.050303 0.063127 
6.4.7 Comparison between BCCM and Some Existing Schemes 
BCCM is compared with two well-know encryption schemes (DES, RC6) 
and one chaotic encryption scheme (Chen S. et al.’s scheme).  Table 6-7 summarizes 
the comparison results for word size, block size, maximum block size, secret key 
length, number of subkeys, number of rounds, mathematical operations and 
algorithm structure. The security of BCCM relies on the sensitivity of secret key, 
chaotic subkeys, chaotic subkeys order, chaotic mixing column, chaotic shifting 
rows, and non-linear operations. The combination of these security factors produces 
a very highly random, sensitive, fixable encryption function with high confusion and 




diffusion properties. Moreover, the simple non-linear operations - addition, 
exclusive-OR, circle left shift, and circle right shift - are very fast on the computer. A 
chaotic system is slower than some other systems on a computer, but we utilized 
simple chaotic systems on subkey generation and the resulting values are employed 
in other functions to provide high randomness, performance and security. DES, RC6 
and Chen et al.’s encryption schemes were proved as insecure encryption algorithms. 
Table  6-7: Comparison between DES, RC6, Chen S. et al. algorithm, and BCCM 
Parameters Encryption Algorithm 
DES RC6 Chen et al. 
[35] 
BCCM 
w (word size in bits) 8 16, 32, 64 8 8, 16, 32, 64 
Block size in words 8w 4w w 8w 
Block size in bits 64 64, 128, 256 8 64, 128, 256, 512 
Max. block size in bits 64 256 8 512 
s (key length in bytes) 7 0, 1, 2, ..., 255 4 1, 2, 3, ..., 512 
No. of keys derived 
from key 
16 2r + 4 4 8r 
r (No. Of rounds) 16 0, 1, 2, 3, ...., 
255 
4 4, 6, 8, ...., 512 
Used operations +, -, *, >>>, 
<<<,  
+, -, *, >>>, 
<<<,  
+, -, *, >>>, <<<, 
 
+, -, >>>, <<<, 
, % 
Algorithm structure Feistel cipher Feistel cipher Feistel cipher Feistel cipher 

















Security Proven inadequate Proven inadequate Proven inadequate Under study 




6.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter, we proposed a novel fast block cipher encryption algorithm 
based on chaotic systems. The proposed algorithm (BCCM) works with different 
parameters such as block size, number of rounds, secret key length and chaotic maps. 
BCCM processes n-bit of plaintext and produces the same size of ciphertext with k-
bit key size. It generates several subkeys from a single secret key using a simple one-
dimensional chaotic map. The proposed algorithm has chaotic subkeys generation, 
chaotic columns mixing, and chaotic rows shifting based on the value of the secret 
key to provide high confusion and diffusion properties. Therefore, encryption and 
decryption functions architectures are depend on the value of the secret key. We 
performed several analyses and computer simulations which confirmed that the 
BCCM algorithm satisfies the characteristics and conditions of cryptography block 
cipher. Moreover, we have compared the BCCM with two well-known block ciphers 
(DES, RC6,) and one chaos-based block cipher; the comparison results showed that 
BCCM work better than these algorithms. BCCM is confirmed as a good candidate 
for texts/images encryption with high flexibility, confusion and diffusion, and fast 
speed. These characteristics show that the proposed algorithm has high potential for 









7. Fast Hash Function Based on BCCM Encryption 
Algorithm for eCommerce (HBCCM) 
In chapter 6, we proposed a fast block cipher encryption algorithm based on chaotic 
maps (BCCM) with high sensitivity, flexibility, performance, confusion and diffusion 
properties. Analyses and experimental results confirmed that the whole encryption 
process is extremely sensitive to any change or changes in the input message and/or 
secret key. These properties are promising for the adoption of the BCCM encryption 
function in designing a new cryptography hash function. In this chapter, we propose 
a fast chaotic hash function based on BCCM encryption algorithm with changeable 
parameters (HBCCM). The proposed hash function produces different lengths of 
hash values based on different chaotic systems with variable parameters. A 
comparison between HBCCM and other hash functions is presented. Analyses and 
computer simulations confirmed that the proposed algorithm satisfies all 
cryptography hash function requirements and it is high potential for adoption in e-
commerce. 
 






ver the past decade, many researchers have utilized chaotic systems to 
design cryptography hash functions to provide high security [30, 70, 76, 
81, 87, 88, 286, 287, 293, 294]. Unfortunately, some of the proposed 
algorithms are described as insecure and/or slow [137, 140, 143, 144]. Therefore, 
further research is still needed to design a fast and secure chaotic cryptography hash 
function. In chapter 6, we proposed a fast block cipher encryption algorithm based on 
chaotic maps (BCCM) with high sensitivity, flexibility, performance, bit confusion 
and diffusion properties [295]. In this chapter, we propose a fast hash function based 
on BCCM encryption algorithm with changeable parameters (HBCCM) [296]. The 
rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2 gives details of the proposed 
hash function (HBCCM). Section 7.3 discusses the experimental results of HBCCM. 
Finally, the conclusion is given in section 7.4. 
7.2 Details of HBCCM Hash Function  
BCCM is a fast block cipher encryption algorithm based on chaotic maps 
with changeable parameters. BCCM is an encryption algorithm that provides high 
flexibility, confusion, diffusion, and fast encryption speed. We performed several 
analyses and computer simulations on BCCM which confirmed that the algorithm 
satisfies the characteristics and conditions of a cryptography encryption algorithm. 
Experimental results confirmed that the whole encryption process is extremely 
sensitive to any change or changes in the input message and/or secret key. These 
properties are promising for the adoption of the BCCM encryption function to design 
a new cryptography hash function. In this chapter, a fast hash function based on 
BCCM encryption algorithm is proposed; it is called HBCCM. 
An overview of the HBCCM hash function algorithm is illustrated in Figure 7-1. The 
new hash function algorithm is exactly same as BCCM encryption function with few 
changes. HBCCM compression function is implemented by adding new compression 
function at the end of BCCM encryption as shown in Figure 7-1(a). The 
Initialization, key generation, subkeys’ orders (SOi), rows shifting (RSi) and 
columns-mixing (CMi) are exactly the same in BCCM algorithm (for more details 
O 





see section 6.2). In the proposed hash function, the total number of subkeys is eight 
times the number of (rounds+1) [8*(R+1)]: eight subkeys for each round and eight 
subkeys for mixing the result of the previous block with the current block in the 
addition compression function (see Figure 7-2(a)). 
 
Figure  7-1: Overview of HBCCM 
In the HBCCM algorithm, after all subkeys, subkeys orders, shifting rows and 
mixing columns are generated, the next step is to apply the hash compression 
function. The blocks of the input message are processed throughout the compression 
function by iterating each block “R” times and in each round applying compression 
function operations to calculate the intermediate result of the sub-block Yi`. Then, 
the values of the next sub-blocks Xi+1[n] are XORed with n+8(R+1) subkeys 
SK[n+8(R+1)], and are then XORed with the resulting values from processing the 
previous sub-blocks through the compression function Yi`[n] to produce the 
correspondence intermediate sub-block hash value (Yi[n]). After that, the resulted 
intermediate sub-block hash values Yi will be the next input to the hash compression 
function. HBCCM keeps running until it has processed the entire input message and 
then generated the final hash value. 






(a) The additional function to adopt the BCCM encryption function to be HBCCM 
 
(b) Full HBCCM compression function 
Figure  7-2: HBCCM compression function 
The number of hash rounds (R) was chosen very carefully by selecting the input 
image and secret key randomly; then the hash value is calculated using the HBCCM 
with different numbers of rounds. For the resulting hash value, the confusion and 
diffusion test and correlation coefficient analysis are applied as explained in detail in 
section 7.3.4 and 7.3.5, respectively. We found that the proposed algorithm has high 





confusion and diffusion properties with the number of rounds equal R ≥ 8. HBCCM 
aimed to construct a keyed hash function; at the same time we can construct an 
unkeyed hash function by processing the complete input message through one of the 
chaotic maps and using the result as the secret key, although this will add to 
computation costs depending on input message size. 
HBCCM has a very flexible design that can be customized using different parameters 
for different applications as follows: 
1- HBCCM can construct a keyed hash function as the chaotic system’s 
initial condition x0 and the control parameter r is used as the secret key. 
2- HBCCM can construct an unkeyed hash function by processing the 
complete input message through one of the chaotic maps and using the 
result as the secret key.  
3- HBCCM processes different types of input messages of variable lengths. 
4- HBCCM can be constructed using several chaotic maps as chaotic 
systems: Tent map, Skew Tent map, Logistic map, and other PWLCMs. 
5- HBCCM produces different hash value lengths in bits, such as 64, 128, 
192, 256, and 512. 
6- HBCCM is based on variable number of rounds R, R[8, N].   
7.3 Experimental Results 
In this section, performance and statistical analysis of HBCCM hash function 
are discussed. Several tests and simulations are performed on the computed hash 
values. The hash value length is 265, the block length is 256-bit, the sub-block length 
is 32, the secret key length is 160-bit, the number of rounds is 16 and logistic map is 
used as the chaotic map with x0 = (0.80660971808844940000)10 and r = 
(3.99999999)10. 





7.3.1 Hash Value Distribution  
Uniform distribution of hash value is a very important condition in hash 
function security [81]. We performed the uniform distribution test on the following 
message: “The computer security term refers to the protection of data, networks, 
computer programs, computer power and other elements of computerized 
information systems.” The differences between ASCII distribution of original 
message and hexadecimal distribution of hash value are shown in Figure 7-3. The 
experiment result shows that the ASCII distribution of the original message focuses 
on a very small space, while the hash value distribution is irregular and spread over a 
large hash space. The simulation result confirms that the proposed hash function is 
secure enough against statistical attack and it is difficult to retrieve information about 
the input message from the calculated hash value. 
 
(a) ASCII distribution of the original message 
  
(b) Hash values distribution in hexadecimal format 

































Hexadecimal code sequance number






Figure  7-4: Hash value distribution in hash space with N = 3000 and mean 1498.03 
Similar to [87, 286], another hash space uniform distribution is performed to check 
hash space distribution property. A message is generated randomly and then the 
correspondence hash value is calculated to ensure hash space distribution. One bit is 
toggled randomly and then the new correspondence hash value is calculated. Later 
on, the number of toggled bits in the calculated hash space for the two hash values is 
counted. This test is performed 3000 times by fixing the first input message and 
toggling one bit randomly to calculate the number of toggled bits at same location in 
the hash space, as shown in Figure 7-4.  The mean of toggled bits is 1498.03, which 
is very close to the ideal mean value (1500). Therefore, HBCCM will be strong 
enough against statistical attacks and in terms of collision resistance.  
7.3.2 Hash Value Result of Text Input Message 
In order to evaluate HBCCM hash value sensitivity to text input message, 
simulation tests are performed on the following text: “The computer security term 
refers to the protection of data, networks, computer programs, computer power and 
other elements of computerized information systems.” Then, several changes are 
performed using secret key K = (2F050FE938943ACC45F65567FFFFFFFFE)16. The 
correspondence hash value for each scenario is calculated in hexadecimal format (see 
Appendix D). The simulation results show that HBCCM are very sensitive to any 





slight change(s) in the input text message or used key by producing significantly 
different hash value.  
7.3.3 Hash Value Result of Images Input Message 
In order to evaluate HBCCM hash value sensitivity to image input message, 
simulation tests were performed on Ayham image of size 500 × 375 pixels with 8-bit 
greyscale; the used key is k = (2F050FE938943ACC45F65567FFFFFFFFF)16 (see 
Figure 7-4). Then, several changes were performed and the correspondence hash 
values were calculated in hexadecimal format (see Appendix E). The simulation 
results show that HBCCM are very sensitive to any change(s) in input image or used 
key by producing significantly different hash value. 
 
Figure  7-5: Ayham 8-bit grayscale input image 
7.3.4 Statistical Analysis of Diffusion and Confusion 
Confusion and diffusion properties are very important for many cryptography 
algorithms such as block cipher encryption algorithms and hash functions [297]. A 
hash function requires the spreading influence of the whole input message into the 
hash value space. A well-designed hash function must have a complex relationship 
between the bits of input message and the correspondence bits in the hash value. 
Consequently, changing any bit or bits in input message must affect at least half the 
hash value bits with a 50% probability of each bit in the hash value being changed. A 





message is chosen randomly and correspondence hash value is calculated. Then, one 
bit in the input message is selected and toggled randomly, and the binary hash value 
is calculated. Now, a comparison between the original and the new hash value is 
performed by counting the number of changed bits in the same locations called Bi. 
This test is performed 3000 times and the correspondence distributions of the 
changed bits are calculated (see Figure 7-6). Similar to [70, 87, 286, 287], six 
statistics for HBCCM hashing scheme (see section 5.3.2 and equations 5-3 to 5-8)  
 
Figure  7-6: Distribution of changed bit number Bi 
Table 7-1 shows the statistical results for different numbers of tests: N = 3072, 2048, 
1024, and 512. The mean number of changed bits and the mean changed bit 
probability are 128.14 and 50.05, respectively, which are very close to the ideal 





values of 128 and 50%. ΔB and ΔP indicate the stability of diffusion and confusion 
which show that the HBCCM hashing scheme is very stable. We conclude that 
HBCCM is secure enough against statistical attacks and very difficult to attack, so it 
can be adopted in many different applications and protocols such as e-commerce, e-
business and Internet banking. 
Table  7-1: Statistic of number of changed bit Bi 
 N = 3072 N = 2048 N = 1024 N = 512 Mean 

B 128.20898 127.93505 127.9463 128.47656 128.14
P 50.08163 49.97463 49.97902 50.18616 50.055
ΔB 7.8296714 7.7925710 8.176215 7.9626966 7.9402
ΔP 3.057968 3.043973 3.193834 3.110428 3.1015
Bmin 100 103 104 108 103.75 
Bmax 158 153 157 145 153.25 
7.3.5 Analysis of Collision Resistance 
HBCCM collision resistance capability is tested. First, a message is selected 
randomly and the associated hash value is calculated in ASCII format. Then, one bit 
is selected and toggled randomly to generate a new hash value in ASCII format. 
Now, the difference between the two ASCII hash values in the same position is 
calculated. Finally, absolute difference (d) is calculated by calculating the summation 
of all differences of all characters for two hash values (see equation 5-9). This kind 
of test is performed 3000, 2000 and 1000 times and maximum, minimum, mean and 
mean/c, where c is number of hexadecimal character of hash value for each case, are 
calculated, as shown in table 7-2. Figure 7-7 shows the distribution of number of 
ASCII characters with same value at the same location in the hash value, with 
number of tests 3000, 2000 and 1000 (see equation 5-10). It is clear that the 
maximum number of equal ASCII characters in the same location is only three, the 
possibility of collision is very low, and most of the entries are different in ASCII 
format. Figure 7-7 shows that the peaks values at one while Figure 5-6 shows that the 





peaks at zero, which means the probability to find a collision in PHFC is less than 
HBCCM.  
Table  7-2: Absolute differences of two hash values 
 N = 3000 N = 2000 N = 1000 
Maximum 5436 5417 5533 
Minimum 2630 2693 2585 
Mean 3956 3936 3959 
Mean/C 123.6 123 123.7 
 
Figure  7-7: number of ASCII characters distribution of the same value at the same 
location in the hash value with 3000, 2000, and 1000 number of tests 
7.3.6 Execution time of HBCCM with Different Parameters 
The main idea behind designing a hash function is to provide a fast security 
algorithm based on a small amount of data compared with some public key 
encryption algorithms for security applications. An ideal hash function algorithm 
should provide high security with high speed. Several speed tests have been 
performed on HBCCM algorithm execution time with different parameters, such as 
number of rounds and size of the input text/image. This test has been performed for 
the proposed hash algorithm on Laptop Intel Core(TM) 2 Duo 2.00 GHz CPU with 
3 GB RAM running on Linux Operating System, using GMP (GNU Multi-Precision 





Library) and OpenCV-2.0.0. Speed average is very small for calculating hash values 
using HBCCM algorithm with different parameters (see Tables 7-3 and 7-4).  
Table  7-3: Execution times for HBCCM to generate hash value of Images 
Image size (in 
pixels) 
Image size on 
disk (in bytes) 
HBCCM Encryption/Decryption Time(s) in Seconds 
R = 4 R = 8 R = 12 R = 16 
64 x 64 629 bytes 0.000121 0.000198 0.000231 0.000269 
128 x 128 881 bytes 0.000446 0.000484 0.000524 0.000564 
256  x 256 1649 bytes 0.001298 0.001338 0.001392 0.001464 
512 x 512 4721 bytes 0.004754 0.004832 0.004924 0.005056 
1024 x 1024 17009 bytes 0.019006 0.01926 0.019482 0.019702 
Table  7-4: Execution times for HBCCM to generate hash value of texts 
Text size (in bits)  
HBCCM Encryption/Decryption Time(s) in Seconds 
R = 4  R = 8 R = 12 R = 16 
2048 0.000131 0.000145 0.000165 0.000181 
5888 0.000189 0.000204 0.000230 0.000263 
10240 0.000265 0.000281 0.000315 0.000352 
20480 0.000445 0.000463 0.000515 0.000562 
32768 0.000660 0.000681 0.000755 0.000814 
57344 0.001093 0.001118 0.001235 0.001318 
81152 0.001511 0.001541 0.001700 0.001806 
94208 0.001741 0.001773 0.001955 0.002074 
A comparison of execution times between SHA-1, CHA-1, parallel version of PHFC 
(P-PHFC), sequential version of PHFC (S-PHFC), and HBCCM hashing schemes is 
performed. The experiment result shows that the CHA-1 and sequential mode of 
PHFC are very slow compared with the other hashing schemes (see Figure 7-8). 
Moreover, the parallel mode of PHFC and SHA-1 average execution times is very 
short and close to each other, but SHA-1 shows a slightly better performance with 





bigger message size. Furthermore, the average execution times of HBCCM with 8 
rounds is shorter than all the other algorithms with different input message lengths, 
and HBCCM with 16 rounds is slightly higher than SHA-1 with all input message 
lengths. The overall result shows that HBCCM is a very fast and secure hashing 
scheme compared with many of the existing algorithms. Therefore, HBCCM is 
considered a very fast and secure hashing scheme that would be a good candidate for 
use in e-commerce applications over broadband networks. SHA-1 code was 
downloaded from Requests for Comments (RFC) website (http://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/rfc2841.txt). 
 
Figure  7-8: Comparison between SHA-1, CHA-1, sequential and parallel versions of 
PHFC with 8-round, and HBCCM with 8 and 16 rounds in the execution time 
(millisecond) 
7.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter, we proposed HBCCM as a new hash function based on BCCM 
block cipher encryption algorithm. HBCCM is very simple, flexible, and sensitive to 
any change (s) in the input message of the secret key. It processes input messages of 
different lengths to generate different hash value lengths based on different chaotic 
systems. Moreover, it can be used to calculate the correspondence hash value of 
input messages as texts or images with high confusion and diffusion properties. 
Comparisons between HBCCM and other hash functions show that HBCCM 





outperforms all the other algorithms. Several analyses and computer simulations 
have been performed that confirm the new hash function algorithm satisfies the 
characteristics and conditions of cryptography hash hashing scheme, which would 
have high potential for adoption in e-commerce applications. 





8. A Novel Pseudorandom Number Generator Based 
on New Triangle-Chaotic Map for High Security 
Applications 
In this chapter, a new one-dimensional Triangle-chaotic map (TCM) with full 
intensive chaotic population is proposed. It shows a great sensitivity to initial 
conditions, has unpredictability, is uniformly distributed, random-like and has an 
infinite range of intensive chaotic population with large positive Lyapunov exponent 
values. In addition, a novel pseudorandom number generator based on TCM map is 
proposed; it is called PRNGT. PRNGT generator is designed based on a 
combination of two TCM maps running side by side and starting from independent 
initial conditions. Generated pseudorandom sequences based on logistic map, 
modified logistic map and PRNGT generators are tested using NIST 800-22 suite 
standard statistical tests. The experimental results confirm high randomness of 
generated sequences using PRNGT by passing all NIST 800-22 suite tests. Moreover, 
non-randomness of generated sequences using original and modified versions of 
logistic map is confirmed. The statistical analysis results confirm that PRNGT is a 
high-potential candidate for high-security applications such as e-commerce and e-
banking. Moreover, TCM characteristics are very promising for possible utilization 
in designing and developing new security primitives. 






andom number generator is an algorithm or a device that generates a 
statistically independent sequence of bits. Random number generators play 
a significant role in many applications such as computer simulation, 
games, science, statistical sampling and cryptography [272, 298]. Generating a high-
randomness bit sequence is considered a big challenge in the literature. There are two 
main types of random numbers generators: truly random number generator (TRNG) 
and pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). TRNG is a non-deterministic 
procedure for extracting random bits from physical phenomena such as a user’s 
mouse movements. PRNG algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that produces 
random statistically independent bits from mathematical formulae [10].  
PRNG’s initial set of input parameters are called seeds and output values are called 
random bit sequence. PRNG produces multiple pseudorandom bits based on one or 
more input parameters. Ideally, we can regenerate exactly the same sequence only if 
we use the same seeds. In a generated pseudorandom sequence, the subsequent bits 
should be independent and unpredictable from the current bits or generated bits. The 
input parameters should be random and unpredictable from the generated sequence 
and the output sequence is deterministic on the same input parameters. Unpredictable 
sequences are used to provide high security for many cryptography systems such as 
digital signatures, secret key in DES encryption algorithm, and prime numbers in 
RSA [10].  
A logistic map shows a chaotic behaviour that can arise from very simple non-linear 
dynamical equations (see Figure 8-1) [239]. Logistic map behaviour seems to be a 
random jumble of dots and mainly depends on two parameters (x0 and r). We can 
observe different logistic map behaviours by changing the value(s) of one or both of 
these parameters. The general idea of a logistic map was built based on an iterations 
function, where the next output value depends on the previous output value. Figure 
8-2 shows the calculated Lyapunov exponent value of a logistic map with different 
values of parameter r [0, 4]. In a logistic map equation, x0 and r represent the 
initial conditions, x0 [0, 1] and r [0, 4]. Chaotic behaviour is exhibited with 3.57 
> r ≥ 4, but it shows non-chaotic behaviour with some values of parameter r (see 
R





Figures 8-1 and 8-2). In this chapter, we refer to x0 and r parameters as the initial 
conditions of a logistic map. 
 
Figure  8-1: Bifurcation diagram of logistic map 
 
Figure  8-2: Lyapunov exponent of Logistic map with t  [0, 4] 
A small range of logistic map parameters are consider as valid values to show 
chaotic behaviour [299]. In general, chaotic behaviour is exhibited with values of 
parameter r greater than 3.57 and less than or equal to 4. It is very clear from Figure 
8-1 that the logistic map periodic window becomes significantly complicated with 
3.57 > r ≥ 4. In Figures 8-3 and 8-4, we plotted a portion of logistic map bifurcation 
and its Lyapunov exponent, respectively, using MATLAB software, to give a clear 
picture of the chaotic areas [300, 301]. There are non-chaotic areas with some values 





of parameter r over the chaotic interval, which are called stability or islands. It is 
very clear that there is a 3-periodic window between 3.828429 and 3.841037 [124]. 
The value of r = 3.840 falls in the 3-periodic window and the value of r = 3.845 fall 
in the 6-periodic window. Therefore, after a small number of iterations with different 
initial values of x, (x0) will end up in one of these periodic. The cryptosystems fall 
within the 3-perodic and the 6-periodic windows with r = 3.840 and 3.845, 
respectively, and were utilized for the purpose of attacking them [124]. Moreover, 
the logistic map population will cover the full interval of x, ([0, 1]), only with r = 4. 
 
Figure  8-3: Logistic map bifurcation diagram of a periodic window 
 
Figure  8-4: Lyapunov exponent of Logistic map with t  [3.575, 4] 
In this chapter, we propose a new one-dimensional triangle-chaotic map (TCM) of 
degree two with full chaotic population over infinite interval of parameters. 






Moreover, a novel pseudorandom bits sequence generator based on TCM chaotic 
map is proposed for high security applications. The rest of this chapter is organized 
as follows. In section 8.2 details of the new triangle-chaotic map are given. Section 
8.3 describes details of pseudorandom number generators. High level of NIST 
statistical suite test details are given in section 8.4. Experimental results are 
discussed in Section 8.5. Finally, the conclusion is given in section 8.6. 
8.2 New Triangle-Chaotic Map (TCM) 
In this chapter, a new triangle-chaotic map (TCM) is proposed. TCM is a 
one-dimensional chaotic map of degree two with full chaotic population over infinite 
interval of parameter t values (see equation 8-1). The triangle-chaotic map behaviour 
mainly depends on the initial values of parameters y0 and t. TCM behaviour seems to 
be a random jumble of dots, and depends on initial conditions (y0 and t). The y0, yn 
are positive real numbers between 0 and 1, yn [0, 1], and t can be any positive real 
number t [0, ∞]. Figures 8-5 and 8-6 show a TCM map bifurcation diagram and the 
calculated Lyapunov exponent value over r  [0, 4]. It is very clear from the figures 
that TCM shows perfect chaotic behaviour over the full interval. Figure 8-7 shows a 
TCM diagram with initial value of t very close to zero and random number of y0, 
iterating TCM map many times, and then plotting the t series of values of yn using 
MATLAB software. In other words, we plotted corresponding points of yn to a given 
value of t and increased t to the right. TCM is very sensitive to any change(s) in one 
or both initial conditions and is unpredictable in the long term, as shown in Figures 
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where yn is a number between zero and one, y0 represents the initial population, t is a 
positive real number, n is a number of iterations, β: is a positive odd number between 
3 and 99. 





The general idea of a TCM map was built based on an iteration function. The result 
of the next output value (yn+1) in TCM depends on the previous output value (yn) (see 
equation 8-1). A TCM map over a different range of parameter t values will give 
different f maps. To show TCM sensitivity we plotted the behaviour of three nearby 
initial values of y0 and three nearby initial values of t. Three nearby initial values of 
y0 (0.990000, 0.990001, and 0.990002) for t =1 started at the same time and rapidly 
diverged exponentially over time with no correlation between each of them (see 
Figure 8-7). Moreover, we plotted populations of three slightly different parameter 
values of t (4.000000, 4.000001, and 4.000002) and y0 = 0.5 to show great sensitivity 
to initial conditions of the TCM map (see Figure 8-8).  
 
Figure  8-5: TCM chaotic map bifurcation diagram with t  [0, 4] 
 
Figure  8-6: Lyapunov exponent of TCM chaotic map with t  [0, 4] 





TCM diagram and population distribution histograms have been plotted for 
population of TCM over the t [32, 36].  TCM iterated 43686 times with initial 
conditions values of t0 = 32 and y0 = 0.5. We draw the TCM diagram by plotting 
corresponding points of yn to a given value of t and increasing t to the right (see 
Figure 8-9).  TCM population interval, [0, 1], is divided into 10 equal sub-intervals 
and the number of points in each interval has been counted for each sub-interval and 
plotted (see Figures 8-10). It is very clear from Figures 8-9 and 8-10 that TCM 
population is uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1] with t [32, 36]. We draw 
the TCM diagram and population distribution histogram with different initial t values 
(0, 4, 8, 12....etc.) and the overall results confirm that the TCM population 
distributions are uniformly distributed with t ≥ 12 and interval size 4. In conclusion, 
TCM is a new one-dimensional chaotic map with perfect chaotic behaviour over 
infinite interval, high positive Lyapunov exponent value, uniform distribution, and 
great sensitivity to any change(s) in the initial condition or the control parameter (see 
Appendix B).  
 
Figure  8-7: TCM iterations with t = 1 and three different initial values of y0 






Figure  8-8: TCM iterations with y0 = 0.5 and three different initial values of t 
 
Figure  8-9: TCM chaotic map bifurcation diagram with t [32, 36] 
 
Figure  8-10: TCM distribution of yn values over t [32, 36] 





8.3 Pseudorandom Number Generators 
8.3.1 Constructing a Novel PRNG based on TCM Map (PRNGT) 
In this section, we discuss the details of the novel proposed pseudorandom 
number generator based on TCM (PRNGT). The proposed pseudorandom number 
generator is based on two TCM maps running side by side, as shown in Figure 8-11. 
We employ two TCM maps to increase the complexity of the PRNGT generator and 
prevent information extraction. The initial conditions of the two TCM maps are 
independent: 0000 , yyrr  . After setting the initial values of each map, the TCM 
maps are iterated a number of times. Each time, the summation mod by one of the 
output results of the two TCM maps is calculated (see equation 8-3). Threshold is 
applied to convert the TCM real output value to zero and one as binary bits. We 
apply equation 8-4 with threshold value 0.5. If the obtained value from equation 8-3 
is less than 0.5, the PRNGT will generate zero (0); otherwise it will generate one (1) 


















    ( 8-2) 














SumFZ      ( 8-4) 
We can briefly express the PRNGT algorithm as follows: 
1. Set values ( iii ty ,, 00 ) and ( iii ty   ,, 00 ). 
2. Calculate the two TCM output values (yn+1, 1ny ). 
3. Apply equation 8-3 to calculate sumn+1. 
4. Zn+1 = F(sumn+1). 





5. Set yn = yn+1 and 1 nn yy . 
6. Increment it  and it by ii nttn , ; 01.0 ii nttn  
7. Do the next iteration. 
The sum function aims to mix two TCM output values to produce a third real number 
and map it from (0, 2) to (0, 1). The generated pseudorandom bit sequence using 
PRNGT generator will be denoted as 0}{ iiZ . In each iteration the variables it and it 
will be incremented by a small real number, 01.0 ii nttn , in each map equation. 
PRNGT generator can be easily implemented in parallel by running the two TCMs 
either in a parallel system or in a distributed system to provide a faster generator. The 
proposed pseudorandom number generator produces an infinite number of random 
bit sequences. 
 
Figure  8-11: Block diagram of the proposed PRNGT generator 
8.3.2 Logistic Map Pseudorandom Number Generator (LPRNG) 
In this section we briefly explain another proposed pseudorandom number 
generator based on a logistic chaotic map equation [117]. The authors proposed two 
pseudorandom number generators based on a logistic map for a cryptography stream 
cipher. One of the proposed generators is based on two logistic maps to generate a 
pseudorandom binary sequence. The initial conditions of the two maps should be 
independent (r0≠r0, x0≠y0), where x0, y0 (0, 1) and r0, r0 (3.99996, 4]. They 





calculate the remainder by dividing the sum of the two output values (xn+1, yn+1) by 1 
(see equation 8-3). The algorithm generates the binary pseudorandom sequences 
based on equation 8-4. They tested their proposed pseudorandom number generator 
using Beker and Piper’s suite [273] and FIPS 140-1 suite [274]. They claimed that 
the proposed random number generator has passed all FIPS 140-1 and Beker and 
Piper’s suites with sequence length 100,000 bits and significance level α = 0.05. In 
this chapter, we refer to the logistic map pseudorandom number generator as 
LPRNG. 
8.3.3 Modified Logistic Map Pseudorandom Number Generator (MLPRNG) 
 As we explained earlier, a small range of logistic map parameters are 
considered valid values to show chaotic behaviour r > 3.57 ≥ 4.  In addition, the 
logistic map population will cover the full interval of x, xn[0, 1], only with r = 4. 
Therefore, we propose to use a modified version of the logistic map defined in 
equation 8-6. We used the remainder of dividing the logistic map by 1 to ensure that 
all the output values will be between zero and one, xn [0, 1], and we added a small 
real number (β ≤ 0.001) to ensure xn ≠ 0 or 1. Consequently, in the modified version 
the value of parameter r can be any value greater than 0, r [0, ∞]. We plotted the 
modified version of logistic map bifurcation and its Lyapunov exponent over 
different intervals using MATLAB software (see Figure 8-12 and Appendix A). It is 
very clear from Figure 8-12 that the modified version has bigger intervals of chaotic 
behaviour and it covers the full x interval over many different values of parameter r. 
Unfortunately, It still shows non-chaotic areas over different values within the 
intervals: [0, 4], [4, 8], [8, 12] and [12, 16], which are known as stability or islands. 
In contrast, the TCM map shows perfect chaotic behaviour and covers the entire 
range of y for every value of t (see Figure 8-13 and Appendix B). In other words, in 
the triangle-chaotic map at every value of f(x) there is at least one image value, but in 
the logistic map and modified logistic map there are no image values.  
;1mod))1((1  nnn xrxx      ( 8-5) 
 where xn  (0, 1), r [0,∞], nN, β < 0.001 and x0 is value of initial population. 





In this section, we propose a new pseudorandom number generator based on 
modified logistic map equation (see equation 8-5). This generator is based on two 
modified logistic maps running side by side. The initial conditions of the two maps 
should be independent (r0≠r0, x0≠y0), where x0, y0 (0, 1) and r0, r0 (3.99996, 4]. 
We calculate remainder of divide the sum of two output values (xn+1, yn+1) by 1 (see 
equation 8-3). We used equation 8-3 to generate the binary pseudorandom sequences.  
Then, we increment the parameters rx and ry of the two maps by a small real number 
and then apply the next iteration. In this paper, we refer to modified logistic map 
pseudorandom number generator as MLPRNG. 
 
Figure  8-12: Modified logistic map bifurcation diagrams over r [4, 8] 
 
Figure  8-13: TCM map bifurcation diagrams over t [4, 8] 





8.4 NIST Statistical suite test 
NIST (National Institute of Standard Technologies) developed a statistical 
package to test the randomness of generated bit sequences for cryptography 
applications  [211]. It contains 16 tests and each test contains several subtests. The 
focus of these tests is to confirm the existence of non-randomness in the input bit 
sequences. A number of tests have chi-square (x2) and standard normal to refer to 
distribution. In each test, p-value for each sample in the sequence will be computed, 
thus m p-values will be computed for each test. A p-value of greater than or equal to 
α = 0.01 would be considered a random sequence with a confidence level of 99%. A 
p-value of less than α = 0.01 would be considered a non-random sequence with a 
confidence level of 99%.   
The recommended significance level (α) value is in the range 0.0001 ≤ α ≤ 0.01. For 
the statistical tests in this paper the value of α has been chosen to be 0.01. If the 
computed p-value is greater than the chosen significance level (α = 0.01), the 
sequence will be considered a random sequence. In random sequences, if the chosen 
value of α is 0.01, it would be acceptable to reject only one sequence out of each 100 
sequences. The computed p-values of p-values should be greater than 0.001 to be 
considered uniformly distributed. We can broadly classify these tests into two main 
types: parameterized tests and non-parameterized tests. The parameterized tests have 
some input variables that the user can change its values, while the variables values of 
the non-parameterized tests are already set. NIST suite test is described in high-level 
description in Appendix F.  
8.5 Experimental results  
In [117], the proposed random number generator was tested using FIPS 140-1 
and Beker and Piper’s suites which were published in 1982 and 1994, respectively. 
The authors claimed that the generated sequences passed all the tests with sequence 
length of 100,000 bits for several samples and significance level of α = 0.05. In 2010 
NIST published a package of statistical suite tests of random bits for random and 
pseudorandom number generators for cryptography applications (NIST 800-22) to 
check the non-randomness of generated sequences. Typically, they recommended the 





chosen significance level (α) in the range [0.001, 0.01] and sequence size of at least 
20,000 without giving an exact sample size.  Therefore, the chosen significance level 
α = 0.05 is considered an atypical value, which make the test much more easier as it 
would be acceptable to reject five sequences out of each 100 sequences. Moreover, 
based on acceptable confidence interval in equation 8-7, the minimum sample size 
with significance α = 0.05 should be 3250 samples approximately. 
Table  8-1: Number of NIST 800-22 test suite sub-tests 
No. Statistical Test Sub-tests 
1 Frequency 1 
2 Block Frequency 1 
3 Cusum-Forward 1 
4 Cusum-Reverse 1 
5 Runs 2 
6 Long Runs of Ones 1 
7 Rank 1 
8 FFT 1 
9 NonOverlapping Templates 1 
10 Overlapping Templates 148 
11 Universal 1 
12 Approximate Entropy 18 
13 Random Excursions 1 
14 Random Excursions Variant 1 
15 Linear Complexity 1 
16 Serial 8 
NIST 800-22 suite test consists of 16 main tests aiming to verify the randomness of 
the input sequences (see table 8-1). Some of these tests are decomposed to sub-tests; 
thus, the total number of tests is 188 tests in NIST 800-22 suite (see table 8-2). The 
test aims to confirm the existence of non-randomness in the generated bit sequence. 
The generated sequences based on the three pseudorandom number generators 
(LPRNG, MLPRNG, and PRNGT) were tested using NIST SP800-22 suite test to 
prove their randomness. Significance level (α) and sequence length determine that 
the pass criteria α is set to 0.01 for all tests of p-values. Each generator is used to 
generate 1000 samples, m = 103, of 1-Mbit sequence size, n = 106. The experimental 
results confirm that LPRNG and MLPRNG failed in most tests with sample sizes 
bigger than 10 (see table 8-3). Conversely, the proposed pseudorandom number 





generator (PRNGT) passed all NIST tests with high p-values that confirm the 
randomness of the generated sequences (see table 8-4).  
Table  8-2: NIST 800 – 22 suite test parameters value 
Test Type Parameter Value 
The Block Frequency  Block Size 128 
The Non-overlapping Template  Block Size 9 
The Overlapping Template  Block Size 9 
Maurer’s “Universal”  Block Size 7 
Maurer’s “Universal”  Number of Blocks 1280 
The Approximate Entropy  Block Size 10 
The Serial  Block Size 16 
The Linear Complexity  Sequence Length 500 
Table  8-3: NIST statistical test suite for MLPRNG and LPRNG generators with α = 
0.01, m = 103, and n = 106 
Statistical Test 
LPRNG MLPRNG 
P-value Result P-value Result 
Frequency  0.000 Failed 0.000 Failed 
Block Frequency (m = 128)  0.000 Failed 0.000 Failed 
Cusum-Forward  0.000 Failed 0.000 Failed 
Cusum-Reverse  0.000 Failed 0.000 Failed 
Runs  0.000 Failed 0.000 Failed 
Long Runs of Ones  0.000 Failed 0.000 Failed 
Rank   0.000 Failed 0.009467 Passed 
FFT  0.000 Failed 0.000 Failed 
NonOverlapping Templates  
(m = 9, B = 000000001)  0.000 Failed 0.000 Failed 
Overlapping Templates (m = 
9)  0.000 Failed 0.000 Failed 
Universal  0.000 Failed 0.000 Failed 
Approximate Entropy (m = 10)  0.000 Failed 0.000 Failed 
Random Excursions (x = +1)  0.213309 Passed 0.593823 Passed 
Random Excursions Variant (x 
= -1)  0.122325 Passed 0.357274 Passed 
Linear Complexity (M = 500)  0.000 Failed 0.002447 Passed 
Serial (m = 16, ∇Ψ ଶ
௠
  ) 0.000 Failed 0.000 Failed 





Distribution histograms have been plotted for the resulting p-value from each test of 
NIST suite test for generated sequences using PRNGT. If the calculated p-valuep of 
the p-values ≥ 0.001, it will considered uniformly distributed. 1000 samples of binary 
sequences have been generated by the proposed generator and each one is of size 106 
(n = 106 and m = 103). P-value interval [0, 1] is divided into 10 equal sub-intervals 
and the number of p-values are counted for each sub-interval and plotted for each test 
(see Figures 8-14 and 8-15). It is clear from all calculated p-valuep of p-values, p-
valuep≥ 0.0001 and p-values are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1]. 
Moreover, the proportions of passed test sequences have been calculated for each 
NIST test. Then, we compare these values with acceptable confidence interval of p-
values. The quantitative analysis test results show that proportions lie inside the 
acceptable confidence interval [0.980561, 0.999439] as shown in Figure 8-16.  
Table  8-4: NIST statistical test suite for PRNGT generator with α = 0.01, m = 103, 
and n = 106 
Statistical Test PRNGT P-value Proportion Conclusion 
Frequency  0.298282 0.985 Passed 
Block Frequency (m = 128)  0.190654 0.990 Passed 
Cusum-Forward  0.676615 0.985 Passed 
Cusum-Reverse  0.166260 0.986 Passed 
Runs  0.989425 0.992 Passed 
Long Runs of Ones  0.628790 0.986 Passed 
Rank   0.025708 0.997 Passed 
FFT  0.966626 0.988 Passed 
NonOverlapping Templates  
(m = 9, B = 000000001)  0.587274 0.991 Passed 
Overlapping Templates (m = 9)  0.068571 0.988 Passed 
Universal  0.461612 0.989 Passed 
Approximate Entropy (m = 10)  0.007694 0.993 Passed 
Random Excursions (x = +1)  0.587748 0.989 Passed 
Random Excursions Variant (x = -1)  0.917766 0.994 Passed 
Linear Complexity (M = 500)  0.796268 0.988 Passed 
Serial (m = 16, ∇Ψ ଶ
௠
  ) 0.911413 0.989 Passed 






Figure  8-14: P-values histograms of parameterized NIST 800-22 suite tests 
 
Figure  8-15: P-values histograms of non-parameterized NIST 800-22 suite tests. 






Figure  8-16: PRNGT proportions of sequences passing NIST 800-22 suite test for 
(a) non-parameterized tests (b) parameterized tests. The acceptable proportions range 
between the dashed lines. 
8.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, we proposed a new triangle-chaotic map (TCM) with high-
intensity chaotic areas over infinite interval. The proposed chaotic map has very 
strong chaotic properties such as very high sensitivity to initial conditions, random-
like, uniformly distributed population, deterministic nature, unpredictability, high 
positive Lyapunov exponent values, and perfect chaotic behaviour over infinite 
positive interval. TCM chaotic map is a one-way function that prevents the finding of 
a relationship between the successive output values and increases the randomness of 
output results. Furthermore, a novel pseudorandom number generator based on TCM 
map (PRNGT) for high security applications is proposed that can be implemented in 
parallel to achieve high efficiency. The proposed generator produces high-
randomness pseudorandom sequences that were confirmed by passing all NIST 800-
22 suite standard statistical tests with high p-values and excellent statistical 
properties. Moreover, we analyzed the security and statistical properties of generated 
sequences based on logistic map (LPRNG) and modified logistic map (MLPRNG) 
using NIST 800-22 suite test. The analysis results confirmed that the generated 
sequences based on the two generators are non-random with sample size bigger than 
10. TCM characteristics are encouraging for possible utilization in designing new 
security primitives. 
 





9. Conclusion and Future Works 
In this chapter, a summary of our work in this thesis is given and can be classified 
into five parts: cryptanalysis of chaotic hash function; designing new chaos-based 
hash functions; designing new chaos-based encryption algorithm; designing new 
chaos-based pseudorandom number generator; cryptanalysis of chaotic 
pseudorandom number generators; and new chaotic system. Moreover, remarks and 
future directions on designing chaos-based security primitives are given.  
9.1 Conclusion of this Thesis 
ver recent years, electronic commerce has developed amazingly rapidly; 
people have become dependent on the Internet to use many electronic 
commerce services include online shopping, order-tracking, online 
payments and online money transfers. The security of electronic commerce is very 
necessary as it is considered the most important requirement for the success of 
electronic commerce. The integrity of many traditional security algorithms remains 
at risk including MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, Triple DES, RC6, AES and many other 
algorithms. Therefore, designing new security algorithms is needed for electronic 
commerce to grantee safety of information in transactions over the Internet 
(integrity), identification of parties involved in online transactions (authentication), 
O 




ensuring that only authorized people can access the information (confidentiality), and 
preventing denial of the transaction (non-repudiation).  
Customers and merchants are very concerned about the security of electronic 
commerce applications such as Internet banking, online shopping and online 
payments. The security of electronic commerce is built based on the security of hash 
functions, encryption algorithms and pseudorandom number generators. These 
primitives are used to ensure the integrity of data transactions, privacy of sensitive or 
personal information of sellers and buyers, non-repudiation of buyers and 
authentication of sellers. Therefore, the construction of fast and secure security 
primitives is essential to protect electronic commerce applications and protocols. The 
construction of security primitives based on chaotic systems would provide a high 
level of security and performance for electronic commerce. 
To this end, designing fast and secure new security algorithms based on chaotic 
systems to guarantee integrity, authentication and confidentiality is essential for 
electronic commerce development. In this thesis, we explored comprehensively the 
analysis and design of security primitives based on chaotic systems for electronic 
commerce: hash functions, encryption algorithms and pseudorandom number 
generators. The main purpose of this thesis is to design new, fast and secure hash 
functions, encryption algorithms and pseudorandom number generators based on 
chaotic systems for electronic commerce. In addition, we have studied and analyzed 
the security of chaos-based hash functions and pseudorandom number generators.  
9.1.1 Contribution of this Thesis  
This thesis involves several aspects of analysis and design of chaos-based 
cryptography algorithms for electronic commerce: hash functions, block cipher and 
pseudorandom number generators. One of the proposed hash functions and one 
pseudorandom number generator are analyzed. Moreover, two hash functions, block 
cipher encryption algorithm, pseudorandom number generator and chaotic map are 
proposed. The original key contributions in this thesis are addressed by the 
following:  




1- A chaotic hash function algorithm based on a tent map (CBHF) was 
proposed. We realized that the proposed hash function has a weak design and 
directly exploited to tent map. Therefore, we carefully studied its design and 
then analyzed its resistance to collisions. In this research, we explained in 
detail how to break keyed and unkeyed versions of CBHF mathematically. 
Moreover, real collision examples of keyed and unkeyed versions were given.  
2- After analyzing the security of the CBHF hash function, we designed a fast 
parallel hash function based on chaotic maps for electronic commerce 
applications. Simple chaotic maps are used with the control parameter of a 
positive Lyapunov exponent value to provide high security and better 
performance. Several analyses and computer simulations are performed to 
show the security and performance of our proposed hash function. The 
proposed hash function is satisfying the cryptographic hash function 
characteristics. Moreover, the proposed hash function is compared with other 
proposed hash function algorithms and a comparison between parallel and 
sequential modes is made. Overall comparison results show that the proposed 
parallel hash function algorithm outperforms other algorithms.   
3- In recent years, several chaotic block cipher encryption algorithms have been 
proposed. Some of the proposed chaotic encryption algorithms had major 
problems such as vulnerability to different types of attacks, inflexibility and 
slow speed. This motivated us to design and implement a new, fast block 
cipher encryption algorithm based on chaotic maps (BCCM) by utilizing 
chaotic maps for electronic commerce applications. The security and 
performance of the proposed algorithm is analyzed using well-known 
computer simulations and theoretical analysis in this field. Both experimental 
results and computer simulations confirm that the proposed chaotic block 
cipher encryption algorithm satisfies the cryptographic properties. 
4- Experimental results confirmed that the whole encryption process of BCCM 
algorithm is extremely sensitive to any change or changes in the input 
message and/or secret key. These properties suggest that the BCCM 
encryption function could be adopted in designing a new cryptography hash 




function. We propose a fast chaotic hash function based on BCCM 
encryption algorithm with changeable parameters (HBCCM). The proposed 
hash function produces different lengths of hash values based on different 
chaotic systems with variable parameters. Comparing the results of the 
proposed hash function with other cryptographic hash functions shows that 
the proposed hash function has a performance equivalent to that of SHA-1. 
These characteristics confirm that this hash function is practical and reliable 
with high potential to be adopted for secure and fast applications. 
5- Most of the well-known chaotic maps show chaotic behaviour over small 
regions with certain parameter values. Moreover, within the chaotic areas 
there are some regions of n-periodic window with small values of n (2, 3, 
6…), which can be exploited by attackers to help them attack the 
cryptographic systems that fall in these regions. Therefore, we designed a 
new triangle-chaotic map with full chaotic population and a very large value 
of periodic window. Triangle-chaotic map analysis shows its perfect chaotic 
behaviour, great sensitivity to initial conditions, unpredictability, and 
intensive chaotic population with full positive Lyapunov exponent values 
over an infinite interval. These properties confirm that the proposed triangle-
chaotic map can be adopted for many applications in many disciplines such 
as high-security applications, computer science, engineering, mathematics, 
physics and economics. 
6- A cryptographic secure pseudorandom number generator is used to provide 
high security for several cryptographic applications such as key generation 
and digital signature. In this research, a new cryptographic secure 
pseudorandom number generator based on the proposed triangle-chaotic map 
is presented. The PRNGT generator is designed based on a combination of 
two TCM maps running side by side and starting from independent initial 
conditions. The proposed generator was tested using the well-known NIST 
800-22 suite test, which is designed to test cryptographic random and 
pseudorandom number generators, and compared with two other generators 
based on a logistic map and modified version of a logistic map, respectively. 




The tests and comparison results showed randomness of the proposed 
generator output and non-randomness of the other two logistic generators’ 
outputs. Therefore, the proposed generator is a high-potential candidate for 
high-security applications such as online payments and online banking 
systems.  
9.1.2 Results and Discussion of Individual Chapters 
Here is a brief summary of each chapter of this thesis. 
 Chapter 4: Cryptanalysis of Chaos-based Hash Function 
In 2009, Amin et al. suggested a new hash function based on chaotic systems for 
cryptography applications (CBHF). In this chapter, we show how to break the 
recently proposed unkeyed hash function based on chaos theory (CBHF). Our attacks 
show that we can easily find two different messages that have the same hash value. 
In addition, we show how to break the keyed version of CBHF by adding different 
blocks at the end of the original message without changing the final hash value. We 
can find a large number of collisions for each message using our analysis technique. 
Therefore, neither keyed nor unkeyed hash versions of CBHF are at all secure. 
Advanced research on chaotic hash functions is needed to design a new family of 
secure hash functions for cryptography and e-commerce applications.   
 Chapter 5: Fast Parallel Hash Functions Based on Chaotic Maps for 
eCommerce (PHFC). 
In this chapter, we propose a fast, parallel, chaos-based hash function called PHFC. 
Coupled chaotic maps with high chaotic behaviour are used in design PHFC 
functions: subkey generation, round hash function, and chaotic hash mixing function. 
PHFC is a very flexible hash function that generates different lengths of hash values 
using different chaotic maps: PHFC-128, PHFC-160, PHFC-224, PHFC-256, PHFC-
384, and PHFC-512. The proposed hash function can be implemented as keyed and 
unkeyed hash function based on chaotic systems. We have compared the proposed 
hash function with two well-know hash functions (SHA-1, MD5) and five other 
chaos-based hash functions; the comparison results showed that PHFC outperforms 




many other existing hash functions. We performed several analyses and computer 
simulations on PHFC hash function, including hash value sensitivity to any 
change(s), hash space distribution, statistical analysis of diffusion and confusion, 
collision resistance analysis, number of hash rounds, implementation and flexibility, 
and speed analysis to verify its characteristics. The simulations and analyses results 
show that PHFC satisfies the characteristics and conditions of cryptography hash 
functions such as collision resistance, high bit confusion and diffusion, uniform 
distribution, flexibility and fast speed. PHFC is practical and reliable, and has 
efficient hash functions with high potential for adoption in e-commerce applications 
and protocols. 
 Chapter 6: Fast Encryption Algorithm Based on Chaotic Maps for 
eCommerce (BCCM) 
In this chapter, we proposed a novel, fast block cipher encryption algorithm based on 
chaotic systems. The proposed algorithm (BCCM) works with different parameters 
such as block size, number of rounds, secret key length and chaotic maps. BCCM 
processes n-bits of plaintext and produces the same size of ciphertext with k-bit key 
size. It generates several subkeys from a single secret key using a simple one-
dimensional chaotic map. The proposed algorithm has chaotic subkeys generation, 
chaotic columns-mixing and chaotic rows-shifting that provide high security and 
confusion and diffusion properties. We performed several analyses and computer 
simulations on the BCCM encryption algorithm, including images encryption and 
decryption, modes of operation effects, correlation coefficient analysis, information 
entropy analysis, and execution time with different parameters to verify its 
characteristics. The simulations and analyses results show that the algorithm satisfies 
the characteristics and conditions of a secure cryptography block cipher. Moreover, 
we have compared the BCCM with two well-know block ciphers (DES, RC6) and 
one chaos-based block cipher; the comparison results showed that BCCM 
outperforms these algorithms. BCCM is confirmed as a good candidate for 
texts/images encryption with high flexibility, confusion and diffusion, and fast speed. 
These characteristics confirmed that the proposed algorithm has high potential for 
adoption for e-commerce. 




 Chapter 7: Fast Hash Function Based on BCCM Encryption Algorithm 
for eCommerce (HBCCM) 
In this chapter, we propose HBCCM as a new hash function based on BCCM block 
cipher encryption algorithm. HBCCM is very simple, flexible and sensitive to any 
change (s) in the input message of the secret key. It processes input messages of 
different lengths to generate different hash value lengths based on different chaotic 
systems. Moreover, it can be used to calculate the correspondence hash value of 
input messages as texts or images with high confusion and diffusion properties. We 
performed several analyses and computer simulations on HBCCM hash function, 
including hash value sensitivity to any change(s), hash space distribution for image 
and text as an input, statistical analysis of diffusion and confusion, collision 
resistance analysis, number of hash rounds, implementation and flexibility, and speed 
analysis to verify its characteristics. The simulations and analyses results show that 
the algorithm satisfies the characteristics and conditions of cryptography hash 
functions. Comparisons between HBCCM and other hash functions show that 
HBCCM outperforms all the other algorithms. HBCCM is fast hashing scheme, with 
high potential for adoption for e-Commerce applications. 
 Chapter 8: A Novel Pseudorandom Number Generator Based on New 
Triangle-Chaotic Map for High Security Applications 
Some existing chaotic maps have several limitations such as small size of periodic 
and partial chaotic population. In this chapter, we proposed a new triangle-chaotic 
map (TCM) with high-intensity chaotic areas over infinite interval. The proposed 
chaotic map has very strong chaotic properties such as very high sensitivity to initial 
conditions, random-like, uniformly distributed population, deterministic nature, 
unpredictability, high positive Lyapunov exponent values, and perfect chaotic 
behaviour over infinite positive interval. TCM chaotic map is a one-way function 
that prevents the discovery of the relationship between the successive output values 
and increases the randomness of output results. Furthermore, a novel pseudorandom 
number generator-based TCM map (PRNGT) for cryptography application is 
proposed that can be implemented in parallel to achieve high efficiency. The 




proposed generator produces highly random pseudorandom sequences that are 
confirmed by passing all NIST 800-22 suite standard statistical tests with high p-
values and excellent statistical properties. Moreover, we analyzed the security and 
the statistical properties of generated sequences based on a logistic map (LPRNG) 
and a modified logistic map (MLPRNG) using NIST 800-22 suite test. The analysis 
results confirmed that the generated sequences based on the two generators are non-
random with sample size bigger than 10. TCM characteristics are encouraging in 
terms of its potential utilization in designing new security primitives. 
9.2 Perspective of Future Research 
There are three very important challenges in the chaotic cryptography research 
area: security, performance and stability within chaotic areas. One essential 
requirement of any cryptographic system is its security and resistance to any kind of 
attack. Unfortunately, some of the proposed chaotic cryptography algorithms suffer 
from either security or performance problems, whereas some chaotic cryptography 
algorithms provide high security at the expense of performance. Therefore, those two 
requirements must be considered together to design fast and secure chaotic 
cryptography algorithms. Moreover, most chaotic systems exhibit chaotic behaviour 
with specific parameter values and, within the chaotic areas, non-chaotic areas still 
exist. Unfortunately, this could be utilized by researchers to break chaotic 
cryptography systems. Thus, the choice of chaotic system and its parameters must be 
made based on deep studies and analysis. 
9.2.1 Remarks for Designing a Good Chaotic Cryptography 
There are many important issues that should be considered in chaotic 
cryptography. Providing high security and good preference in chaotic cryptography 
is very important, and these mainly depend on the selection of a good chaotic system. 
Evaluating certain dynamical properties, security, and performance of chaotic 
cryptography using appropriate analyses and computer simulations is essential. 
Remarks on future research in chaotic cryptography are listed below: 




1. A well-designed cryptography system provides high security and fast 
computation speed. Security and performance of chaos-based cryptography 
systems mainly depend on the selected chaotic system and the algorithm’s 
internal structure, and/or secret key. Smaller computation cost is achieved by 
selecting a simpler chaotic system, but evaluating certain dynamical 
properties of the chaotic system is crucial. Parallel implementation would be 
useful to implement complex chaotic cryptography systems that provide fast 
and secure cryptography for many applications such as e-commerce and 
online banking.  
2. Chaotic system parameters are chosen carefully with a large positive 
Lyapunov exponent value and no stability islands. A chaotic system with a 
large exponent value means that the chaotic system with certain parameter 
values is sensitive to initial condition and behaviour chaotically. A logistic 
map is one of the simplest chaotic systems, which shows chaotic behaviour 
over a small parameter range (3.57 ≥ r ≥ 4) and full chaotic population with r 
= 4. It shows non-chaotic behaviour (stability) within the chaotic interval.  
3. Uniform distribution of most chaotic cryptosystems depends on the properties 
distribution of the chaotic system orbit. A chaotic system with non-uniform 
distribution reduces the quality of the diffusion property. Moreover, the 
security of some encryption algorithms is based on chaotic pseudorandom 
sequence. Thus, if the chaotic system has non-uniform distribution, the 
relationship between plaintext and cipher text will be deduced. 
4. The secret key is composed of several subkeys in some chaotic cryptography 
systems. Sometimes, partial knowledge of the key can lead to the deduction 
of all the other subkeys; this can be prevented if the different subkeys are 
uncorrelated.  In some chaotic cryptography systems, the subkey generation 
is based on a chaotic system, by iterating the chaotic system using the secret 
key as initial condition.  
5. The secret keys of chaotic cryptography systems are the values of initial 
condition and the control parameter of the chaotic system, or these values are 




derived from the secret key. The link between secret key and the control 
parameters has to be established carefully to ensure that the chaotic system is 
evolving in a chaotic way. Otherwise, the chaotic system evolves non-
chaotically and the security level of the chaotic cryptography system can be 
reduced significantly. Large secret key parameter space is very important to 
prevent an exhaustive search attack.  Moreover, generation of subkeys based 
on a chaotic system should be with a parameter value of large Lyapunov 
exponent value.    
6. Implementing chaotic systems on digital computers using finite-precision 
may cause dynamical degradation as the dynamical properties of computers 
are different from the theoretical ones. Consideration of this issue is very 
important as it could affect the performance and security of the chaotic 
cryptography system. Higher precisions, cascading multiple chaotic systems 
or random perturbation of the chaotic systems could be used to solve the 
digital degradation problem. Cascading multiple chaotic systems could 
provide highly secure chaotic cryptography systems, but at the expense of 
computation time.  
7.  In chaos-based cryptography, using a single, simple operation such as XOR 
operation mixed with chaotic systems could help attackers to break the 
system. Moreover, the padding process of adding one “1” followed by a 
number of zeros “0” (100…0)2 could help attackers to find collisions; this 
could be solved by padding the length of the input message at the end of the 
last block. 
9.2.2 Future Work 
In closing this chapter, possibilities for future work directions are summarized as 
follows:  
 Design and analysis chaos-based public key algorithms 
Cryptography algorithms are divided into three main categories: cryptography hash 
function, symmetric cryptosystem, and asymmetric cryptosystem. A cryptosystem is 




a cryptographic algorithm that depends on certain parameters called keys. 
Cryptography hash function can be further divided into two main categories: keyed 
hash function and unkeyed hash function. In addition, a symmetric cryptosystem uses 
one key to encrypt and decrypt messages that can be further divided into block cipher 
and stream cipher. On the other hand, an asymmetric cryptosystem uses two keys to 
encrypt/decrypt an input message. In this thesis, we analyse and design chaos-based 
keyed hash function, unkeyed hash function, block cipher and stream cipher. A few 
chaos-based asymmetric algorithms have been proposed in the literature, but they are 
not of the standard level as they lack deep study and analyses. Therefore, the analysis 
and design of asymmetric key cryptosystem based on chaotic system is a promising 
route to the designing of very secure and fast algorithms for high-security 
applications.  
 Cryptanalysis some chaos-based cryptography algorithms 
Over the past two decades, a tremendous number of papers have been published on 
chaos-based cryptography including block ciphers, cryptography hash functions and 
pseudorandom number generators. Simultaneously, many cryptanalytic researchers 
have analyzed some of the proposed chaos-based cryptography algorithms which 
proved to be insecure and/or slow. Therefore, we believe deep analyses of these 
algorithms are still needed to attack and/or improve the insecure algorithm; this will 
be reflected optimistically in the progress of this research area. 
 Adopting Triangle-Chaotic Map  
A novel triangle-chaotic map designed with full chaotic population over infinite 
interval is proposed. Triangle-chaotic map analysis shows its perfect chaotic 
behaviour, great sensitivity to initial conditions, unpredictability, and intensive 
chaotic population with full positive Lyapunov exponent values over infinite interval. 
Therefore, adopting the triangle-chaotic map in designing new security primitives 
could provide cryptography algorithms with high security. Moreover, it can be 
adopted in many disciplines including computer science, engineering, mathematics, 
physics and economics. 




 Design and analysis chaos-based stream cipher algorithms 
In chapter 8, we propose a novel pseudorandom number generator based on a chaotic 
system. The proposed generator can be used to provide high security for many 
cryptography systems such as digital signature, secret key of DES algorithm, and 
prime numbers in RSA. Moreover, it can be used in stream cipher encryption 
algorithms as a keystream by simply XORing the keystream with the plaintext to 
provide ciphertext. Therefore, we believe further research can be conducted to 
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Figure A- 1: Logistic map bifurcation diagram with t[3.8, 3.9] 
 
 







Figure A- 3: Modified logistic map bifurcation diagram with t[4, 8] 
 
 






Figure A- 5: Modified logistic map bifurcation diagram with t[8, 12] 
 
 








Figure A- 7: Modified logistic map bifurcation diagram with t[12, 16] 
 
 








Figure B- 1: TCM chaotic map bifurcation diagram with t[4, 8] 
 
 






Figure B- 3: TCM chaotic map bifurcation diagram with t[8, 12] 
 
 






Figure B- 5: TCM chaotic map bifurcation diagram with t[12, 14] 
 
 






Figure B- 7: TCM chaotic map bifurcation diagram with t[32, 36] 
 
 






Figure B- 9: TCM chaotic map bifurcation diagram with t[10, 14] 
 
 








Condition 1: The original message as it is. 
Condition 2: Change first character "A" in the original message to "B". 
Condition 3: Change the first character in word "cryptographic" from "c" small letter 
to "C" capital letter.  
Condition 4: Remove the full stop from the end of the statement. 
Condition 5: Remove the blank space between "A" and "cryptographic". 
Condition 6: Change the word "data" in original message to "bata". 
Condition 7: Add a blank space at the end of the original message. 
Condition 8: Calculate the hash value with K0 = 0.989741855821374191455. 
Condition 9: Change the secret key to K0 = 0.989741855821374191456. 
Condition 10: Change the secret key to K0 = 0.989741855821374191457. 
The correspondence calculated 160-bit hash values in hexadecimal format for each 
condition as follows:  
Condition 1: 44 15 51 1B 3D DF DC 6D 55 B9 B0 23 29 AB E6 20 D4 D4 BF BF 
Condition 2: 13 92 7A 4E 75 0D 8D 48 3A 74 D3 9C 96 47 BB 67 04 27 A5 33 
Condition 3: AA 4D 87 D7 9D DE 6E D3 E3 58 F0 07 F8 05 8C 0F 79 B3 03 54 
Condition 4: FA 08 CE A3 1E BC BB 35 7A 0F B1 1E 37 7D 41 E1 A0 41 FA FD 
Condition 5: E6 FE F0 9A C8 4C C6 4E 37 A5 90 13 46 ED FB 13 DE A7 CF 47 
Condition 6: 62 80 03 87 10 18 25 5F 7D 70 F4 CB 18 3E FA 4C DC 96 43 87 
Condition 7: 3B 7F C0 8D BE 3C F6 38 75 31 51 AE 7A C9 99 78 09 2B 83 66 
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Condition 8: 74 BB 46 1D C5 BE 6F 9E 12 9C B9 C7 DF BC 2D 78 E9 77 2E 2D 
Condition 9: E0 B2 15 03 F1 6C B6 26 29 DF A6 ED 9F 22 09 3B 05 84 5D 02 



















Scenario 1:  The original message as it is. 
Scenario 2: Change the first character “T” in the original message into “U”. 
Scenario 3: Change the first character “s” small letter in the word "security" to "S" 
capital letter.  
Scenario 4: Remove the full stop from the end of the statement. 
Scenario 5: Remove the first blank space in “The computer”. 
Scenario 6: Change the word “to” in the original message into “do”. 
Scenario 7: Change the word “programs” in the original message into 
“programmes”. 
Scenario 8: Add a blank space to the end of the original message. 
Scenario 9: Add the number zero at the beginning of the original message. 
Scenario 10: Remove the comma after the word “data”.  
Scenario 11: k = (2F050FE938943ACC45F65567FFFFFFFFF)16 is the used key.  
Scenario 12: k = (2F050FE938943ACC45F65567FFFFFFFFD)16 is the used key.  
Correspondence hash values in hexadecimal format for each of the previous 
scenarios are as follows:  
Scenario 1:  
1D B4 03 A7 BA 17 5B 51 10 E2 51 FC 53 CE 0B CE AB 55 96 F7 99 B2 E7 1F F7 
C0 7D D9 89 6A A0 FD 
Scenario 2:   
F4 58 9F 14 E0 B3 06 21 6B DE DF 6D 55 6E DC 3A 0D 3A EE A6 01 75 AC 62 
61 88 2C 49 46 7B 26 03 
Scenario 3:   
BA 54 C0 28 33 7C 73 A2 BE 76 67 5B 73 8A 6B 2C 5D CC A8 61 3B 5F 06 8F C0 
86 21 49 BF 07 F0 91 
Scenario 4:  
EB 63 91 2F 05 19 FC 1F F9 AC CC FE E9 9F 4B 48 FF 5B 18 5A 16 E1 DF A1 B0 
E3 58 57 46 F5 A1 5E 
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Scenario 5:  
48 E4 7B E0 33 38 D8 35 A0 01 39 0E 48 71 B4 79 BC 36 16 88 EA 8F 4F B1 40 
96 ED 53 22 3F 16 3F 
Scenario 6:  
EC 4B 81 7E 73 22 A0 E1 5A CE 08 4B 8A C8 BD C1 01 B0 D9 EF C5 3C D5 4A 
E9 B0 A5 61 27 C5 EF 09 
Scenario 7:  
B3 91 A4 E6 0A 79 81 D3 DC F1 55 BE 7A 5B CE FC 8A B7 59 2E 2E 3E 0C 45 
FB 89 C6 41 2A 67 2B 7E 
Scenario 8:  
63 84 36 51 CF D7 EA 00 2F A6 F2 58 D0 FA 92 4E 45 79 4C 32 2B B4 C7 FF 10 
10 B2 FC 25 00 C8 E4 
Scenario 9:  
EE 6C 00 77 B5 27 43 97 EA DE D9 72 59 80 15 5E EE F0 D9 56 0F 44 E0 AC 5D 
B6 C7 ED FA 51 86 EF 
Scenario 10:  
BB 08 75 DC 8D 1B 6A 07 5D 29 C3 70 74 8D 89 D9 C6 29 BF AC 81 1C BD A9 
5C 22 74 63 F4 67 44 80 
Scenario 11:  
8F 29 3F 24 D3 9C 88 CC EF 55 78 F6 48 AC A0 91 B3 A4 0D 88 1D AD 62 D6 84 
43 73 D8 31 9B A2 24 
Scenario 12: 
12 61 EC 23 72 C9 76 A5 FB 8D 3D FB 2C 95 EA EF 89 5D 0C 4A 5E 8F 15 33 FF 





Scenario 1: Ayham image with 8-bit greyscale is used. 
Scenario 2: Add 1 to the value of the pixel located at the upper left corner. 
Scenario 3: Subtract 1 from the value of the pixel located at the upper left corner. 
Scenario 4: Add 1 to the value of the pixel located at index x = 250, y = 188. 
Scenario 5: Add 1 to the value of the pixel located at the lower right corner. 
Scenario 6: Subtract 1 from the value of the pixel located at the lower right corner. 
Scenario 7: Change the last digit in the key from number F to E. 
Scenario 8: Change the last digit in the key from number F to 0. 
The calculated 256-bit hash values in hexadecimal format for each of the previous 
scenarios are as follows:  
Scenario 1:  
E7 90 B2 C1 A8 F1 A5 7E 8B C1 53 0A AE BB 25 71 D3 5 8 03 17 A7 4F F2 D2 
A6 B2 51 01 B8 1B 44 DC 
Scenario 2:  
55 DF F3 19 A0 2F A4 58 5A 37 C3 4C 4D A6 B5 B8 ED BB EF C4 48 4F A1 CF 
04 A4 57 7D 38 9D 27 92 
Scenario 3:  
42 27 72 5B1 90 868 F7 44 5B9 2D0 E6 CE 58 2B F1 48 81 77 B4 09 CB A1 7A D6 
24 66 18 79 3A F8 
Scenario 4:  
53 DB 4D 77 73 15 75 93 56 C2 53 81 96 78 7B 37 0F 2C 4C C1 20 EC 04 5F A3 





09 EF 06 66 73 93 BB 7C F6 C4 97 AD DE 2C 0E 10 41 A7 16 DD E2 96 98 66 94 
00 5D 56 D2 E2 D1 79 
Scenario 6:  
70 10 87 DB 7D 13 4F B4 02 0E D3 86 E6 5C 35 D7 00 35 C6 54 D2 74 43 12 A8 
0A 37 AA 86 3F D9 C6  
Scenario 7:  
21 83 3C A7 CA 87 0E 32 CB DD 7D C7 F3 ED BB 8F FA 7D 0D A7 C5 76 95 16 
EA 1D C2 36 B9 35 EF CA 
Scenario 8:  
62 08 4E B6 9C 05 83 AE 23 2E 35 EC 19 8E 12 2E E5 A4 A8 7F 13 A5 72 29 8F 













NIST Statistical suite test 
NIST (National Institute of Standard Technologies) developed a statistical 
package to test the randomness of generated bit sequences for cryptography 
applications  [211]. It contains 16 tests and each test contains several subtests. The 
focus of these tests is to confirm the existence of non-randomness in the input bit 
sequences. A number of tests have chi-square (x2) and standard normal to refer to 
distribution. In each test, p-value for each sample in the sequence will be computed, 
thus m p-values will be computed for each test. A p-value of greater than or equal to 
α = 0.01 would be considered a random sequence with a confidence level of 99%. A 
p-value of less than α = 0.01 would be considered a non-random sequence with a 
confidence level of 99%.   
The recommended significance level (α) value is in the range 0.0001 ≤ α ≤ 0.01. For 
the statistical tests in this paper the value of α has been chosen to be 0.01. If the 
computed p-value is greater than the chosen significance level (α = 0.01), the 
sequence will be considered a random sequence. In random sequences, if the chosen 
value of α is 0.01, it would be acceptable to reject only one sequence out of each 100 
sequences. The computed p-values of p-values should be greater than 0.001 to be 
considered uniformly distributed. We can broadly classify these tests into two main 
types: parameterized tests and non-parameterized tests. In the following subsection, 
we will describe the NIST suite test in high-level description.  
1. Non-parameterized tests 
1.1 Frequency (Monobit) Test 
A frequency test concentrates on the number of ones and zeros in generated 
bit sequences. This test aims to find out whether the number of zeros and ones in an 
input bit sequence are roughly equal to the number expected for a truly random input 
sequence. The proportions of ones and zeros should be very close to each other. 
Based on the number of zeros and ones in the sequence, the p-value will be 
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computed. The input sequence is concluded to be a random sequence if the computed 
p-value is greater than or equal to 0.01. Otherwise, the input sequence is concluded 
to be a non-random sequence. The minimum input sequence length (n) in this test is 
recommended to be 100 bits. All other NIST suite test tests depend on passing this 
test.  
1.2 Run Test 
A run test concentrates on the entire number of runs in the input sequences. 
This test aims to find out whether the number of runs of zeros and ones is as 
expected for an input random sequence of different length. A run is a continuous 
sequence of matching bits. A run of size l-bit consists of l matching bits. This test 
helps to determine whether the fluctuation between ones and zeros is very slow or 
very fast. The input sequence is concluded to be a random sequence if the computed 
p-value is greater than or equal to 0.01. Otherwise, the input sequence is concluded 
to be a non-random sequence. The minimum length of input sequence (n) in this test 
is recommended to be 100 bits. 
1.3 Longest Run Test 
A frequency test concentrates on the longest run of ones within a block of l 
bits size. This test aims to find out whether the length of the longest run of ones of 
the input sequences is steady with the length of the longest run of ones expected in 
input random sequences. The main focus of this test is on longest run of ones, but it 
implies the longest run of zeros. P-values are used to determine whether the input 
sequences are random or not. The input sequence is concluded to be a random 
sequence if the computed p-value is greater than or equal to 0.01. Otherwise, the 
input sequence is concludes to be a non-random sequence. The minimum input 
sequence length (n) in this test depends on sub-block size. 
1.4 Binary Matrix Rank Test 
The rank test concentrates on the rank of disjointed sub-matrices of complete input 
sequences. This test aims to check for linear dependence between fixed-length 
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streams of input sequence. The input sequence is concluded to be a random sequence 
if the computed p-value is greater than or equal to 0.01. Otherwise, the input 
sequence is concluded to be a non-random sequence. The minimum input sequence 
length (n) in this test is recommended to be 38MQ, where M and Q are the number of 
rows and columns in each matrix, respectively. 
1.5 Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) Test  
The DFT test concentrates on testing the peak highest in the Discrete Fourier 
Transform of the input bits sequence. This test aims to find out the nearby repetitive 
patterns in the input sequence that could deviate from the random sequence. This test 
detects whether the number of peaks that are greater than the threshold (95%) is 
considerably different from 5% (1.00-0.95) (see equation F-1).  If the calculated test 
value exceeds the threshold value (95%), then we conclude the sequence is not 
random. Otherwise, we conclude the sequence is random. The input sequence is 
concluded to be a random sequence if the computed p-value is greater than or equal 
to 0.01. Otherwise, the input sequence is concluded to be a non-random sequence. 









        ( 9-1) 
1.6 Cumulative Sum Test 
Cumulative sum (Cusum) test concentrates on the random walk highest 
excursion (from zero) in the sequence. This test aims to conclude whether the 
cumulative sum of sub-sequences occurring in the input sequence is very small or 
very large compared with the expected behaviour of the random sequence, which 
may be considered as random walk. Random walk excursions of random sequences 
should be close to zero for random tested sequences. The input sequence is 
concluded to be a random sequence if the computed p-value is greater than or equal 
to 0.01. Otherwise, the input sequence is concluded to be a non-random sequence. 
The minimum input sequence length (n) in this test is recommended to be 100 bits. 
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1.7 Random Excursions Test 
Random Excursions test concentrates on the number of cycles that have 
exactly t visits in Cusum random walk. This test aims to find out whether number of 
visits to specific state within cycle deviates from what we expect for random 
sequence. Cycle random walk consists of unit length steps in the sequence starting 
from one point and returning to the same starting point (ex. 0, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 0). This 
test consists of eight sub-tests and each one has one conclusion for each case: +4, +3, 
+2, +1 and -1, -2, -3, -4. The input sequence is concluded to be a random sequence if 
the computed p-value is greater than or equal to 0.01. Otherwise, the input sequence 
is concluded to be a non-random sequence. The minimum input sequence length (n) 
in this test is recommended to be 106 bits. 
1.8 Random Excursions Variant Test 
Random Excursions Variant test concentrates on the total number of 
occurrences of a specific state in Cusum random walk. This test aims to calculate the 
deviation from the expected number of visits for different states in random walk. 
This test consists of eighteen sub-tests and each one has one conclusion for each 
case: +9, +8, ..., +2, +1 and -1, -2, ..., -8, -9. The input sequence is concluded to be a 
random sequence if the computed p-value is greater than or equal to 0.01. Otherwise, 
the input sequence is concluded to be a non-random sequence. The minimum input 
sequence length (n) in this test is recommended to be 106 bits. 
2. Parameterized tests 
1.9 Frequency Test within Block 
Frequency test within block concentrates on the fraction of ones within a 
certain block size. This test aims to find out the number of ones in a block of size m-
bit. If the number of ones is very close to m/2, the block is assumed to be random. 
Otherwise, it is assumed to be non-random. P-value is computed based on the 
number of ones in the blocks of each sequence.  The input sequence is concluded to 
be a random sequence if the computed p-value is greater than or equal to 0.01. 
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Otherwise, the input sequence is concluded to be a non-random sequence. A small p-
value indicates a big variation from the fraction of ones and zeros in one or more 
blocks. The minimum input sequence length (n) in this test is recommended to be 
100 bits. 
1.10 Non-overlapping Template Matching Test 
Non-overlapping Template Matching test concentrates on the number of 
predefined target strings in the input sequence. This test aims to find out whether 
sequence generators produce sequences with too many given non-periodic patterns. 
The search for patterns of b-bit size will be in a window of the same size. The 
window will shift one bit position until the pattern is found. If the pattern is in the 
current window, the search will be restarted from the bit immediately after the found 
pattern. The input sequence is concluded to be a random sequence if the computed p-
value is greater than or equal to 0.01. Otherwise, the input sequence is concluded to 
be a non-random sequence. The minimum targeted string (template) length (n) in this 
test is recommended to be 9 or 10 bits. 
1.11 Overlapping Template Matching Test 
Overlapping Template Matching test concentrates on the number of 
predefined target strings in the input sequence. The search for patterns of b-bit size 
will be in a window of the same size. The window will shift one bit position until the 
pattern is found. The only difference between overlapping and non-overlapping 
template matching tests is that, in the non-overlapping matching template test, after 
the pattern is found, the sliding will be one bit only before the search is resumed. The 
input sequence is concluded to be a random sequence if the computed p-value is 
greater than or equal to 0.01. Otherwise, the input sequence is concluded to be a non-
random sequence. The minimum-targeted string (template) length (n) in this test is 
recommended to be 9 or 10 bits.  
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1.12 Universal Statistical (Maurer’s) Test  
The Universal Statistical test concentrates on the number of bits between 
similar patterns in the input sequences. This test aims to find out the possibility of 
compressing the input sequence without loss of the information. If the sequence can 
be significantly compressible, then we conclude that the sequence is non-random. 
The input sequence is concluded to be a random sequence if the computed p-value is 
greater than or equal to 0.01. Otherwise, the input sequence is concluded to be a non-
random sequence.  
1.13 Linear Complexity Test 
The Linear Complexity test concentrates on size of a linear feedback shift 
register. This test aims to find out whether the input sequence is complex enough. If 
the size of a linear feedback shift register is too short, the sequence will not be 
complex and will be considered non-random. Otherwise, the sequence will be 
considered complex and random. The input sequence is concluded to be a random 
sequence if the computed p-value is greater than or equal to 0.01. Otherwise, the 
input sequence is concluded to be a non-random sequence. The minimum input 
sequence length (n) in this test is recommended to be 106 bits and the length of each 
block is greater than or equal to 500 and less than or equal to 5000. 
1.14 Serial Test 
The Serial test concentrates on the frequency of every possible overlapping b-bit 
patterns over the entire input sequence. This test aims to find out whether the 
incidence of the 2s b-bit overlapping patterns is roughly same as that expected for a 
random bit sequence. The chance of every b-bit occurring in the sequence is equal to 
any other bit of the same size, which is called uniformity of random sequence. The 
input sequence is concluded to be a random sequence if the computed p-value is 
greater than or equal to 0.01. Otherwise, the input sequence is concluded to be a non-
random sequence. The input sequence length (n) and block length (b) in this test is 
recommended to be such that b < (log2 n)-2. 
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1.15 Approximate Entropy Test 
Approximate Entropy test concentrates on the incidence of every possible 
overlapping b-bit pattern over the complete input sequence. This test aims to 
compare the incidence of two adjacent lengths (b and b+1) of overlapping blocks 
with the expected result for random input sequence. The input sequence is concluded 
to be a random sequence iff the computed p-value is greater than or equal to 0.01. 
Otherwise, the input sequence is concluded to be a non-random sequence. The input 
sequence length (n) and block length (b) in this test is recommended to be such that b 
< (log2 n)-5. 
 
